Islam and the Foundations of Political Power by Abdel Razek, Ali et al.
eCommons@AKU
In Translation: Modern Muslim Thinkers ISMC Series
1-1-2013
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power
Ali Abdel Razek
Maryam Loutfi
Translator
Abdou Filali-Ansary
Editor
Follow this and additional works at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/uk_ismc_series_intranslation
Part of the Islamic World and Near East History Commons
Recommended Citation
Abdel Razek, A. , Loutfi, M. , Filali-Ansary, A. (2013). Islam and the Foundations of Political Power Vol. 2, p. 144.
Available at: http://ecommons.aku.edu/uk_ismc_series_intranslation/1
A
liA
b
d
el
R
azek
Islam
and
the
Foundations
ofPoliticalPow
er
IN TRANSLATION:MODERN MUSLIM THINKERS
IN TRANSLATION:MODERN MUSLIM THINKERS
Series Editor: Abdou Filali-Ansary
This series aims to broaden current debates about Muslim realities which often ignore seminal
works produced in languages other than English. By identifying and translating critical and
innovative thinking that has engendered important debates within its own settings, the series
hopes to introduce new perspectives to the discussions about Muslim civilisations occurring on
the world stage.
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power
Ali Abdel Razek
Translated by Maryam Loutfi
Edited byAbdou Filali-Ansary
‘There could not be a more propitious time for this translation that – almost a century after its publication
– raises issues still relevant to the governance of Muslim societies and authority.’
Azim Nanji, Stanford University
The publication of this essay in Egypt in 1925 took the contemporaries of Ali Abdel Razek by storm.
Challenging fundamental ideas about political power, it was the focus of much attention and the seed of a
heated debate. It was especially potent as at this time the Muslim world was in great turmoil over the
question of the abolition of the caliphate by Mustapha Kamal Ataturk inTurkey.
The essay gave rise to a series of ‘refutations’ and unleashed theArab world’s first great public debate with
polemics supporting or refuting Ali Abdel Razek’s ideas published all over the press. Eventually he was tried by
theAl-Azhar court, denounced, stripped of his title of ‘alim and barred from future employment in education
and the judiciary.
AliAbdel Razek graduated fromAl-Azhar University in 1915 and went on to study for a short period at
Oxford University. After returning to Egypt he served as anAl-Azhar ‘alim, a judge in the traditional Islamic
Courts of Alexandria and as a teacher of Arabic.
Maryam Loutfi has worked as a freelance translator both in Morocco and in Europe.
Abdou Filali-Ansary was the founding director of theAga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim
Civilizations (2002–9). He is author of several books including Is Islam Hostile to Secularism? (1996, 1999) and
Reforming Islam? An Introduction to Contemporary Debates (2003).
Jacket design: McColmDesign.co.uk
Established in London in 2002, theAga Khan University, Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations aims to
strengthen research and teaching about the heritages of Muslim societies as they have evolved over time, and
to examine the challenges these societies face in today’s globalised world. It also seeks to create opportunities
for interaction among academics, traditionally trained scholars, innovative thinkers and leaders, in an effort to
promote dialogue and build bridges.
Ali Abdel Razek
Edited byAbdou Filali-Ansary
Translated by Maryam Loutfi
Islam and the
Foundations of
Political Power
ISBN 978-0-7486-
www.euppublishing.com
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power
In Translation: Modern Muslim Thinkers
Series Editor: Abdou Filali-Ansary
Books in the series include
Islam:
Between Message and History
Abdelmadjid Charfi
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power
Ali Abdel Razek
Governance from the Perspective of Islam
Ayatullah Aqa Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Na’ini
With a Commentary by 
Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani
www.euppublishing.com/series/tmmt
Islam and the Foundations 
of Political Power
A L I  A B D E L  R A Z E K
Translated by 
Maryam Loutfi
Edited by 
Abdou Filali-Ansary 
in association with
THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY
Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations
The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Aga Khan University,
Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations. 
© Ali Abdel Razek, 1925
Introduction © Abdou Filali-Ansary, 2012
English translation © Aga Khan University, Institute for the 
Study of Muslim Civilisations, 2012
Edinburgh University Press Ltd
22 George Square, Edinburgh eh8 9lf
www.euppublishing.com
Typeset in Garamond Premier
by Koinonia, Manchester, and
printed and bound in Great Britain
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon cr0 4yy
A CIP record for this book is available 
from the British Library
ISBN  978 0 7486 3978 6 (hardback) 
ISBN  978 0 7486 5631 8 (webready PDF)
ISBN  978 0 7486 5633 2 (epub)
ISBN  978 0 7486 5632 5 (Amazon ebook)
The right of Ali Abdel Razek and Abdou Filali-Ansary to be 
identified as authors of this work has been asserted in 
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Contents
About the Author  vi
A Tribute to Ali Abdel Razek from his Grandson, Amr Hamed vii
Preface xi
Introduction 1
Foreword 21
Book One: The Caliphate and Islam
1 The Nature of the Caliphate 25
2 The Status of the Caliphate 35
3 The Caliphate from the Social Point of View 43
Book Two: Islam and Government
4 The System of Power at the Time of the Prophet 59
5 Prophecy and Power 67
6 Islam: A Message from God rather than a System of Government;
 A Religion rather than a State 81
Book Three: The Caliphate and the Government throughout History
7 Religious Unity and the Arab People 99
8 The Arab State 107
9 The Nature of the Caliphate 111
List of Sources referred to by Abdel Razek 119
Appendix 123
Index 126
About the Author
Ali Abdel Razek was born in 1888 in Abu Jirj, middle Egypt, to a family of 
wealthy, politically active landowners. His father and brother were renowned 
as liberals, who opposed both the Wafd Nationalist Party that fought against 
British rule in Egypt and the conservatives, who were mostly allies of the 
monarchy. Abdel Razek was educated in the traditional Islamic curriculum and 
graduated from al-Azhar University as an ‘alim1 in 1915. 
Following his graduation from al-Azhar, Abdel Razek received an introduc-
tion to modern university education, enrolling for courses at the newly founded 
Egyptian University. He also spent a few months at Oxford University, where he 
studied politics and economics; however, his time there was cut short with the 
outbreak of the First World War. He later became a teacher of Arabic and a judge 
(qadi) in the traditional Islamic courts of Alexandria.
It was during his time as a qadi that he began to investigate the founders of 
the Islamic justice system. He went on to examine the caliphate as the institu-
tion which lies at the root of the “Islamic” social order and of which the justice 
system is an instrument. It must be added here, that it was the overall context at 
the time that provided a pressing initiative for such reflections; especially with 
the abrogation of the caliphate and the angst it had created. 
After being stripped of his title of ‘alim and banned from any positions related 
to it, it is said that Abdel Razek immediately changed his external appearance, 
adopting European clothes and displaying a disregard for traditional style, habits 
and appearance. 
Following the storm of criticism stirred by his essay, he made only a short 
return to public office (as minister of Islamic affairs). Abdel Razek eventually 
withdrew from the intellectual scene, took refuge in a stubborn silence and built 
himself a room in a tower where he dedicated the remainder of his life to study.
 1 A traditional scholar or theologian.
A Tribute to Ali Abdel Razek 
from his Grandson, Amr Hamed
It was still dawn outside when the sound of the dawn call to prayer seeped into 
my ears, waking me to the dawn of Cairo’s freezing winter. As a young boy of 
nine or ten, it was my daily ritual to jump out of my warm bed in my room on 
the top floor of the old and noble house that was our family home. I would 
follow the voice of my grandfather, Ali Abdel Razek, in his steady recitation of 
the Qur’an, until I arrived at his rooms located on the ground floor. He would 
acknowledge my greeting with a smiling nod, continuing his recitation of the 
holy book uninterrupted. 
Once he had finished his recitation, we would fall into our playful banter 
of teasing and tickling each other like school children, with my grandfather 
seeming to magically cross an age gap of seventy years. I would then be seated in 
a corner and would watch him silently while he paced back and forth between 
his dressing room and the bath, grooming himself for the Fajr prayer, whilst 
reciting from memory his constant zikr.
Half a century later, this image of my grandfather, Sheikh Ali Abdel Razek or 
Ali Pasha Abdel Razek remains indelible in my memory. To this day, I have not 
encountered anyone who prays and prepares for prayer with the singular dedica-
tion of my grandfather. It seemed to me that he used to have a sacred daily date 
with his beloved Allah. I recall Ali Abdel Razek as a man who was gifted with 
everything: the gift of a true and solid belief; an enlightened mind; wisdom; a 
warm and generous heart; self-esteem; professional renown and recognition; and 
perhaps most of all, spiritual richness. However, despite these natural gifts, he was 
a most humble person. He lived his life preoccupied with his relationship to God. 
Our traditional daily dinner was not like that of other Cairo families. In the 
household of Abdel Razek, the table comprised brimming platefuls of stewed 
vegetables and salads, what my uncles would sarcastically call “the daily plate 
of grass”. Occasionally, these might be accompanied by cups of fresh yogurt, or 
cubes of locally made white cheese called Qareesh. The meal would be eaten 
with local dried bread that was brought in daily from Ali Abdel Razek’s native 
village, Abu Jirj, in middle Egypt.
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This is how I remember my grandfather, Ali Abdel Razek, as a kind and 
loving, deeply devout and religious man. 
When I reflect on his now famous book, Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm or Islam 
and the Foundations of Political Power, I am always amazed that even today, close 
to a century after its publication, this invaluable essay still incites huge debates 
and impassioned responses. For me, every word and every phrase of the book are 
like weapons that confront and unveil the uncompromising religious miscon-
ceptions embraced by extremist political groups hiding behind the mantle of 
religion. These misconceptions have led to great turmoil and irreconcilable 
political factions almost all over the Arab and the Muslim worlds.
This book, especially in the final paragraphs, extends to fellow Muslims an 
invitation: 
There is not a single principle of the faith that forbids Muslims to co-operate 
with other nations in the total enterprise of the social and political sciences. 
There is no principle that prevents them from dismantling this obsolete 
system, a system which has demeaned and subjugated them, crushing them 
in its iron grip. Nothing stops them from building their state and their 
system of government on the basis of past constructions of human reason, 
of systems whose sturdiness has stood the test of time, which the experience 
of nations has shown to be effective.
A great many misleading conclusions about the essay still remain, one of 
which contends that it was addressed specifically to King Fouad, due to the 
coincidental publication of the book during a time when the king was attempting 
to reclaim the Egyptian throne and the seat of the caliphate. However, in the 
introduction, Abdel Razek states that his research for this book began in 1915, 
before Fouad became king and claimed the throne in 1917. Indeed, the fact that 
this essay still remains a subject of great discussion and debate seems to give it an 
almost universal relevance, taking it out of the specific and strictly local context 
of King Fouad’s Egypt.
The word “secular” has come to the Arab lexicon since the turn of the twen -
tieth century, bringing with it a host of meanings and interpretations. It was 
first introduced into Arab debates as the term dariya, which connoted a separa-
tion between religion and the state. This later evolved to become la dini, and 
now meant irreligious. In present-day circles secularism is often understood 
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as ‘ilmaniya, and has become associated with immorality or the lack of ethics. 
Many contemporary scholars who perhaps have confused various notions 
and meanings of the idea of secularism have claimed that Abdel Razek was an 
advocate of secularism in this most negative sense, meaning that he was amoral. 
This is certainly not the case. My grandfather argued for the separation of religion 
from the state, as he clearly states in his essay. He could never have advocated 
irreligiosity or the slackening of moral values. He was a man of the highest integ-
rity and he raised us, his family, with great moral uprightness and a deep and true 
awareness of the importance of the sacred and of belief in God. Should one wish 
to name or classify his practice of Islam, then we could say that his “tariqah” or 
way was that of following the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad in a simple and 
moderate manner. Perhaps we could even call him a Sufi, although he himself 
would never have been so bold as to name himself one.
Abdel Razek’s book is an enlightened, scientific reading of the Qur’an – 
nothing less, nothing more. He used the holy book as his main point of refer-
ence. As a matter of fact, most of the chapters contain an on-going chain of verses 
drawn from the Qur’an, but related to the main concern of the book, which is 
governance in Islam. Equally, he makes consistent reference to a number of solid 
(sahih) hadiths. In fact, Ali Abdel Razek, the man and the thinker, steers far 
away from secularism – understood as a form of amoralism – and rather, stays 
very close to the teachings of the sunna of Muhammad. And this is how he raised 
us, his family. We learned a moderate Islam under his guidance, one that was 
based on ease, mercy and asceticism, or zuhd.
Another common, uncanny accusation alleges that Ali Abdel Razek did not 
write Islam and the Foundations of Political Power himself. Rather, it was written 
by someone else, and then given to Abdel Razek to publish in his name. What 
the advocates of this theory have overlooked is the fact that I possess the original 
handwritten manuscript of the book, with a lot of corrections, marginal notes 
and footnotes made by Ali Abdel Razek himself. These manuscripts are available 
as a sound reference for all those interested.
In this post-globalization era, and in the midst of all this turbulence and 
revolution, should we advocate political reform in the modern Muslim world, 
we ought to start by reading and understanding Islam and the Foundations 
of  Political Power. This book can form the backbone of a sound, logical and 
 scholarly inquiry into the question of political power as it pertains to Muslim 
societies. 
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My belief is that every person is created with a mission in life. And no one 
passes away before fulfilling this mission, and thus satisfying his or her divine fate. 
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power was Ali Abdel Razek’s heavy mission 
in the name of Islam and of humanity. He has fulfilled it perfectly. Moreover, he 
went on to live a long life afterwards, confident of having completed his mission 
and without ever altering a single word of the book.
God bless the soul of my beloved grandfather, and God bless the readers and 
scholars of his work. 
Sincerely
Amr K. Hamed
Many scholars consider the publication of the essay Islam and the Foundations 
of Political Power: an Inquiry into the Caliphate and Government in Islam by Ali 
Abdel Razek1 in 1925 to mark an important event in the contemporary history 
of Muslims. Not merely an exceptional intellectual or literary event, the publi-
cation of the book signalled an actual historical turning point, one that had a 
formative, long-lasting impact on the development of Muslim societies during 
the twentieth century.2 
It was in the early 1990s that I learned, to my great surprise, that what in 
his time had been a ground-breaking work by Ali Abdel Razek still awaited 
translation into any of the major languages of Europe. By then, Islam had come 
to occupy centre stage in world awareness. Beyond the media, academics were 
turning their attention to contemporary expressions of thought, as well as to 
political movements in what is called the “Muslim world”. A number of works 
by Muslim thinkers, translated into European languages, had become the object 
of extensive study in specialised circles. It was surprising to find that most of 
these works were representative of conservative, fundamentalist trends in Islam. 
Enormous attention was devoted to, among other things, trends that would later 
come to be grouped under the heading of Islamic fundamentalism. 
This interest had significance beyond academia. It encouraged the idea 
that these thinkers were, in one way or another, “authentic” spokespersons for 
Muslims and Islam in the modern world. It also gave the impression that these 
works were representative of dominant, if not exclusive movements, of thought 
in Muslim contexts. This notion in turn influenced Muslim minds. The resulting 
distortion and misrepresentation is evident to anyone who is aware of the acute 
intellectual controversies which have been widespread in modern Muslim 
 1 No full translation of the essay into English has yet been published. Excerpts can be found in Charles 
Kurzman (ed.), Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. My own trans-
lation into French has been published as Ali Abdel Razek, L’Islam et les fondements du pouvoir, Paris: 
Éditions la Découverte, 1994.
 2 For discussion of the impact of Abdel Razek’s essay, refer to Mohammad ‘Amara, Al-Islam wa Uṣūl 
al-Ḥukm: dirassah wa watha’iq [“Islam and the Foundations of Political Power: The Study and 
Documents”], Beirut: Al-Mu’assassa al-‘Arabiya li al-Dirasat wa al-Nahr, 1972.
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contexts, and of the intensive debate instigated by publications that were neither 
conservative nor fundamentalist, but rather, critical and progressive. It was a 
deeply unsatisfactory state of affairs where essentialist and static-minded works 
by such reformers as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb were available (some 
of them in multiple editions and various languages), and were widely read and 
commented upon, while others of equal, if not greater, importance and conse-
quence in the modern Muslim world were wholly ignored. That Islam and the 
Foundations of Political Power by Ali Abdel Razek in particular, was not available 
in English (apart from short excerpts published in various anthologies) is indica-
tive of this curious situation that has affected on-going debates about Muslims 
and the practice of Islam.
The present translation was conceived shortly after the publication of my 
French translation of Abdel Razek’s essay in 1994. It has taken far too long, with 
many interruptions arising from administrative responsibilities (I could echo 
here what Ali Abdel Razek says about the circumstances of writing his book). 
Ms Maryam Loutfi volunteered a first set of translations from the Arabic into 
English. Shortly afterwards, I was lucky to come into close contact with Dr Aziz 
Esmail, former Dean and present Governor of the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 
who kindly agreed to undertake a complete rewriting with a view to rendering it 
into a plain and readable English. Using my French translation as a template, and 
referring where necessary to the Arabic original, he carried out the laborious task 
of what amounted to a fresh translation into English. 
The result, to my mind, is a faithful rendering of a text which was after all not 
a scholarly disquisition in the technical sense (although it was based on meticu-
lous attention to sources). Ali Abdel Razek’s work is an essay in the best sense of 
the word. It interrogates and provides a perspective on prevailing interpretations 
of the Islamic past and attitudes about the relationship between politics and 
religion that have become widespread in contemporary contexts. It is a “historic” 
piece. In my introduction, I argue that it has played a significant role in shaping 
emerging debates about Islam and politics in Muslim contexts.
I would like to thank Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, Raahat Currim, Chloe Green-
wood, Ashleigh Young, Charlotte Whiting, Mohamad Meqdad and Vera Pestell 
for their dedicated effort in preparing the manuscript for publication.
Finally, it must be emphasised that I alone bear the responsibility for any 
omissions or errors that may have gone undetected in the text.
Abdou Filali-Ansary
1Historical Background
The question of the caliphate, as it re-emerged in the 1920s, galvanised wide 
circles of people, mainly among learned elite Muslims. As an institution, the 
caliphate had until then experienced a rather turbulent thirteen-century history. 
It was created immediately after the death of the Prophet Muhammad to manage 
the community he had founded and to maintain the momentum created by the 
then new religious message. The title of caliph, meaning “deputy” or “successor”, 
was also created shortly after the demise of the Prophet. It was initially given 
to some of the Prophet’s prominent companions who had been co-opted by 
circles of influential members to lead the community. Each of the first four 
caliphs, considered afterwards by the Sunni majority as the “legitimate ones”, 
was appointed in a different manner.1
Eventually, the caliphate was taken over by a succession of ruling families, 
beginning with the Umayyads and ending with the Ottomans. The change from 
co-opted and religiously inspired rulers, as they were later perceived, to a monar-
chical caliphate was considered by many in the community, and recorded later 
by historians, as a kind of coup d’état, constituting a violation of the principles 
associated with Islam and of the integrity and freedom of the umma or Muslim 
community. These monarchical systems which ruled over Muslim communi-
ties were generally accepted as more or less unavoidable. However, they were 
not considered to be fully legitimate. Over the centuries, the title of caliph lost 
its prestige. The Ottoman rulers, following many others, initially claimed for 
themselves the title of sultan or king rather than caliph. During the eighteenth 
century, at a time when their authority was seriously challenged, the Ottomans 
felt the need to reclaim the title of caliph. Early in the twentieth century when 
 1 Historical surveys of Islam’s “founding moments” are numerous. Among the scholarly works that 
attempt an overall survey and understanding of the deep processes of change one should mention, in 
the English language, Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1975 and Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic 
Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. See also J. P. Berkey, The Formation of Islam: 
Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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Mustapha Kamal Atatürk took power of what remained of the once great 
Ottoman Empire, he first stripped the caliph of his temporal powers (1922) and 
then abolished the institution itself (1923).
The abrogation of the caliphate caused intense anxiety within the Muslim 
world. Already thrown off balance as a result of the impact of European coloni-
alism on the traditional social and political order, Muslims were gripped by a 
great fear of the future. They did not know where the umma was headed after 
being deprived of the institution that had symbolised its continuity for centu-
ries. The end of the caliphate, which had become the symbol of an “Islamic” 
polity – though often a remote, weak and disappointing one – signified to 
most Muslims the end of the world in which they had lived for centuries. As no 
religious or political alternatives to the caliphate were in sight, an overwhelming 
sense of loss ensued.
In a way, the loss of the caliphate returned the umma to the debate that 
dated back to the beginning of its history. Questions that had been more or 
less forgotten over the past thirteen centuries regained their relevance: how 
should Muslims organise themselves as a community? What system of govern-
ance should they adopt? Was the caliphate the only appropriate way to build 
and maintain an “Islamic” order? Was the caliphate an institution required by 
the tenets of the faith? Could the initial, authentic and legitimate caliphate 
be re-established? From the early nineteenth century, discussions about the 
modernisation of socio-political institutions had been gaining momentum 
and modern scholars paid great attention to these debates. These focused on 
processes of reform, however, rather than questioning the overarching frame-
work for public life in the Muslim community. Ali Abdel Razek’s essay, Islam 
and the Foundations of Political Power, brought the discussion back to the main 
question: how should Muslims organise themselves as a community?
At the time, deep changes were underway. Egypt, which had become an 
autonomous entity within the Muslim world centuries before, was entering 
a new era in its history. The confrontation between a foreign colonial power, 
Great Britain, and a strong nationalist movement were signalling the birth of 
the first modern, liberal polity in the Middle East. Following a scenario already 
familiar in the region, the king was pressing to re-establish traditional forms of 
political power, a system in which the monarch holds essential authority, while 
religious scholars known as the ‘ulamā mediate between him and the popula-
tion. The ‘ulamā would enforce religious laws in civil matters and legitimise, to 
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some degree, the political system. From the king’s point of view, the rise of mass 
political movements, modern nationalist ideologies and their possible conse-
quences, such as sovereignty of the people and the implementation of the rule of 
law were unacceptable. As a result, the king sought to rally traditional religious 
leaders and representatives of the high bourgeoisie in an effort to counter the 
mobilisation of the masses by the Wafd Party.2
Ali Abdel Razek’s essay was a direct blow to the king’s endeavours and, at 
the same time, a major challenge to the Wafd. From the perspective of Egyptian 
nationalists, Abdel Razek’s ideas disturbed the political game by resuscitating 
basic questions that were thought to have been resolved or at least side-lined. In 
effect, he gave voice to an unexpected new argument in a political debate that 
had been largely restricted to the monarchy and the Wafd. 
Consequently, modern political activists striving for independence, moderni-
sation and democratisation – who should have been Abdel Razek’s most enthu-
siastic supporters – were taken by surprise by his book. The Wafd was pursuing 
politics on a secular front, while benefiting from a rather favourable indiffer-
ence from religious authorities. Egypt’s nationalist project considered it poten-
tially dangerous for the on-going political evolution of the country to reactivate 
political debates about religious terms and perspectives and their implications, 
however positive the new ideas might have been.
Two political games were being played at the same time. The first focused on the 
rejection of foreign subjugation and with it, the liquidation of traditional polit-
ical forms that had made this subjugation possible in the first place. The second 
staked the adoption of modern political forms against the idea of rebuilding 
traditional ones. Liberal thinkers like Ali Abdel Razek found themselves in a 
delicate position. They opposed the traditional views and practices defended 
by the monarchy and the theologians, while also diverging from the popular 
movement that mobilised the masses in favour of populist ideologies which 
mainly proclaimed slogans about independence and emancipation.
What was important about this dilemma was that it brought to the fore points 
of view that profoundly differed from what had been known and recognised for 
centuries in traditional Muslim societies. As André Raymond has argued,3 even 
 2 A nationalist political party created after the First World War and dissolved in 1952. It played an 
important role in the political life of Egypt for decades, acting as the “delegates” (the meaning of the 
Arabic word “Wafd”) of the people in its fight to recover sovereignty from foreign powers.
 3 Égyptiens et français au Caire 1798–1801 [“The Egyptians and French in Cairo”], Paris: Institut français 
d’archéologie orientale, 1998. 
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during a period of close proximity like the French occupation of Cairo in the 
aftermath of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1898, there was no effective 
exchange of ideas between European invaders and local intellectuals. He adds 
that nothing, or nearly nothing, changed in the way that indigenous societies 
viewed the natural and historical order of the world. With the exception of a 
very small elite, such as the chronicler Abdelrahman al-Jabarti,4 local thinkers 
had not been able to access the intellectual world of the savants who accompa-
nied the occupying forces. 
However, roughly a century later, Muslims were becoming aware of other 
ways of looking at the world that embraced a better knowledge of the physical 
world, science and philosophy. A print press in the Arabic language had been 
born. A new “space of public communication” was created for the expression of 
ideologies, ambitions and desires that had originated in modern Europe, but had 
been infused with new life in non-European contexts. Debates about Islam and 
modernity shaped a new awareness, which was articulated by leading thinkers 
such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani5 and Muhammad ‘Abduh.6 Muslim societies 
were no longer bound by their traditional views of the world. Initial advances 
towards the evolution of these new ideas were made by Arab Christians, who 
were the first to be receptive to modern European trends and to convey them to 
wider circles within the Arab world.
In this light, and for the first time in the modern history of Muslims, Ali 
Abdel Razek articulated a perspective that allowed for the examination of 
Islamic religious traditions from external, historical and critical points of view. 
This was to have major consequences. The first was a return to rationality as a 
pivot around which discussions about politics and religion would take place 
in ways that differed from the rational approaches previously adopted in the 
history of Muslim thought. In the early Muslim community, the rational analysis 
of religious matters had been, in a sense, common practice. Religious attitudes 
and obedience to divine commandments were initially understood as “require-
ments” of rationality in societies formerly bound by narrow traditions. 
Rational thinking in early theology reached its peak with the Mu’tazilites 
and a host of other literate elites, who attempted to sketch rational perspec-
tives about religious systems that could work as blueprints for Muslim forms of 
understanding and social order. Over generations, however, once an  impressive 
 4 1753–1825.
 5 1838–97.
 6 1849–1905.
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corpus of theology and law had been endowed with authority, the implemen-
tation of reason in religious matters became progressively unacceptable and 
intolerable. Ali Abdel Razek hence spearheaded the return to a call to reason 
in religio- political matters. Implicitly, he challenged reformist and apologetic 
groups for whom rational discourse had to remain within the boundaries of 
established truths as they had been formulated within the domain of “tradition” 
and, furthermore, had been restricted to defending the faith against critics.
The reintroduction of reason in debates about religion also took place in the 
following decades by way of new disciplines, such as the humanities and social 
sciences. These new scholarly approaches would include historical critiques of 
canonical texts, the critical study of political and religious institutions, as well 
as commonly held perceptions and myths. They would function without paying 
heed to the authority of elders and of authoritative interpretations. A secularisa-
tion of world views and a form of disenchantment took place through the elabo-
ration of new forms of knowledge. 
Through the discussion initiated by Ali Abdel Razek, the ultimate criteria 
for truth came to be rationally supported views, rather than the established, 
authority-backed interpretations of revealed truth. This became a basic stake in 
the battle that Muslims were on the verge of engaging in, pitting reason, secular 
and free thought against the authority of tradition. Although Muhammad 
‘Abduh endeavoured to demonstrate the rationality of beliefs and practices 
associated with Islam, his attempt was to a large degree apologetic and limited by 
the need to restore the confidence and pride of Muslims in their own religious 
heritage. It was Ali Abdel Razek who made the first advances in the direction of 
applying processes of critical reasoning to what were considered to be religious 
matters that had been settled by authoritative tradition. He attempted to solve, 
through critical inquiry, an old dilemma that had created the most intense drama 
in the remote past of the Muslim community and one that was resurrected with 
the restoration and abolition of the caliphate.
The Abdel Razek Essay and its Immediate Impact 
Ali Abdel Razek’s ground-breaking essay, Al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm, is widely 
credited with having had a great impact on subsequent socio-political events 
across the Muslim world, generating what has been considered by some to be 
the greatest controversy in the modern history of Muslim societies. It created a 
kind of intellectual exchange that did not exist in traditional societies, involving 
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polemics on a large, public scale and reaching out to popular opinion through 
the written press. One could argue that the intense conflict of interpretations 
generated by the book revived something similar to what Muslims had experi-
enced in their early history: the Fitna al-Kubra, or Great Dissent, which had 
“broken” the community into the denominations – Sunni, Shi’a and Khawarij – 
that thrive to this day. The trauma of that age-old confrontation, which brought 
into existence deep and long lasting lines of division among Muslims, was still 
vivid in the collective memory. 
The book led to the first trial of an intellectual for his ideas in modern times. 
The battle over the book raged in the press and was brought to court by the 
decision of King Fouad of Egypt, who was offended by it. Indeed, some parts 
of the book were very critical of despotism and the monarchical system in 
general. Moreover, it was understood that Abdel Razek ridiculed the ambition 
of reviving the title of caliph, an ambition that was nourished in many Middle 
Eastern royal courts of that time, including that of Egypt. 
The court before which Ali Abdel Razek was tried was originally a discipli-
nary commission of the al-Azhar University for the oversight of the behaviour 
of its faculty members. The case of Ali Abdel Razek was the first to be brought 
before this institutional body, which had for the occasion called upon eminent 
traditional scholars and members of the faculty from al-Azhar. They were asked 
to determine whether the ideas presented in the book were acceptable from an 
orthodox point of view and whether the author could still hold onto his title 
of ‘alim (theologian). The fact that Ali Abdel Razek was a traditional scholar, 
whose role was understood as a guardian of orthodoxy, was clearly a source of 
discomfort for the authorities of the time. Not only were deeply held beliefs 
and prescriptions being challenged, they were being challenged by a then duly 
 certified faculty member of al-Azhar University. He was later stripped of his title 
of ‘alim and had to observe a strict reserve; in fact, he seems to have suspended 
all research on the topic.
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power also resulted in a deep political 
crisis in Egypt. At the time, the Egyptian government was a coalition of two 
parties. The Liberal-Constitutionalists represented mainly landowners and the 
upper classes, which included many relatives and friends of Ali Abdel Razek. 
The second party in government had been created by the king to resist the 
overwhelming influence of the Wafd nationalist and populist political movement 
that enjoyed strong support among the population. The book provoked a deep 
Introduction
7
disagreement between the two coalition partners. The Liberal-Constitution-
alist Party, siding with Ali Abdel Razek, declared itself in favour of freedom of 
thought. The second party sided with the king and the traditionalists, rejecting 
Abdel Razek’s views and urging his exclusion from all official functions. The Ali 
Abdel Razek case led to the eventual fall of the cabinet and the failure of the 
conservative, monarchist coalition. It became clear that the alliance of conserva-
tive and liberal ideologies was unable to offer a solid alternative to the nationalist 
and populist movements represented by the Wafd Party.
Furthermore, the book had a negative influence on attempts at the time to 
revive the institution of the caliphate. After the abrogation of the caliphate in 
Turkey by Mustapha Kamal Atatürk in 1923, prominent Muslim scholars and 
political activists began to call for reviving the caliphate, which was understood 
to be an essential institution for Muslims and a symbol of the unity and conti-
nuity of their community. It was chiefly in the “peripheries” of the Muslim 
world, in countries where Muslims were a minority, such as India or East Africa, 
that the need for restoring the caliphate was most intensely felt. However, it 
was mainly in the “central” areas, such as the Middle East, that the moral and 
political benefits of holding the title were perceived. The then kings of the Hijaz 
and Egypt competed for the title, and no agreement could be reached about 
who would next hold the title of caliph. Ali Abdel Razek, on the other hand, 
speaking as an al-Azhar scholar, argued that the caliphate was not a religious 
obligation for Muslims and that having been taken over by despots, it had in 
fact inflicted intense suffering and produced deep and devastating dissent within 
the community. This verdict on the part of Abdel Razek is believed by many to 
have impeded the revival of the caliphate and discredited the arguments of its 
supporters.
Perhaps one of the most important arguments regarding its influence on 
modern historical developments is that Abdel Razek’s essay induced the birth 
of Islamist movements within Muslim societies as a reaction to on-going events 
and the way they were interpreted in his essay. Observers have pointed out a 
“troubling coincidence”, linking the book’s publication in 1925 to the creation in 
Egypt three years later of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first Islamist organisa-
tion in the modern Muslim world.7 Was there a “cause and effect” relationship 
between these two events? Fundamentalism is seen as an outraged reaction of 
 7 See Mohammad ‘Amara, Al-Islam wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm: dirassah wa watha’iq [“Islam and the Founda-
tions of Political Power: The Study and Documents”], Beirut: Al-Mu’assassa al-‘Arabiya li al-Dirasat 
wa al-Nahr, 1972.
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pious Muslims to “Western-inspired” secularists who promote an alien system 
of thought, one which would strip Muslims of their identity, their faith and the 
very foundation of their worldview and social order.8 The assumption of a histor-
ical link between the publication of Abdel Razek’s book and the birth of Islamic 
fundamentalism is made by some who consider fundamentalism as a reaction 
and a defence against alien attempts at penetration and subversion of indigenous 
institutions and traditional expressions of thought, faith and so on. 
Intimately linked to the previous points is the idea that Ali Abdel Razek was a 
precursor of secularist movements within Muslim societies. In fact, before 1925, 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many endeavours to reform 
or modernise traditional institutions within Muslim societies were launched. 
They proposed, in one way or another, to reshape social and political institutions 
that had been under the control of religious clerics, in effect introducing some 
degree of secularisation. While a number of Muslim intellectuals supported this 
idea, the first clear defence of secularism through a fresh reading of the heritage 
came with Ali Abdel Razek’s essay. Its thesis was subsequently adopted and 
supported by a line of thinkers, who although formulating different answers to 
the question of the relationship between religion and politics, considered Abdel 
Razek to be the initiator of a new and promising methodology of historical 
thinking in reinvestigating matters which had been assumed to be settled by 
Sunni dogma. It remained to be seen how such radical rethinking would evolve 
and what its influence on Muslim societies would be.
A New Theology?
As noted earlier, one of the most interesting facts in this debate was the office 
of Ali Abdel Razek as a traditional scholar, a member of the corps of ‘ulamā, 
trained to preserve and implement religious conceptions and rules. He was the 
son of a notable, a wealthy landowner and a militant for the political modernisa-
tion of Egypt. Like his elder brother Mustafa, Ali received a complete course in 
traditional “Islamic” education. His opponents highlighted the fact that he had 
been “contaminated” by “Western” ideas when he undertook “secular” studies 
in the newly founded Egyptian University, shortly after receiving his ‘alimiya 
degree from al-Azhar University. He went on to Oxford University in Britain for 
 8 For details of this view of fundamentalism, see Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, New 
York: ACLS Humanities, 2008 and Leonard Binder, “Ali Abdel Razek and Islamic liberalism”, Asian 
and African Studies, 6(1), March 1982.
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further education, but had to interrupt his studies due to the outbreak of the First 
World War. Hence, his critics claimed that he had been exposed to  “Orientalist” 
approaches, thus explaining his “deviation” from the orthodox path.
The striking fact about Abdel Razek’s work is that, although it makes some 
explicit references to Western thinkers and Orientalists such as Hobbes and 
Locke, it does not show any direct influence of European thinkers. It is clear that 
he has an intimate knowledge of the key works that form part of the traditional 
Islamic corpus. He also had wide access to the latest writings by his contempo-
rary scholars. At the same time, he does not seem to have a substantial knowl-
edge of European political philosophy, nor of the works by the Orientalists on 
Islam. The only exception to this is the notable interest he shows in thinkers who 
had been “forgotten” or side-lined by mainstream scholarly trends in the Muslim 
world, and who had recently been “rediscovered” by European scholars, such 
as the Mu’tazila and Ibn Khaldun. Moreover, Abdel Razek’s rationalist attitude 
is closer to that of the Mu’tazila and Ibn Khaldun than to any of the modern 
European scholars who had been fully exposed to the humanities and social 
sciences. In a way, his essay is a long reflection on the theories of Ibn Khaldun, 
who approached political power as an observable and complex reality rather 
than as a matter for broad and easy moralising. Therefore, the limited contact 
he had with Western thought may have “awakened” him from his “dogmatic 
slumber” and shown him that there were alternatives to the responses given by 
tradition. However, he remains a traditional scholar applying rational enquiry to 
matters thought to have been settled a long time ago.
Abdel Razek began to work on his essay during his immediate post graduate 
years, but, as he indicates in his preface, he did not decide to publish it until 
events forced him to do so. What were these events? The abolition of the 
caliphate and the reaction it stirred up within traditional circles? The subse-
quent attempts to revive the caliphate? The apology for an “implicit Islamic 
constitution” by Rashid Rida?9 The manoeuvres by King Fouad to divert the 
process of political modernisation? Probably all of these; the most significant of 
which was an innate disquiet caused by the collapse of fundamental institutions 
and the questioning of deeply entrenched views that had hitherto defined the 
framework of the public and private lives of Muslims. One may be tempted to 
believe that efforts to restore the caliphate and attempts to revive old symbols of 
 9 Rashid Rida, Al-Khilāfa wal-Imāma al-‘Uẓma [“The Caliphate and the Great Imamate”], first 
published in 1924. See Simon Wood, Christian Criticisms, Islamic Proofs: Rashid Rida’s Modernist 
Defence of Islam, Oxford: Oneworld, 2007.
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authority were perhaps the strongest incitement to the publication of this essay. 
However, certain parts of the essay seem to have been written taking into account 
the prevailing conditions in Egypt, especially those regarding the “nature” of the 
monarchical system. All the same, it remains the case that the ideas developed 
by Ali Abdel Razek, although situated in a specific historical context, are not 
entirely limited to this context. He questions the problem of foundations of polit-
ical power at a time when the debate was entirely focused on discussions about 
prevailing concerns. Therefore, leaving aside what were perceived as unques-
tionable truths, he wanted to go beyond short-term concerns and reactions to 
consider certain essential questions from their very roots. Without intending to 
propose new theological interpretations, he nonetheless explores new ways of 
assessing fundamental issues of Islamic theology and of questioning some of the 
basic tenets of orthodox Sunni theology.
Abdel Razek’s approach is striking in that it attempts to make a tabula rasa 
of everything considered to be unquestionable truth, particularly the narratives 
that surround “authentic” traditions associated with Islam. Traditional theolo-
gians usually develop their ideas within frameworks that they consider to be 
well-established truths. They attempt, smoothly and cautiously, to strengthen 
or attenuate certain notions within the framework of accepted principles. Their 
thought is often presented as a “commentary” or critique on some authority, 
whether a tradition, a conception or an author. Ali Abdel Razek does none of 
this. He proceeds with the approach of a rational scholar who, from a distinct 
and external perspective, examines established beliefs as given, observable 
phenomena in order to reach conclusions about the significance these beliefs 
may have for contemporary conditions.
He comes to the conclusion that Sunni Muslims maintained two different 
conceptions of the caliphate. Some, encouraged by “official” discourses, advo -
cated it as a divinely originated power, sacred and unquestionable. Others saw 
the caliphate as a “contractual” system, where the caliph is a representative chosen 
by the community who exercises his power by virtue of a general consensus. This 
difference of opinion was usually held implicitly, in ambiguous terms, where 
the virtues of both models were advocated. However, Abdel Razek exposed in 
explicit terms widely accepted beliefs that had not been clearly conceptualised. 
This was the case with the theocratic implications of the first model, which saw 
the caliphate as a divinely ordained system, often “attenuated” with occasional 
references to the other, “contractual” one.
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Abdel Razek’s objective is clear: to attain maximum clarity and expose the 
incoherence and inconsistency of some generally accepted views; while at the 
same time to reach conclusions that can be asserted with a fair degree of certainty. 
Critical reason became the basic instrument, reference point and authority by 
which “tradition” would be judged. This was precisely the opposite of what 
theologians had encouraged. In the later history of Muslim jurisprudence and 
theology, traditional schools used reason within the boundaries of what they 
considered to be established truths. They used reason as an instrument to settle 
technical problems arising in legal matters. However, they did not attempt to go 
any further than this.
When Ali Abdel Razek was a young man, Muhammad ‘Abduh, one of the 
most influential reformists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
was propounding the idea that religion, and Islam more than others, was not 
opposed to reason. For ‘Abduh, Islam was in fact the most “rational” of the great 
religions. He diagnosed that Islam in the nineteenth century, as it was practised by 
multitudes, was clouded by superstition and conformism. However, he believed 
that this could be eliminated by a return to the original attitudes of clear and 
simple principles by which the early generations of Muslims lived. He used reason 
apologetically, advocating on behalf of a proclaimed “truth” that would heal the 
consciousness of Muslims under the weight and humiliation of European domina-
tion. Reason was not used to search for truth, but rather to justify the truthfulness 
of inherited conceptions and to comfort anxious Muslim communities facing the 
onslaught of European powers and the need for rapid and deep change. 
Distinctly, this was not the approach of Ali Abdel Razek who invoked reason 
as a tool and as the ultimate arbitrator in every discussion. Religious dogma was 
still accepted, but the associated narratives through which it was received and 
internalised were not. Although the dogma was accepted seemingly without 
question, the traditions that had been built around it and through which it had 
been formulated were submitted to open and direct scrutiny. 
Theologians or traditional scholars were often asked to find justifications for 
already accepted, preconceived beliefs. Abdel Razek was critical of this view of the 
scholars’ role. He came to a very bold conclusion: Muslims believe that the organi-
sation of their community into a political entity is prescribed by their religion; 
however, the texts, traditions and even the example of the Prophet do not formu-
late any such obligation, nor do they provide anything that could be considered to 
be a constitution or a political prescription for the community. Rather, it was the 
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theologians who strove to mobilise various and sometimes contrived strategies to 
“extract” or derive political indications from the sacred sources. 
Ali Abdel Razek departs from the approach that prevailed in classical theology 
by arguing that it is more logical and respectful of the sources to admit that the 
political structures of Muslim communities belong to the history of Muslims 
rather than to the teachings of Islam as a religion. Therefore, Muslims should 
free themselves from what had been a harmful “myth” and a destructive institu-
tion – the caliphate and the monarchy lumped together – and from the idea that 
Islam imposes such forms on the Muslim community as the prescribed means of 
organising themselves as a community that conforms itself to the norms of Islam.
It is striking that as extreme rigour is sought through bold and innovative 
notions, Abdel Razek remains within the fold of traditional normative perspec-
tives that have prevailed and continue to prevail in some circles within the Sunni 
community.
What were the Enduring Consequences?
The salient feature of Ali Abdel Razek’s essay was to combine the attitude of the 
believer, based on the most reliable theological knowledge of the time, with the 
boldest questioning of what believers had associated with the creed regarding 
questions concerning the socio-political order. What he proposed fuses a strict 
adherence to the sacred texts and their explicit and visible message with the 
elimination – or at least rigorous rethinking – of some important conclusions 
that generations have drawn from them. This was, and still remains today, a 
direct blow to the conservative establishment.
Immediate reactions to the publication of Ali Abdel Razek’s essay took the 
form of “refutations”.10 Three essays aimed at offering refutations to his reasoning 
and conclusions were published the same year (1925), and others were published 
subsequently. As mentioned before, there were also a number of other reactions: 
polemics in the print media; a trial before a disciplinary court; the fall of the 
coalition government; and the failure of the Muslim congresses to agree on a 
consensual response. The aftershocks can still be felt almost a century after the 
publication of Islam and the Foundations of Political Power. Reactions to Abdel 
10 See Muhammad Al-Khidr Hussein, Naqd Kitāb al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm [“A Critique of the Book 
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power”], Cairo, 1925; or Muhammad Bakhit al-Mat‘i, Haqīqat 
al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm [“The Truth about Islam and the Foundations of Political Power”], Cairo, 
1926.
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Razek’s work continue to be published,11 even though contemporary thinkers 
such as Khalid Muhammad Khalid12 and Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah13 not 
only shared his basic views, but also developed sophisticated arguments in his 
defence. The rise of the fundamentalist tide has made a kind of pariah of Ali 
Abdel Razek, the emblem of what Muslims should never accept. Nevertheless, 
the challenge raised by his arguments remains. 
Ali Abdel Razek reacted with great courage and firmness during the first 
months of the controversy surrounding his essay. A similar crisis was to be stirred 
up one year later when a book by Taha Hussein14 about pre-Islamic poetry15 
raised questions about pre-Islamic history that pertained to the accepted narra-
tives about the birth of Islam and its founding moments. Eventually, Ali Abdel 
Razek was obliged to retreat into total silence. He never withdrew or denounced 
his thesis as an error, as some other intellectuals did when faced with similar 
pressure. However, he was silenced and did not continue his research or publish 
any further on the subject. His title of ‘alim, which had been revoked, was later 
restored under the liberal government formed in 1948. Nevertheless, he would 
not return to his profession or defend his authority as a religious scholar.
The case of Abdel Razek illustrates how repression and censorship operate 
in a context where no single institution has the exclusive responsibility for 
defending orthodoxy. The absence of such an institution does not mean that 
there is greater freedom of thought. Rather, the absence of a sole source of 
orthodoxy seems, on the contrary, to make the system tighter. When orthodoxy 
is not linked to a specific entity or corps, large numbers of individuals within 
the whole community ipso facto assume its defence. It becomes even more diffi-
cult to step outside the often implicit, mild but firm consensus that holds the 
 community together. This pattern becomes apparent in subsequent cases of 
11 It would be difficult to offer an exhaustive survey of such reactions. Suffice it to say that no work by 
an Islamist today would be devoid of critical mentions of ‘Ali Abdel Razek.
12 1920–96. See his works From Here We Start, trans. Ismail R. el-Faruqi, Washington, DC: American 
Council of Learned Societies, 1953 (1st edn 1950) and Al-Dawla fi al-Islam [“Islam and the State”], 
Cairo: Dar Thabit lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi, 1989. 
13 d. 1991. See his work Al-Fann al-Qassassi fi al-Qur’an al-Karim [“Narrative Art in the Venerable 
Qur’an”], first published in 1951. In 1947 Khalafallah presented a controversial doctoral dissertation 
to Cairo University about narrative art in the Qur’an. As a result of the critical attack that followed, 
he resigned from his teaching post at the university. A revised dissertation also proved unacceptable; 
the third revision, published as Al-Fann al-Qassassi fi al-Qur’an al-Karim, was reprinted several times. 
In this work he argues that the histories related in the Qur’an should be viewed as literary stories and 
that the welfare of the Muslim community should take precedence over Qur’anic texts.
14 1889–1973.
15 Fīl-Shi‘r al-Jahīlī [“On Pre-Islamic Poetry”, 1926]. See also the edition published by Dar al-Nahr, 1996.
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religious controversy, one of the most recent being the case of Nasr Hamid Abu 
Zayd.16 Sometimes individuals or a small group, who often represent an extreme 
activist segment of the community, voice concern over an author’s alleged assault 
on the sacred beliefs and values of the community. This concern is echoed by a 
large and embarrassed silence from the majority, coupled with strident support 
from minority voices, thereby marginalising the critic who made the assault and 
eventually silencing him or her.
In the case of Ali Abdel Razek, there was not a popular manifestation against 
him in the immediate aftermath of the publication of his essay. This denotes a 
nuance of the attitude of “the masses”. He faced traditionalist ‘ulamā and some 
conservative voices in the political sphere rather than the pre-modern operatives 
through which controversies were conducted. Can we infer then that Ali Abdel 
Razek’s attitudes towards despotism and his challenge to a certain politics at 
the core of the Islamic faith were more acceptable to the public? This is more 
than likely. Although with time Ali Abdel Razek seems to have become a pariah 
within conservative circles, during his own time he was a kind of moral winner, 
benefiting from the assent of the people while facing rejection from some elites. 
Another long-term impact of Ali Abdel Razek’s work has been more positively 
assessed. The adoption of a scholarly approach in dealing with issues considered 
until then as religious – and therefore amenable only to traditional theological 
handling – was to become an important trend in contemporary thought within 
predominantly Muslim contexts. It has transformed the heritage of Muslims 
– its theology, history, law and popular mythology – into an object of study 
for scholars both from within and outside the Muslim community. Eventually, 
the secularised humanities and social sciences made their way into the heritage 
of Muslim civilisations, deploying the full array of their conceptual tools and 
methodologies, although the analytical frameworks developed by most contem-
porary academics have not yet made their way to the public consciousness.
When they came to be applied to Muslim traditions, social and human 
sciences were already mature, secularised disciplines, in the sense that they 
were the outcome of a long evolution within Western, Christian and Jewish 
contexts. Religious dogmas, beliefs and perceptions were for them an object 
16 1943–2010. In 1995, Abu Zayd was promoted to the rank of professor at Cairo University, but contro-
versies about his academic work on the Qur’an led to a court decision of apostasy. It was claimed that 
Abu Zayd had renounced his Muslim faith through his writings, thus he was denied the promotion. 
As a supposed apostate (murtadd), he was also declared divorced from his wife, fellow academic Dr 
Ibtihal Younis. This decision forced the couple to leave their teaching posts at Cairo University. 
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of study that was not conceded any kind of privileged status. The truth they 
sought was beyond any religious revelation or tradition, accessible only through 
rational  investigation. Ali Abdel Razek was probably the first from within the 
Muslim community to submit its religious corpus to approaches of this kind 
and to attempt to solve one of its basic dilemmas through rigorous scholarly 
 investigation.
Such an approach was the first of its kind in that it was an attempt at 
reforming prevailing views within Muslim contexts; this was to become an 
enduring trend from the early twentieth century onwards. The term “movement” 
does not apply here, since the sequence of scholarly endeavours that emerged 
did not display the features of a movement. However, it is striking to observe 
an unplanned, unconscious convergence among different parts of the commu-
nity, all aimed at constructing alternative views of Muslim beliefs, and building 
new Muslim religious attitudes, by resorting to critical–historical approaches. 
Although communication within Muslim communities and across borders has 
benefited from modern technology, and new spaces of debate have emerged 
as a  consequence, it should be noted that the division of the “Muslim world” 
into nation-states and the integration of these states into the new global order 
has created obstacles to a fluid communication on purely intellectual matters. 
And yet one finds great similarities in the disparate efforts of such thinkers as 
Mahmood Muhammad Taha,17 Fazlur Rahman,18 Abdelmajid Charfi19 and 
Abdolkarim Soroush,20 in which clear echoes of Ali Abdel Razek’s ideas and 
approach can be perceived. 
The Structure of the Essay
Regarding the formulation of his argumentation, Ali Abdel Razek visibly 
attempts to build a kind of logical or even geometrical demonstration. The essay 
is divided into “books”, chapters and sections. Each section is numbered and 
given a title. At the outset of each chapter a list of points is provided, which is 
in fact a list of section titles. In this translation, we have maintained the way the 
17 1909–85, author of The Second Message of Islam, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996.
18 1919–88, author of Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982.
19 (1943–), author of Islam: Between Message and History, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press in 
association with Aga Khan University, 2009.
20 (1945–), author of Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim 
Soroush, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
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text was presented in its original Arabic version. The entire essay is engineered 
as a structured, rational enquiry progressing step by step to the final conclu-
sion. In a way, Abdel Razek’s writing style is strikingly reminiscent of the style 
adopted by rational philosophers such as Baruch Spinoza in his Ethics (1677) 
and logicians such as Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico Philosophicus 
(first published in German in 1921 as Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung, with 
English  translations in 1922 and 1961). Ali Abdel Razek introduced footnotes 
in his text and this was quite an innovation in the writing style adopted by 
traditional scholars. However, the information provided in the footnotes is 
not detailed and does not comply with the conventions that are followed in 
scholarly publications today. Abdel Razek assumed that his audience, which 
included his peers – theologians, scholars, judges and lawmakers, as well as 
politicians – would have been familiar with the texts to which he refers, in the 
same way that an early twentieth-century essay written in Europe with refer-
ences to Saint Thomas Aquinas or Nietzsche would be readily understood 
without necessarily requiring further reference details. Abdel Razek’s sources 
include some traditional classics, such as books of hadith, The Muqaddimah of 
Ibn Khaldun and a number of treatises widely used in academia during his time. 
We know that most of these sources were published in Arabic with no English 
translation available. 
For the sake of clarity, this volume includes a list of Abdel Razek’s sources 
with full publication details. The text also includes some explanatory notes, in 
square brackets, beside Abdel Razek’s original footnotes. Additional notes are 
provided about particular people, events or vocabulary that may be unfamiliar 
to modern readers; these notes are indicated with asterisks. Readers may find, 
however, that Abdel Razek’s argument is such that exact references may not be 
needed to comprehend his logic.
In form as well as in substance, the essay represented a major turn in breaking 
with traditional discourses. This may explain the shock that it produced. This 
becomes especially true when one bears in mind that Muslim scholarly circles 
from the tenth century onwards produced mainly commentaries on earlier 
works, glosses and summaries, some in verse form, built upon the assump-
tion that the important matters had been settled by early masters and all that 
remained for later generations was to strive to understand and assimilate.
On the other hand, the perspective taken by Abdel Razek assumes that 
normative judgements made within Sunni theological schools are the standard 
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and authentic representation of Muslim views. He often combines all other 
views – Shi’a, Kharijites and Mu’tazila – in one broad category under a label 
used by traditional Sunni theology, such as rawafidh (rejectionists), to refer 
to all those who rejected the assumptions of Sunnism. In his attempt to reach 
scholarly detached views, he did not go as far as to take seriously the diversity 
of interpretations that emerged in the history of Muslims. Historically it has 
been, and continues to be today, a reflex among many Muslim thinkers, often 
passed onto non-Muslim scholars, to assume that the Sunni interpretation sets 
the standard and that there is one broad unit called Islam that can be discussed 
from one main or even unique perspective, discarding variants that are consid-
ered “unorthodox”. Ali Abdel Razek does refer to “variants” within the Muslim 
tradition, but he does so by using the terminology of Sunni authorities. As a 
result, he shares an attitude that does not rise to the standards of the scholarly 
and rigorous approach that he strives to attain. Paradoxically, while he takes an 
approach more in line with modern scholarly trends, including the “rediscovery” 
of the Mu’tazila and of Ibn Khaldun, he remains deeply rooted in attitudes 
proper to traditional Sunni circles, where the Shi’a and others are seen as remote 
and marginal “sects”.

Islam and the Foundations
of Political Power

In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.
I bear witness that there is no god but God. I worship and fear none but Him. 
All but Him are as nothing. Unto Him is the power and the glory. Praise be to 
Him in this world and the next. He is my only recourse, and my best protector. I 
bear witness too that Muhammad is the Messenger, sent as a witness, a giver of 
glad tidings and warnings, to summon humankind to God, and be a guiding 
light to them. May God’s peace be upon him, and may he be in peace.*
In the year 1333 ah [1915] I was appointed a judge in the Islamic courts of Egypt 
and subsequently began developing an interest in the history of Islamic jurispru-
dence.
Jurisprudence, with all its branches, is an instrument of governance. Its 
history is closely linked to that of the political establishment. Moreover, Islamic 
jurisprudence is a key element of Islamic government. Therefore, if we wish to 
understand the institution of Islamic jurisprudence, it is first necessary to under-
stand the basis upon which it has been founded; in other words, to understand 
the nature of political authority in Islam. 
It is generally believed in Islam that all power resides with the caliphate, the 
supreme imamate. Therefore, I have decided to begin this work with an inves-
tigation of the caliphate – something which I initiated many years ago. I now 
feel, however, that I have barely accomplished anything significant, as all I have 
managed to produce at the end of what was truly a laborious task are these few 
pages. It is with the utmost humility, therefore, that I present them to the inter-
ested reader. 
These pages are meant to be an introduction to the study of the history of 
jurisprudence. They cover all the principal conclusions I have reached concerning 
the caliphate and the theory of political power in Islam. I do not claim to have 
exhausted this topic in all its aspects, or to have achieved anything beyond a 
Foreword
 * This is a ritual prayer formula with which Muslim theologians would open their essays.
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general treatment of the subject. At times, I have had to satisfy myself with 
 statements that may appear evasive or allusions that may seem vague.
I earnestly wish to be able to amend the weaknesses of this work, which I am 
the first to acknowledge. And if that is not possible, I will have at least provided 
new ideas on the subject; ideas which I express to other scholars with the utmost 
candour and honesty. I hope, too, that this work will offer a starting point for 
further elaboration and that it may propel those who remain unclear about these 
questions to look for further answers. 
That being said, I must state that these pages are the fruit of a labour in which 
I have invested the better part of my energies for many years. These years have 
been difficult; full of forced interruptions, worries and loss of heart. I might, 
for example, work for a day, only to find that events outside my control obliged 
me to put off the job for several days. I might return to it for a month, only to 
find myself having to interrupt it once again, for several months at a stretch. 
Naturally, therefore, the work as it stands now falls well short of the quality I 
had intended it to have. All the same, it represents my best efforts and the best 
conclusions that I was able to reach.
God charges not any soul except with what it can bear. To its credit belongs 
what it has earned: upon it falls the burden of what it has deserved. 
Our Lord,
Take us not to task if we forget or err.
Our Lord,
Do not lay upon us a heavy burden, as You laid upon those 
who came before us.
Our Lord,
Do not lay upon us what we have no power to bear.
Pardon us, forgive us, be merciful towards us.
You are our Patron, so grant us Your support against the impious.1
Ali Abdel Razek
Mansoura, Friday, Ramadan 7, 1343 [1 April 1925]
 1 Qur’an 2.286. [The Qur’an: A New Translation, trans. Tarif Khalidi, Penguin Classics: London, 2006. 
All Qur’anic verses are taken from this translation and are referenced as Qur’an sura.aya; chapter 
number.verse number.]
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Linguistic origins of the word “caliphate” – Conventional usage – The signifi-
cance of the theory of the Prophet’s deputyship – Explanation for the choice of 
the term – The rights of the caliph according to common belief – On whether 
the caliph’s prerogatives are defined in religious law (sharī’a) – Caliphate and 
monarchy – Origins of the caliph’s power – The theory according to which the 
caliph derives his power directly from God – The theory that the caliph derives 
his authority from the people – Prevalence of the same difference of opinion 
among thinkers in the West
1. The root form of the word “caliphate” has the sense of deputising for someone, 
succeeding him or following in his wake. It also means performing an office in 
lieu of another, whether in the latter’s presence or absence.
Had We willed We could have created you as angels, to take your place on earth.1
Khilafa (caliphate), then, is a “standing-in” for someone who happens to have 
died, is ill or incapacitated. The plural of khilafa is khala’if, while the plural of 
khailifa (caliph) is khulafa’.2 The caliph is the supreme holder of power (sultan).3
2. In Muslim usage, the term “caliphate”, for which the term “imamate” is used 
as a synonym, refers to an overall leadership of the community in spiritual as well 
 1 Qur’an 43.60. 
 2 Definitions given by Al-Isfahani in his Al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-Qur’ān [“Rare Terms in the Qur’an”, 
c. 1109].
 3 See dictionaries, collections of hadith and other reference works.
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as temporal affairs by a successor to the Prophet.4 Al-Baydawi5 offers a similar 
definition: “The imamate is the office of someone who deputises for the Prophet, 
with a view to the observance of the religious law (sharī’a) and defending the 
community through means that it is obliged to follow.”6 
Ibn Khaldun explains this as follows: “And to exercise the caliphate means 
to cause the masses to act as required by religious insight into their interests in 
the other world as well as in this world. The worldly interests have bearing upon 
the interests in the other world, since according to the Lawgiver (Muhammad); 
all worldly conditions are to be considered in their relation to their value for 
the other world. Thus, the caliphate in reality substitutes for the Lawgiver 
(Muhammad), in as much as it serves, like him, to protect the religion and to 
exercise (political) leadership in the world.”7
3. According to the sources mentioned above, the office of the caliph substitutes 
the office of the Prophet, who during his lifetime was entrusted with a religious 
mission arising from divine revelation. He was charged with maintaining the 
Message of Islam and implementing its tenets, transmitting it from God to the 
people and summoning them towards Him.
These scholars think that God appointed the Prophet Muhammad to propa-
gate the truth, to convey the tenets of His holy law to humanity and simultane-
ously, to preserve the religion and conduct temporal affairs in accordance with 
its principles.8
Upon the death of the Prophet, the caliphs succeeded him in both of his 
roles: as a custodian of the religion, and in the regulation of the community’s 
quotidian affairs in accordance with the principles of the faith. 
4. The name imam is derived from the comparison (of the caliph) with the 
leader (imam) of prayer, since (the caliph) is followed and taken as a model, just 
 4 See Abd as-Salam al Laqani’s commentary, Itḥāf al-Murīd bi-Sharaḥ Jawharat at-Tawḥīd [“The 
Disciple’s Contribution to Commentary on the Essence of Divine Unity”, 1831] on Abd as-Salam’s 
Sharḥ Jawharāt at-Tawḥīd [“Explaining the Essence of Divine Unity”, c. 1276].
 5 His full name is Nassir al-Din Abu Said Abdallah ibn Umar ibn Muhammad al-Shirazi al-Baydawi. 
Died in 791 ah [1388].
 6 Refer to the book by the latter titled Ṭawāli’ al-Anwār min Maṭāli’ al-Anẓār [Al-Baydawi, “Manifesta-
tions from the Perspectives of the Horizon”, c. 1300]. [This is a summary of Zamakhshari’s Al-Kashāf 
al-Tanzil, c. 1132.]
 7 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, vol. 1, pp. 387–8 [trans. Franz Rosenthal, Chichester: Princeton 
University Press, 1967. All subsequent quotations from the Muqaddimah refer to this edition].
 8 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, vol. 1, pp. 387–8. 
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like the prayer leader. Therefore (the caliphate) is called the “great imamate”.
The name “caliph” (khalifah) is given to the caliph, because he repre-
sents (kh-l-f  ) the Prophet in Islam. One uses “caliph” alone, or “caliph of the 
Messenger of God”. There is a difference of opinion concerning the use of “caliph 
of God”. Some consider (this expression) permissible as derived from the general 
“caliphate” (representation of God) of all descendants of Adam, implied in the 
verse of the Qur’an, “I shall appoint a deputy on earth” (Qur’an 2.30) and the 
verse, “It is He Who made you inheritors of the earth” (Qur’an 6.165). But, in 
general, it is not permissible to use (the expression “caliph of God”), since the 
verse quoted has no reference to it (in connection with the caliphate in the 
specific sense of the term). Abu Bakr forbade the use (of the expression “caliph 
of God”) when he was thus addressed. He said, “I am not caliph of God, but the 
caliph (representative, successor) of the Messenger of God.”9
5. Nevertheless, these scholars suggest that the caliph assumes the same position 
as the Prophet towards the faithful. He is expected to govern their affairs and 
is entitled to receive their unconditional obedience while exercising absolute 
sovereignty over them. It is the duty of the caliph to ensure strict observance of 
religious principles, to implement the legal provisions contained in the sharī’a 
and to administer the affairs of the community. 
On their part, the faithful are expected to show love and devotion to the 
caliph as he is the successor to the prophet whose position, in the eyes of 
Muslims, is that of the noblest individual. The caliph therefore becomes entitled 
to the respect due to a representative of the Prophet; the supreme overseer and 
defender of the faith. As protecting the Message [of Islam] is a task of supreme 
importance, one who is entrusted with this religious duty carries a mission of the 
greatest nobility and dignity. 
According to several hadiths, the faithful are obliged to listen to the caliph 
and to obey him both “outwardly and inwardly”.10 For obedience to the imam 
is equivalent to obedience to God; while disobeying him is tantamount to 
disobeying God.11 The obligation of offering counsel to and obeying the imam is 
 9 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, pp. 387–8.
10 See the commentary of Al-Bajuri on Al-Jawhara. [The commentary is entitled Sharḥ Jawharāt 
at-Tawḥīd, “Explaining the Essence of Divine Unity”, c. 1276.]
11 A tradition attributed to Abu Hurayra. See Ibn ‘Abd Rabbuh, Al-‘Iqd al-Farīd. [“The Unique 
Necklace”, c. 860–940. Abu Hurayra (603–81) was one of the Prophet’s companions to whom many 
hadith reports were attributed by later hadith collectors.]
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a religious duty and a necessity. Faith is not complete, nor the profession of the 
Islamic faith fulfilled, until this duty is realised.12
In sum, the person endowed with the authority of the caliph thus becomes 
the successor of the Messenger of God. He represents the power of God13 as His 
shadow on earth. His authority over Muslims, like the authority of God Himself 
or His Prophet, becomes absolute. It is not surprising therefore, that he should 
proclaim power over the souls and the goods of men.14
It follows that the caliph is the only person entitled to command and to 
forbid; as well as to administer the major and minor affairs of the umma. Any 
other authority that is hierarchically inferior to the caliph, then, must derive 
from him. Any secondary function is encompassed within the caliph’s own 
authority. All duties, whether religious or worldly, belong to his office. For, “It 
has become clear that to be caliph in reality means acting as substitute for the 
Lawgiver (Muhammad) with regard to the preservation of the religion and the 
political leadership of the world”:15 “The caliphate is a kind of mainspring and 
comprehensive basis, and all these (functions) are branches of it and fall under 
it because of the wide scope of the caliphate, its active interest in all conditions 
of the Muslim community, both religious and worldly, and its general power to 
execute the religious laws relative to both (religious and worldly affairs)”.16
The caliph does not share his authority with anyone else. He alone has 
authority over Muslims, except for that which he delegates to others. Personages 
such as judges, governors, moral guardians and all other officers in charge of the 
affairs of Muslims are subordinates of the caliph. He alone is entitled to appoint 
or dismiss them, and is the only person with the right to define the scope and 
boundaries of their prerogatives. 
6. It may seem, from the work of these scholars and their definition of the 
caliphate, that the caliph’s authority is confined to ensuring a strict observance 
of the edicts of the sharī’a; which he is required to enforce and which he would 
12 Ibid.
13 In a speech given at Mecca, the Caliph Al-Mansur said: “O people, I represent the power of God 
on earth, I lead you with His support, His guidance and His backing. I am also the guardian of His 
treasury, for which I act following His will and decision, distributing His allocations with His agree-
ment, since He made me a trustee in charge of overseeing it” (Al-‘Iqd al-Farīd).
14 See Al-Baydawi, Ṭawāli’ al-Anwār min Maṭāli’ al-Anẓār [“Manifestations from the Perspectives of the 
Horizon”, c. 1300]. 
15 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 448.
16 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 449.
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by no means infringe upon. He is duty-bound to guide Muslims along a single, 
unique path, distinct from all others. This is a straight, unwinding path, defined 
by the principles, objectives and guidelines that are unequivocally laid down in 
the sharī’a; thus making it impossible for the faithful to go astray. Furthermore, 
these same principles, objectives and guidelines also prevent the caliph from 
either deviating from the sharī’a or abusing his power. This is understood as the 
path of the Islamic faith shown to Muslims long ago by the Prophet Muhammad. 
It is the path outlined in the Book of God, the traditions of His Prophet and the 
consensus [ijmā] of Muslims.
The theologians discussed earlier, believe that the caliph’s authority is rigor-
ously restricted by the sharī’a. They consider this a sufficient safeguard against 
potential abuses or deviations on his part. Some go as far as to assert that if a 
caliph happens to commit an injustice, or to compromise himself through 
debauchery, he would de facto disqualify himself.
7. For this reason, Muslim scholars have made a distinction between caliphate 
and kingship. (To exercise) natural royal authority means to cause masses to act 
as required by purpose and desire. (To exercise) political (royal authority) means 
to cause the masses to act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the 
means of furthering their worldly interests and avoiding anything that is harmful 
(in that respect). (And to exercise) the caliphate means to cause the masses to act 
as required by religious insight into their interests in the other world as well as 
in this world.17 
Thus, Ibn Khaldun came to conclude that a genuine caliphate existed only 
during the first era of the Islamic State and up to the end of ‘Ali’s reign.
It has thus been shown how the form of government came to be royal 
authority. However, there remained the traits that are characteristic of the 
caliphate, namely, preference for Islam and its ways, and adherence to the 
path of truth. A change became apparent only in the restraining influence 
that had been Islam and now came to be group feeling and the sword. That 
was the situation in the time of Mu’awiyah, Marwan, his son ‘Abd-al-Malik, 
and the first Abbasid caliphs down to ar-Rashid and some of his sons. Then, 
the characteristic traits of the caliphate disappeared, and only its name 
remained. The form of government came to be royal authority pure and 
17 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 387.
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simple. Superiority attained the limits of its nature and was employed for 
particular (worthless) purposes, such as the use of force and the arbitrary 
gratification of desires and for pleasures.
 This was the case with the successors of the sons of ’Abd-al-Malik and 
the Abbasids after al-Mu’tasim and al-Mutawakkil. They remained caliphs 
in name, due to the continuation of “the spirit of collective solidarity” 
[assabiya] among the Arabs. In these two stages caliphate and royal authority 
existed side by side. Then, with the disappearance of the spirit of collective 
solidarity and the annihilation of the (Arab) race and complete destruc-
tion of (Arabism), the caliphate lost its identity. The form of government 
remained royal authority pure and simple.
 This was the case, for instance, with the non-Arab rulers in the East. They 
showed obedience to the caliph in order to enjoy the blessings (involved in 
that), but royal authority belonged to them with all its titles and attributes. 
The caliph had no share in it. The same was done by the Zanatah rulers of the 
Maghrib. The Sinhajah, for instance, had just such a relationship with the 
’Ubaydid (Fatimids), and the Maghrawah and also the Banu Yafran (Ifren) 
with the Umayyad caliphs in Spain and Ubaydid (Fatimids) in al-Qayrawan.
 It is thus clear that the caliphate first existed without royal authority. 
Then, the characteristic traits of the caliphate became mixed up and 
confused. Finally, when royal authority came to exist alone its spirit of 
collective solidarity had separated from the spirit of collective solidarity 
of the caliphate.18
8. Having attributed so much power to the caliph’s position, and having raised 
it to such exalted heights, the scholars ought to have informed us of the source 
of the power imputed to the caliph. Furthermore, they ought to have explained 
from where it sprang – who bequeathed this power to the caliph? However, the 
fact is that these scholars neglected to follow this manner of enquiry, just as they 
neglected the study of other political subjects that might have placed the caliph’s 
position into question, or under discussion. Nevertheless, upon reading some 
of the relevant statements of these scholars, we may infer that Muslims have 
adopted two theories regarding the matter of the caliphate.
18 See the chapter, “Transformation of the caliphate into a monarchy” in Ibn Khaldun, The Muqad-
dimah, pp. 427–8. 
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9. The first theory, widely shared among Muslim scholars and by the general 
public, asserts that the caliph derives his authority and power directly from God. 
All the studies and treatises regarding the caliphate concur with this point of 
view and refer to this belief. As indicated above,19 Muslim scholars have inter-
preted the caliph as the shadow of God on earth. Abu Ja’afar al-Mansur went so 
far as to presume that he was God’s power on Earth.*
This opinion was widely spread among Muslims. Religious scholars and poets 
have proclaimed it from the early years of Islam. They attested that it was God 
Himself who appointed the caliph, and bequeathed His authority to him, as 
illustrated in the following verses:
He became the caliph
Or rather the caliphate 
was destined for him – 
Like Moses 
Who was destined
To approach God.
Another poet, speaking in the same vein, said:
God entrusted it to you
For the betterment
And the salvation 
Of the community.**
Again, in the same vein, Al-Farazdaq20 said:
Hisham,21 God’s chosen one
For the people, 
 * See Peri J. Bearman et al. (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, 12 vols, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960–2005.
 ** These excerpts of poetry were popular during the classical period.
19 Ibid., paragraph 5.
20 Abu Firas, Humam ibn Ghalib ibn Sa’sa’a, reputed to have lived for over a hundred years, died in Basra 
in 110, 112 or 114 ah [728, 730 or 732]. [Al-Farazdaq’s poetry collections include Dīwān al-Farazdaq 
[“The Anthology of Farazdaq”], c. 720 and Naqā’iḍ bayna al-Jarīr wal-Farazdaq [“The Polemic Poem 
between al-Jarir and Farazadaq”], c. 720.]
21 Hicham ibn Abd al-Malik was the tenth Umayyad caliph. He died in Rusafa in 125 ah [743] at the 
age of fifty-five.
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For whom darkness withdraws
From all over the earth,
The sky to which they look, 
Praying for rain.
This point of view led the poets to such exaggeration as to exalt the caliphs to the 
rank, or near rank, of the Divine Being. Thus, one of the poets says:
It is what you will, not what destiny wills.
Command as you will, for you are the One, the Omnipotent.
Praising al-Walid ibn Yazid,* Tarih said:22
You are the son of the vast plains. 
Never have you been confined in the depths of any vales.
Praised be your ancestors from here and from there,
Praised be your noble origins.
If you order the floods to divert from their course, 
Topped by waves high as mountains,
They will scatter, withdraw, turn aside from your path.
If, on the other hand, one examines the writings of several religious scholars 
[‘ulamā], especially after the fifth century of the hijra, one finds that they begin 
their work by mentioning a king or potentate. Invariably, they place him above 
the rest of humankind, crediting him with quasi-divine qualities. This is illus-
trated in the preamble to Ar-Risāla ash-Shamsīya fīl-Qawā’īd al-Manṭaqīya,** by 
Najm al-Din al-Qazwini:23 
He thus beckoned to me: the one who enjoys the solicitude of the Supreme 
Being, who has the exclusive benefit of Divine support, towards whom 
everyone gravitates, and attachment to whom carries advantage to those 
who obey as well as disobey. 
 * Eleventh caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. He ruled from 743 to 744 and was killed in 744.
 ** c. 1276.
22 Tarih ibn Ismail Naqfi chanted for Al-Walid ibn Yazid (an Umayyad) and later for Abu Jaafar 
al-Mansur (an Abbasid). See Kitāb al-Aghānī. [“The Book of Songs”, an encyclopaedic collection of 
poems and songs by the scholar Abu i-Farai al-Isfahani, 897–967.]
23 Known as the Katibi. Died in 493 ah [1100].
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Likewise, Al-Qazwini’s critic, Qutb al-Din al-Rāzī,24 begins his commentary 
with the following: 
I have sought through this work to serve the one who has been graced by 
God’s holy spirit, and who has been divinely appointed in command of 
men … the one whose face bears signs of eternal felicity and the tokens of 
divine favour, the nobility of truth of the state and religion; the wise man 
of Islam, to Muslims, a guide.
Abd al-Hakim al-Sialakuti25 says in his gloss concerning the above-mentioned 
commentary: 
I have made this work a gift to the one chosen by God for eternal sovereignty, 
favoured by his supreme support … the propagator of the true faith, the 
founder of the principles of the Holy Law, the shadow of God in the two 
lands, the saviour of Islam and of Muslims, the builder of God’s nations, 
the successor to the Prophet, graced with divine support and victory …26
In sum, the theory according to which the caliph derives his authority from God 
was dominant in the discourse of the theologians; hence, it became widespread 
among Muslims.
10. According to another theory, upheld by some scholars and expounded at 
length, the caliph derives his authority from the umma, which designates and 
confers sovereignty on him. Al-Hutay’a27 seems to favour this theory. Addressing 
Umar ibn al-Khattab, he said:
You are the Imam to whom, after his companion,
Men entrusted the reins of authority.
In choosing you it was not you they favoured,
It was for their own sake that they did so.
24 Qutb al-Dīn Mahmud ibn Muhammad ar-Rāzī. Died in 466 ah [1033]. Ar-Risāla ash-Shamsīya 
fīl-Qawā’īd al-Manṭaqīya [“The Dazzling Work on the Foundations of Logic”, 1948]. 
25 Qadi ‘Abd al-Hakim al-Sialakuti. Died in 1067 ah [1657] and was buried in Sialakut.
26 See the collection published by Sheikh Faraj Allah Zaki al-Kurdi in 1323 ah [1905]. [The author is 
alluding to a collection that is no longer available.] 
27 Jarual ibn Aws ibn Malik, died around 30 ah [650]. 
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The most complete exposition of this theory along with its most categorical 
defence can be found in the treatise entitled Caliphate and the Sovereignty of the 
Nation, published by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara.28 
11. A similar disagreement to that among Muslims regarding the basis of the 
ruler’s power emerged among Europeans and had a considerable impact on their 
history. The first of the theories discussed above bears a resemblance to the ideas 
of Thomas Hobbes,29 to the effect that “the power of kings is sacred and divinely 
ordained”. The second theory is quite similar to the ideas of John Locke on this 
topic.30
We hope, in this first chapter, to have given a sufficient account of the signif-
icance attached by Muslim scholars to the caliphate, particularly of the belief 
according to which the caliphate denotes “the management of worldly and 
religious affairs by a delegate of the Prophet”.31
28 Translated into Arabic by Abd-al-Ghani Sunni and published in Egypt in 1924. [Caliphate and the 
Sovereignty of the Nation was an attempt by a group of religious lawyers to provide a religious justi-
fication for the change in government in Turkey in 1922. On behalf of the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, the lawyers issued a statement which reasoned that the change was in harmony with the 
Qur’an.]
29 Thomas Hobbes, 1588–1679. See Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student’s History of Philosophy, 1901. 
30 John Locke, 1632–1704. See Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student’s History of Philosophy, 1901.
31 Saad Eddin Taftazani, Maqāṣid at-Ṭālibīn fī Ilm Uṣūl ad-Dīn. [“The Aims of Students and the 
Foundations of Faith”, 1383.]
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The Status of the Caliphate
The proponents of the necessity of the caliphate – The opponents of this theory 
– The arguments of the former – The Qur’an and the caliphate – Resolution of 
doubts surrounding some verses of the Qur’an – The tradition (sunna) and the 
caliphate – Refutation of the arguments of those who claim that justification 
can be found in the sunna
1. The scholars discussed in Chapter 1 considered the appointment of a caliph 
to be a binding duty; they believed that to do otherwise would be to commit a 
sin. Nevertheless, these scholars disagree on whether the basis of the caliphate is 
rational or legal. However, this is not the issue we are interested in here. Rather, 
we are concerned most notably with the fact that the necessity of the caliphate 
was so widely accepted that Ibn Khaldun himself claimed it was a question to be 
settled by consensus or ijmā. 
2. Ibn Khaldun argues: “Some people have taken the exceptional position of 
stating that the position of imam is not necessary at all, neither according to 
the intellect nor according to religious law. People who have held that opinion 
include the Mu’tazilah al-Asamm and certain Kharijites, among others. They 
think that it is necessary only to observe the religious laws. Those (who so argue) 
are refuted by the general consensus.1
3. These scholars present various arguments as outlined below in support of the 
idea that the caliphate is essential:
 1 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, pp. 390–1.
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First, the consensus of the Prophet’s companions: 
At the death of the Prophet, the men around him proceeded to render the 
oath of allegiance to Abu Bakr and to entrust him with the supervision 
of their affairs. And so it was at all subsequent periods. In no period were 
people left in a state of anarchy. This was so by general consensus, which 
proves that the position of imam is a necessary one.2
Secondly, the appointment of an imam is: 
a prerequisite for the due maintenance of worship and the well being of the 
governed. It is equivalent to the enjoining of the right and prohibition of 
the wrong, both of which are, without doubt, religious duties. Unless an 
imam is appointed, these duties cannot be performed, nor can the affairs 
of the governed be organised. Without them, voluntary gifts are replaced 
by confiscations, injustice proliferates, chaos prevails, and the antagonisms 
inherent in human society remain unresolved. No doubt, whatever is 
essential for the discharge of a duty itself becomes a duty. Consequently, 
the appointment of an imam becomes a duty. Its character as a duty may 
be deduced in the same manner as the obligation to observe, within the 
bounds set by the Lawgiver, the six fundamental rules – the protection, 
namely, of the faith, of human life, of reason, of the integrity of lineage, of 
property and of honour.3 
4. None of the scholars who attested that the appointment of an imam was 
a religious duty could substantiate this thesis with a verse from the Qur’an. If 
such a verse had existed, the scholars concerned would not have hesitated to 
utilise and expound it at length. Had there existed a mere shred of evidence in 
favour of the thesis of the imamate as an obligation, the more zealous among 
the proponents of the caliphate would have taken this hint as complete proof. 
However, the scholars, whether neutral or partial to the caliphate, were unable 
to find any arguments in favour of their thesis in God’s book. Therefore, they 
satisfied themselves with the legal thesis that a consensus had been reached on 
the subject, with further, logical elaborations.
 2 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 389.
 3 Commentary titled Al-Qawl al-Mufīd ‘ala ar-Risāla al-Musāma’a Wasīlat al-‘Abīd fī ‘Ilm at-Tawḥīd 
[“Useful Remarks on the Work entitled ‘Means of Devotion in the Science of Divine Unity’”, c. 1908].
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5. We need, however, to elucidate the true meaning of several verses in the 
Qur’an with a view to eliminating any ambiguity about their potential bearing 
on the question of the imamate: 
O believers, obey God and obey the Prophet and those set in authority over 
you. If you dispute among yourselves over any matter, refer it to God and the 
Messenger, if you believe in God and the Last Day. This would be best, and 
best also in consequence.4
When there comes to them a report, bearing news of security or of foreboding, 
they spread it wide. Were they to refer it to the Messenger and to those set in 
authority over them, its true import would be ascertained from them by those 
best fitted to understand it. Were it not for God’s bounty upon you and His 
mercy, you would have followed Satan, all but a few.5
We do not know of any scholar who claims to find support in these verses for 
either of the two proposals in question. Therefore, in an effort to avoid being 
derailed by superfluous issues and arguments, we will not prolong this discus-
sion.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that exegetes of the Qur’an interpreted the 
expression “those in authority” in the first of the verses quoted above as a refer-
ence to Muslim princes during the Prophet’s lifetime as well as afterwards. These 
included caliphs, judges, military commanders and, according to the words of 
the Qur’an, “those in authority among them, those of them whose task it is to 
investigate”, including theologians.6
Alternatively, the expression “those in authority” in the second verse refers to 
“the most acute-minded among the companions of the Prophet, or to those who 
were in authority among them”.7
In either case, there is nothing in these two verses to support the argument 
in favour of the caliphate. At most, these verses may be interpreted to imply that 
certain people present, among Muslims, are entrusted with the conduct of their 
public affairs. This, of course, has a much wider, more general meaning than the 
 4 Qur’an 4.59.
 5 Qur’an 4.83.
 6 See the commentary by Al-Baydawi, Ṭawāli’ al-Anwār min Maṭāli’ al-Anẓār [“Manifestations from 
the Perspectives of the Horizon”, c. 1300]. 
 7 See al-Zamakhshari, Al-Kashāf al-Tanzil [“The Revealer”, c. 1142].
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theory of the caliphate mentioned (by the religious scholars). The two differ to 
such an extent as to appear unrelated.
If one wished to enquire further into this topic one could consult the volume 
The Caliphate by the great scholar Sir Thomas Arnold.8 The explanation offered 
in the second and third chapters of his work is both charming and persuasive.
It would be appropriate in this connection to cite the remark made by the 
author of the Mawāqif at the end of his argument about the need for the appoint-
ment of an imam through a consensus among Muslims:
If it is claimed that the ijmā needs to be supported and if the supporting 
tradition were at hand, it would have been transmitted without interrup-
tion. For this would have been required. Either the consensus was that it 
was not considered necessary or, alternatively, that the support required 
would be by way of observable facts available only to the contemporaries 
of the Prophet.*
As is clear, this author concluded that the consensus in this connection was not 
verifiable. Moreover, the author of the Mawāqif would have had no reason to 
resort to such arguments if he had found support for this claim in the holy book.
If we read the Qur’an from beginning to end, we find the treatment of every 
possible case and details concerning all aspects of religion – We have not neglected 
any matter in this Book.9 However, we do not find any reference to a general 
imamate or caliphate. This, then, is something that merits examination. 
6. The issue of the caliphate is not only passed over in the Qur’an, it is equally 
ignored in the sunna. This is borne out by the fact that the religious scholars 
were unable to provide even a single hadith in support of their case on this issue. 
Had they found the least evidence to buttress their argument in the sunna, they 
would have used it to reinforce the idea of unanimous agreement. Had this 
been the case, the author of the Mawāqif would not have argued that the idea of 
unanimous agreement was not embedded in tradition.
7. Muhammad Rashid Rida, seeking to find evidence for the caliphate in the 
 * See Abdurrahman al-Eiji, Al-Mawāqif fī-‘ilm al-Kalām [“Doctrines of Theology”, 1355].
 8 Sir Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate [Oxford, 1924].
 9 Qur’an 6.38.
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prophet’s traditions, repeated the arguments used by Sa’ad al-Din Al Taftazani10 
in favour of this theory in his work Al Maqāṣid. However, none of the arguments 
used in the Al Maqāṣid were to be found in the Qur’an or the sunna. Rida 
 therefore accused Sa’ad al-Din of having “neglected”, just like the other authors, 
to back up his conclusion regarding the need for the appointment of an imam. 
These hadiths are explicit about the collective commitment of Muslims towards 
their imams, and in some cases go as far as to state that anyone who dies without 
having sworn allegiance to an imam dies the death of a jahili.* Likewise, in the 
authenticated hadith transmitted by Hodayfa, the prophet speaks of “a binding 
obligation for the whole community of Muslims and their imam”.11 
Before considering this objection, we should note that the author admits what 
we have already pointed out, namely, that the claims of the religious scholars lack 
support in the sunna.
In fact, Rida’s contribution to this debate was not novel. Ibn Hazm12 had 
already said: “Both the Qur’an and the sunna lay down the obligation to obey 
the imam, as is made clear by the verse: ‘O you who have attained to faith! Pay 
heed unto God and pay heed unto the Apostle and unto those from among you 
who have been entrusted with authority’,13 and by many other genuine hadiths 
of the Prophet which stress the obligation to institute the imamate and obey the 
imams.”14** 
However, when we examine these words of the Prophet, we find nothing 
more than allusions to notions such as the “imamate”, “allegiance”, “community” 
and so on. This is the case for instance in the following hadiths: 
The imams should be of Qurayshi origin; it is binding upon the community 
of Muslims; the person who dies without having sworn allegiance to an 
 * This notion is conventionally used to indicate one who has not been enlightened by the faith; 
however, etymologically it would be translated as “pagan” or “savage” in the sense of one who has not 
yet been “civilised”.
 ** Abdel Razek uses the word “imam” according to one of its two main meanings in the Sunni lexicon, 
rendering it interchangeable with “caliph”; he does not take into account the various Shi’a meanings 
and associations with the concept of “imama”.
10 Sa’ad al-Din Al Taftazani, Mas’ud ibn ‘Umar or ‘Umar ibn Mas’ud, born in Taftazan (a locality in 
Khorassan) in 722 ah [1322], died in Samarkand in 792 ah [1390]. [See Al-Fawā’id al-Bahīya fī 
Tarājim al-Ḥanafīya [“The Splendid Benefits of Hanafi Biographies”], c. 1357.]
11 Muhammad Rashid Rida, Al-Khilāfa wal-Imāma al-‘Uẓma [“The Caliphate and the Great Imamate”, 
1924]. 
12 Abu Muhammad ‘Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Said, born in Cordoba in 384 ah [994] and died in 456 ah 
[1063].
13 Qur’an 4.59.
14 Ibn Hazm, Al-Faṣl fīl-Milal wal-Niḥal [“The Book of Sects and Creeds”, c. 994–1064].
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imam is like someone who dies without having adhered to Islam; if someone 
has given allegiance to an imam and committed his actions and sentiments 
to him, he is bound to obey him as far as possible; if someone disputes the 
imam’s authority, he should be decapitated; and follow the example of those 
who come after me – Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and so on.15
Nothing in the above quotation supports the claim that the sharī’a conclusively 
lays down the principle of the caliphate or the great imamate, understood as a 
deputyship for the Prophet and a fulfilment of the functions that he undertook 
among Muslims.
We do not wish to question the authenticity of the hadiths drawn upon 
here, although there might be a lot to say on that issue. Let us assume, for the 
sake of discussion, that all the hadiths are authentic. Nor do we wish to debate 
the significance given by the Lawgiver (the Prophet Muhammad) to the words 
“imamate”, “allegiance”, “community” and so on.
We would embark on a discussion of the significance of these words if we 
wanted to illustrate that these expressions, as used in the religious law, do not 
carry the same interpretations as those introduced later, in Islamic discourse, 
after the fact.
We will, however, disregard these above-mentioned controversial questions 
and assume that all the afore-mentioned hadiths are authentic, that the notions 
of “imam” and “caliph” carry the same meaning in the sharī’a as they do for 
contemporary supporters of the “great imamate”; that “allegiance” refers to 
allegiance to the caliph; and that “Muslim community” and the community 
governed by the Islamic caliphate mean the same thing.
Even upon accepting all of the above premises, and admitting all possible 
concessions; we cannot find, in the entire body of the above-cited traditions, any 
evidence that the institution of the caliphate is a matter of religious dogma, or 
that it is entailed by religious belief. 
Jesus Christ said, “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s”.* This Biblical phrase 
does not mean that Jesus attributed a divine foundation to Caesar’s government. 
It does not decree that recognition of Caesar’s government is a part of the Chris-
tian creed. No one who has an understanding of linguistic usage can interpret 
Jesus’ words in a manner that would support assumptions of this sort.
 * Matthew 22.21. 
15 These hadiths are quoted in Rashid Rida, Al-Khilāfa wal-Imāma al-‘Uẓma [“The Caliphate and the 
Great Imamate”, 1924].
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The above allusions to the concepts of “caliphate”, “imamate” and “allegiance” 
in the Prophet’s hadiths do not mean anything beyond what Christ meant when 
he referred to the legal requirements pertaining to the government of Caesar.
If it is true that the Prophet commanded us to obey an imam whom we 
ourselves have nominated, then it is no less true that God has commanded us to 
honour our agreements with polytheists and to be fair in our dealings with them 
as long as they are fair to us. This does not mean that God sanctions polytheism, 
or that we should, in compliance with His order, sanction it ourselves. Does the 
religious law not require us to obey tyrants and unjust rulers if we are obliged to 
do so and if we reckoned that acting otherwise would cause grave unrest? Such 
a precept does not mean that tyranny is legitimate, or that rebellion against a 
government is lawful. Are we not commanded by the sharī’a to be generous to 
beggars, considerate to the poor, and kind and compassionate towards them? 
Would a reasonable man deduce from this that we should make it a point to have 
poor people and beggars in our midst?
Again, God talks to us about slavery. He exhorts us to set slaves free, to 
treat them well and lays down several other recommendations regarding them. 
However, this does not imply that slavery is a religious obligation, or that it is 
desirable.
The same applies to issues such as divorce, borrowing, commerce, mortgaging 
and so on, mentioned frequently in God’s book and plainly regulated in His 
law. This does not mean that these issues are religious duties, or that they have a 
special significance for God.
It is now easy to see what conclusion may be drawn from the fact that the 
Prophet spoke about issues such as the covenant of allegiance, power, govern-
ment and obedience to those in authority; even promulgating rules in this 
regard.
To treat the caliphate as a requirement of religious law is a proposition that 
has consequences of great magnitude. To resort to hadiths, even hadiths of 
proven authenticity, in an effort to legitimise this point of view, does not take 
the gravity of such a proposition fully into account.
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The Caliphate from the Social Point of View
The claim regarding consensus [ijmā] – An examination of this claim – The 
decline of political science amongst Muslims – Muslim interest in Greek 
learning – Uprisings among Muslims against the caliphate – The caliph’s 
reliance on coercion and suppression – Islam as a religion of human equality 
and honour – The office of the caliphate as a focus of affection and fervour – 
The caliphate, autocracy and oppression – The ultimate argument in favour 
of the caliphate – Caliphal royal resistance to a revival of the intellectual and 
political sciences – A rejection of the doctrine of consensus – Religion recog-
nises the institution of government – Government is not synonymous with 
the caliphate – The need for political authority, regardless of what type – The 
caliphate is not required by either religious or worldly criteria – The end of the 
caliphate in Islam – The nominal caliphate in Egypt – The outcome
1. For want of evidence from the Qur’an and the sunna, it was maintained that: 
After the Prophet’s death, there was ongoing consensus among the Muslims 
during the first era of Islam to ensure that the position of the imam did 
not fall vacant. In point of fact, Abu Bakr, in his famous address after the 
Prophet’s death, declared that the situation warranted someone to serve as 
a custodian of the faith. Everyone was united in entrusting to Abu Bakr the 
organisation of what was at that moment the most important task, namely, 
the burial of the Prophet. From that time on, in every age, Muslims acted 
likewise to nominate an imam to administer their affairs.1
 1 See Al-Eiji (d. 1355), Al-Mawāqif fī-‘ilm al-Kalām [“Doctrines in Theology”], 1355 and related 
commentaries in the same.
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2. Setting aside any possible disagreements, let us assume the legitimacy of ijmā.2 
Let us assume too, that consensus is capable of being secured in practice,3 and 
thereby ignore the objections of those who argue to the contrary and insist that 
this is not so. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the argument for consensus 
in this matter is quite unreliable. The authors we have discussed seem to find it 
impossible to produce evidence in support of their thesis. In any case, we will try 
to show that the reference to ijmā is unjustifiable as well as inaccurate; whether it 
involves the companions of the Prophet, or whether along with the companions 
it also includes the second generation of Muslims, or even the entire body of 
Muslim theologians.
3. The history of Muslim intellectual life shows that in comparison with other 
branches of learning, political science was notably neglected. It occupied a very 
modest position among other disciplines. Muslim intellectual activity displays 
a distinct absence of inquiry into systems of government or the foundations of 
political life. Minor endeavours, which are narrow in scope, do exist, but viewed 
in the context of the total intellectual output, these isolated exceptions seem all 
too limited and we do not find a single author or translator who specialises in 
the subject. Paradoxically, there were many valid reasons for Muslims to pursue 
serious research in political science, as a number of factors in their circumstances 
would motivate an earnest engagement with such an enquiry.
4. At the very least, the passion with which Muslims had taken to Greek science 
and philosophy should have served as a source of interest in the area of polit-
ical science; given the natural intelligence and insatiable scientific curiosity to 
which this testified. The works of the Greeks that were studied and translated by 
Muslims had the potential to encourage them to investigate this subject. Polit-
ical science is a very old discipline indeed. It had attracted interest among the 
 2 [The claim here is] that ijmā constitutes a formal legitimacy that is recognised as such by the majority 
of the community, with the exception only of those who followed differing views such as Ibrahim 
al-Nazzam the Mu’tazilite, al-Qashani and most of the Rafidites [rejectionists]. See Adbul-Aziz 
al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrār [“The Unveiling of Secrets”, c. 800].
 3 Some Rafidites and the Mu’tazilite al-Nazzam reject the possibility that ijmā can occur regarding 
matters that are not essential. Daoud and his partisans among the Zahirites and, following a few 
witnesses, Ibn-Hanbal, claimed that ijmā would only prevail among the Prophet’s Companions. The 
Zaydis and the Shi’a imams support the idea that ijmā can be valid only if it is authorised by the 
progeny of the Prophet (descendants of Imam ‘Ali). Malik ibn Anas is said to have held that ijmā was 
valid only among the people of Medina. See Adbul-Aziz al-Bukhari, Kashf al-Asrār [“The Unveiling 
of Secrets”, c. 800].
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forerunners of Greek philosophy and had left a deep imprint on their intellec-
tual production, indeed, on their very lives. 
5. There was another more pertinent incentive for Muslims to study political 
science. From the appointment of Abu Bakr as first caliph to our own day, the 
institution of the caliphate has never ceased to provoke uprisings. It has never 
been free of challenges, to the extent that there is not a single caliph in Muslim 
history who has not encountered opposition, or a single generation that did not 
witness the assassination of the incumbent of this office.
Now, this is undoubtedly true of all absolutist regimes, regardless of the 
nationality, faith or time period in question. We are convinced, however, that 
the Muslim case is unique in this respect, and it does not allow for comparison 
with other nations. The chronicles of Muslim history clearly indicate that from 
its very inception, the seat of the caliph has always faced opposition.
The history of this opposition has been momentous and is thus of tremen-
dous significance to note. At certain times, the opposition was a strong, well-
organised and blatant force. This was the case with the Kharijites under ‘Ali ibn 
Abi Talib.* At other times, it proceeded in a more clandestine manner, under 
the guise of esoteric systems such as the Batiniyya.** This was the case with the 
“partisans of union and progress”.† At times an opposition movement would 
atrophy, becoming nearly extinct, while at others, it would flourish enough to 
shake the thrones of rulers. Sometimes, a movement engaged in vigorous action, 
while on other occasions, it would resort to tactics such as theological and 
religious propaganda. 
 * c. 596–661. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (known as Ali) was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad 
and the fourth caliph after the Prophet’s death  in 632. The Shi’a believe that Muhammad chose Ali 
as his successor and that Ali therefore should have become caliph following Muhammad’s death. But 
Sunni Muslims consider Ali as the fourth and final of the rightly guided caliphs. This disagreement 
split the umma into its two branches of Sunni and Shi’a. 
 ** Batin in Arabic means “hidden” or “implicit”. Its opposite is zahir or dhahir, that is, explicit or visible. 
For some Muslim communities, Qur’anic verses have an inner, or implicit (some contemporary inter-
preters say “esoteric”), meaning alongside the explicit, apparent, accessible-to-all meaning. For Shi’a 
communities, it is the imam who can access the hidden meaning and can derive guidance from it for 
the benefit of their communities. For Sufis, the initiated (shaykh) would fulfil this function to some 
degree.  In late usage within Sunni circles, the Batiniyya, that is, adepts of the batin, came to refer to 
some Shi’a communities in particular (Ismailis and Alevis), who are considered to have freely inter-
preted verses of the Qur’an and derived from them views that stand beyond “orthodoxy”. In some 
Sunni usage, this has tainted the term with a pejorative tone. Here, Abdel Razek has adopted this 
term as used by Sunni theologians, that is, as a category that refers to particular Shi’a communities
 † Abdel Razek is alluding to the movement initiated by reformists in the Ottoman Empire during the 
early twentieth century. 
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The protagonists of these movements could well have pursued systematic 
enquiry into the phenomenon of political power and delved into an analysis of 
its origins. They could have examined governments and the conditions that influ-
ence them. They could have investigated the caliphate and its foundations criti-
cally, addressing the themes that relate to political science. It is undeniable, that 
of all peoples, the Arabs had the most cogent reasons to be interested in political 
science and to encourage those who were engaged in this branch of learning.
6. Why, then, did they retreat from these investigations? Why did they neglect 
to study Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics, even as they admired the latter 
to the point of calling him the “First Teacher”? Why were the Muslim masses 
kept in total ignorance of the principles of politics and of the different kinds of 
governments invented by the Greeks; while they were all too willing to teach 
them the methods of the Assyrians in grammar and to train them in the disci-
pline of mathematics that the Indian author, Baidaba, mentions in the Kalilah 
wa Dimnah.* They prevented this, even as they were willing to assimilate their 
religious disciplines with those of Greek philosophy to explore varying notions 
and ideas of right and wrong, belief and unbelief.
The scholars did not neglect political science because they were ignorant of 
it or because they were unaware of its importance. The reason for this patent 
neglect lies elsewhere, as we shall see below.
The origin of the caliphate is that it be “referred to the choice of those who 
pledge and un-pledged their allegiance”, since “the imamate is a pledge which 
functions through those who pledge and un-pledge their allegiance to the one 
whom they chose, having consulted among themselves, to be the leader of the 
community and the imam of the umma”.4
This might imply that the institution of the caliphate is based on voluntary 
allegiance and that it relies on appointment by the will of those who pledge and 
un-pledge their allegiance. It is conceivable that an institution of this nature could 
have existed. However, if we examine how events really came to pass, we find 
that the caliphate was founded not on voluntary allegiance but rather by sheer 
 * Translated from the Persian into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa (d. c. 756), Kalilah wa Dimnah is a collec-
tion of animal fables based on tales translated through Syriac from old Indian sources. It became 
a great classic of Arabic literature and has been translated into many European languages, thus the 
collection has many different titles. See Ramsay Wood, Kalila and Dimna: Fables of Friendship and 
Betrayal, London: Saqi Books, 2008. 
 4 Rashid Rida, Al-Khilāfa wal-Imāma al-‘Uẓma [“The Caliphate and the Great Imamate”, 1924].
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coercion, and that in most instances this took the form of a physical, military 
coercion. The caliph had only arrows and swords for his defence. He relied upon 
well-armed, intrepid armies. Without these he could not have maintained his 
position or been able to rule.
It may be difficult for us to acknowledge that the first three orthodox 
caliphs relied on physical force to establish their authority and maintained it 
by recourse to suppression and coercion. However, can we doubt that both ‘Ali 
and Mu’awiyya, the fourth and fifth caliphs, rose to the caliphate by means of 
the sword and that this trend persisted without change during subsequent eras, 
down to the present day. There was no way that the “Prince of the Believers” 
[amir al-mu’minin], the Sultan of Turkey, Mehmet VI,5 could have resided in 
Yeldiz, had he not been constantly surrounded by armies to guard his residence 
and to face death whilst safeguarding his throne and his very life.
We have no doubt that coercion has always been the basis of the caliphate. 
History does not offer us a single example of a caliph whose image is not associ-
ated with the fear inspired by the brutal force surrounding him, with the armed 
force supporting him, and the unsheathed swords that lent him protection.
If it were not for the risk of pushing our discourse beyond acceptable limits, 
we would have presented evidence of repression and coercion with regard to 
every caliph down to our time, so that it would become plain to the reader that 
the throne has been erected on the heads of soldiers and carried upon their necks. 
Crowns are preserved only at the expense of human lives. The power of rulers is 
upheld by destroying the power of humankind. Their pomp and grandeur is fed 
by extortions from people, just as night thrives at the expense of day and shortens 
it. Their light springs from the glimmer of swords and flames, ignited in wars.
During certain historical moments, this armed force that upholds the 
caliphate is less visible and therefore not perceived by the populace. This is not 
an exception to the conclusion that we have outlined above. While it is possible 
that during certain periods of time force would not be used due to a lack of 
need for it, the armed forces have been imperative in supporting the rank of 
the caliph. During these more passive phases, people would tend to disregard 
the presence of the armed forces and sometimes forget that it existed. However, 
if this force was not continually present, then the caliphate could not have 
continued to subsist. As Ibn Khaldun has attested: “Royal authority means 
 5 We wrote this at a time when the caliphate was still in place in Turkey. Mehmet VI [1861–1926, 
reigning from 1918 to 1922] was caliph, until such a time as he lost the effective power that, as 
mentioned above, lies at the foundation of the caliphate. 
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superiority and the power to rule by force; kingship is nothing but coercion and 
rule by constraint”.6 Anushivan says in the same vein that, “kingship relies upon 
soldiers”  and Aristotle has also declared that kingship is a regime supported by 
the soldiery.*
7. Naturally, autocracy cannot be established in any nation, except through 
domination and suppression. Moreover, it is also natural that this should be 
the case with Muslims more so than with any other community. For, Islam did 
not satisfy itself with merely teaching its followers the ideals of fraternity and 
equality; that human beings are equal to one another like the teeth of a comb; 
that their slaves are in fact their brethren in faith and that the faithful must 
support each other. No! The message of Islam did not confine itself to a theoret-
ical and abstract teaching of these principles. On the contrary, it taught the 
faithful to abide by these principles in their daily lives and to uphold these values 
in their activities. It established laws founded upon the principles of fraternity 
and equality, put them to test in real circumstances and gave Muslims a concrete 
sense of these principles. Their trustworthy Prophet did not depart from them 
until he had stamped the new faith on their hearts and infused its doctrines into 
their souls. Their polity came into its own only when anyone among the faithful 
could address the caliph from across his rostrum and declare: “Had we noticed 
any transgression on your part, we would have redressed it with our swords.” 
It is natural that these Muslims would believe in freedom as a principle 
and that they would adopt its ways in practice. These early Muslims believed 
in freedom the way they believed in their religion. They cherished it in their 
everyday lives, refusing to submit to anyone other than God, whom they 
addressed directly, as their faith had taught them to do, during the five prayers 
of the day. It came naturally to these self-respecting men to resist the subjuga-
tion demanded by kings. They submitted only under duress or the threat of the 
sword. Consequently, as we have pointed out, the caliphate could only have been 
consolidated by means of force. With the exception of certain specific occasions, 
this “force” took the shape of a physical army.
We are not especially interested in understanding every aspect of the issue 
at hand. It may be as discussed above, or there may have been additional 
 circumstances which have not been examined here. What is important for us to 
 * See Aristotle’s Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair, rev. T. J. Saunders, London: Penguin Classics, 1981.
 6 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 284.
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illustrate is that the link between the caliphate and the use of violence is incon-
testable. Once established as a fact, it matters very little whether it conforms to 
principles of reason or follows religious rules.
To say that the caliphate is founded on suppression and force implies that 
these means are used to stifle any challenge to the caliph’s office, any attack on 
his throne or its foundations. This is illustrated in the circumstances of Yazid’s 
nomination, where a supporter gave a short, but highly charged speech. Pointing 
to Mu’awiyya, Yazid’s father, he said: “This is the prince of the believers”; next, 
pointing to Yazid he said: “when he dies, it will be him”; finally, showing his 
sword, he cried: “and for those who object, it will be this”.7
8. Whatever is secured and maintained by the sword becomes a prized posses-
sion. One is not likely to encourage or to give up anything that compromises 
this possession. Is this not especially true with matters of sovereignty and power? 
The human mind cherishes power even if it is obtained by means other than 
violence. When power is obtained by force and subjugation, the mind is all the 
more attached to it, all the more determined to defend it. One is apt to defend it 
more jealously than one might defend money, honour or women; and to love it 
more than all the riches of the world.
9. If there is anything that has ever driven men to despotism, injustice, aggres-
sion and iniquity, it is the desire for the position of caliph. We have seen how 
it has stirred up the most burning ambitions and the most violent, destructive 
forms of jealousy. When inordinate desire and destructive envy are brought 
together, and when they unite and find at their disposal the means for coercion, 
this can only lead to oppression and violence.
However, we must not confine ourselves to general principles and abstract 
theories. Let us return instead to indelible, historical facts.
Why else, other than out of envy for the position of caliph and the urge to 
cling to it along with its substantial powers, did Yazid ibn Mu’awiyya so wantonly 
 7 Ibn ‘Abd Rabbuh [860–940], Al-‘Iqd al-Farīd [“The Unique Necklace”, c. 900]. We find the narrative 
following which Mu’awiya ibn Abi Sufyan [founder of the Umayyad dynasty] wanted, in 55 ah [674], 
to secure the appointment of his son Yazid as heir to the caliphate. With this in mind, he summoned 
representatives of all the provinces of his realm and received them whilst surrounded by his friends 
and allies. He then asked for their views regarding the eligibility of his son to inherit the caliphate. 
After a number of speakers, Yazid ibn al-Muqaffa’ stood up and said while pointing at Mu’awiyya that 
“The prince of believers is this one …” At this point, Mu’awiyya commended him and said: “Sit down, 
you are the best orator!” 
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violate the noble blood of the Prophet’s line in the personage of Husayn, son of 
Fatima, the daughter of God’s messenger? Why else did Yazid attack Medina, 
the original capital of the caliphate, the erstwhile city of the Prophet?* Was it 
not ambition for the office of the caliph and a desire for power which drove ‘Abd 
Al-Malik ibn-Marwan** to desecrate the holy places of Islam? Is it for nothing 
that Ibn Abbas has come to be known as bloodthirsty and was it not the blood 
of his fellow Muslims that he so wantonly shed? Were not the Umayyads whom 
he fought his own kinsmen?
We can cite countless examples in this vein. This was how the Abbasids massa-
cred one another, as well as the descendants of Sabu. The saintly Najm al-Din 
al-Ayyubi, renowned for his moral uprightness, fought with his own brother, 
Abu Bakr ibn al-Kamil, deposing him and throwing him into jail. The Mamluk 
and Ottoman Circassian dynasties knew many cases of the destitution and assas-
sination of kings. Needless to say, all this was a result of the lure of the office of 
the caliph and the aggrandising appetites it stirred up, along with the readily 
available physical force of the armies. 
10. Attraction to the privileges of royal power incites kings to defend their 
thrones against whatever might threaten their foundations and detract from 
their aura of sanctity. It follows, therefore, that they behave like wild beasts 
towards men who defy them or attack their position. It also follows that they 
should oppose intellectual enquiry, even of the most scientific kind, if they 
suspect that it constitutes a threat, however uncertain.
This is the reason why rulers have opposed enquiry and subjected educa-
tional institutions to censorship whenever possible. Certainly, political science, 
inasmuch as it seeks to understand the nature, specifics and structure of different 
forms of government, poses an especially strong threat to those in power. It is 
normal, then, for rulers to oppose it on principle and to try their utmost to stop 
people from pursuing a study of it. 
This is how we might explain the all too obvious weakness of the political 
 * Abdel Razek is alluding to the battle of al-Hurra, which saw an army sent by Yazid to fight the people 
of Medina who had proclaimed Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr as caliph. The army was led by Muslim ibn 
‘Uqbah and included a large number of Syrian Christians. The battle ended with an invasion and 
ransacking of Medina on 26 August 673. See Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, rev. 10th edn, New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
 ** The allusion here is to the siege of Mecca during the reign of the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik ibn 
Marwan. Led by Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi, the siege began on 25 March 692 and lasted for seven 
months. It ended with the bombardment of the city and its inhabitants with rocks and was followed 
by the defeat and assassination of Ibn al-Zubayr.
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sciences in Muslim history and the neglect of inquiry into this area in the intel-
lectual endeavours of Muslims. It also explains the failure of Muslims to treat 
these questions in a manner commensurate with their abilities and their attain-
ments in other domains of knowledge. 
11. It is no wonder, then, that the achievements of Muslims in political science 
should be so meagre and moribund. It is surprising in fact, that in view of the 
many hurdles mentioned above, this branch of knowledge was not altogether 
extinguished. We cannot but marvel at the fact that notwithstanding the 
enormous pressures and the ever-present threat of unrelenting repression, the 
world of learning included a few works on politics and a small number of intel-
lectuals remained opposed to the point of view of the caliphs. 
This book would have been ten times as long if it were to give a complete 
account of the opposition of Muslim monarchies to political expressions and 
political science. Short of this, we will confine ourselves to some brief indica-
tions, hoping that readers will go on to consult other works on this subject.
Let us return to the claim that the Muslim umma was unanimous on the 
principle of proclaiming an imam and that this unanimity makes such procla-
mation a duty.
Let us suppose that the umma had unanimously abstained from proclaiming 
an imam and that subsequently there had been unanimous agreement on the 
principle of abstention. Or, let us suppose to the contrary that the umma, in 
its entirety with all its constituents, had effectively participated at all times in 
allegiance to the system of the imamate; that it had thus formally recognised 
it; and that a plain and unambiguous ijmā had thus been realised. We would 
still be entitled to dispute this as a real instance of ijmā. We would be justified 
in drawing from it a juridical principle and turning it into a religious argument.
In the discussion of Yazid’s8 investiture, we saw how allegiance was extorted 
and the agreement of Muslims obtained. Yet other examples can be added to 
illustrate these points.
The case of Yazid brings to mind that of Faisal ibn Husayn ibn ‘Ali. His father, 
Husayn ibn ‘Ali, prince of Arabia, sided with the Allies in the First World War 
in revolt against the Turkish sultan who prided himself as the Caliph of the 
Muslims. His sons organised campaigns of support in different regions of Arabia 
for the battles of the allied forces against their Turkish and German enemies, 
 8 See Chapter 3, section 7.
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among others. Faisal was highly esteemed by the English for his brave feats in 
their support and his exemplary steadfastness in their service. As a reward to 
him, the English designated him as the king of Syria. However, no sooner was 
he appointed than the French army expelled him. Faisal had to flee to England, 
renouncing his kingdom, surrendering his power and all that went with it. The 
English assigned him to Iraq, where they proclaimed him as king on the pretext 
that he had been pronounced as king by unanimous agreement with the excep-
tion only of a small group of influential individuals of the type Ibn Khaldun calls 
“deviants”.
In fact, the English were correct. They had indeed organised elections, appar-
ently in accordance with the principles of free and legitimate consultation. They 
had consulted several Iraqi notables. They duly “elected” Faisal. It was the same 
procedure through which the famous orator secured allegiance to Yazid. Can 
this be described as ijmā?
Even if this so-called ijmā had taken place, was it valid in these circumstances? 
Was it even an acceptable form of ijmā? And how can one bank on it consid-
ering, as previously mentioned, that the Kharijites and some of the Mu’tazilites, 
such as Al-Assamm, had denied that the proclamation of an imam was ever a 
religious duty? Thus, to refute the thesis that there was unanimous agreement on 
this issue, it will suffice to recall the opposition of Al-Assamm, the Mu’tazilites 
and the others. This opposition was real, even though Ibn Khaldun dismisses its 
protagonists as “deviants”.
12. We have seen how the Holy Qur’an neither mentions the caliphate, nor 
alludes to it. It is ignored in the tradition of the Prophet and no ijmā ever 
pronounced it. To what other argument can the partisans of the caliphate take 
recourse? Can one still talk about a religious duty in the absence of any support 
for this thesis, be it in the sacred book, the tradition of the Prophet or by way of 
unanimous agreement on the part of the believers?
There remains one argument which our critics might deploy, though it is 
weak and shaky. It is the proposition that the caliphate is a necessary condition 
for the practice of religion and the realisation of the general good of the Muslim 
community.9 
13. Specialists in public law acknowledge that the optimal functioning of any 
 9 See the argument offered on this point in Chapter 2, section 3.
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civilised society, whether it rests on a single religion, such as Islam, Christianity 
or Judaism, or whether it is multi-confessional, and, furthermore, whatever the 
race, colour or language of the people concerned may be, requires the presence of 
a government to keep order and manage its affairs. The forms and features of the 
government might, of course, vary: it may be constitutional or despotic, repub-
lican or Bolshevik, and so on. Scholars of public law disagree on what consti-
tutes the best system. But none of them to our knowledge has ever disputed the 
need for a government, whatever its form, in every society. We do not need to 
reproduce their arguments in this regard. We do not, however, doubt that this 
argument is essentially correct. Abu Bakr, the first caliph, probably had no other 
consideration in mind but this when he said that “this religion (the community 
of believers) needs someone to take charge of its affairs”. The Qur’an seems to be 
of this opinion too: 
Is it they who hand out the mercy of your Lord? 
We distributed their livelihoods among them in this present life, and raised 
some above others in rank, that some might take others into their service. But 
the mercy of your Lord is better than what they amass.10
So let those who follow the Evangel judge in accordance with what God revealed 
in it. Who so judges not in accordance with what God revealed, these are the 
dissolute. 
To you We revealed the Book with the Truth, confirming previous Scripture 
and witnessing to their veracity. So judge between them as God revealed and 
do not follow their whims, to turn you away from the truth revealed to you.
For every community We decreed a law and a way of life. Had God willed, He 
could have made you a single community – but in order to test you in what He 
revealed to you. So vie with one another in virtue. To God is your homecoming, 
all of you, and He will then acquaint you with that over which you differed.
So judge between them as God revealed and do not follow their whims, and 
beware lest they tempt you away from certain things that God revealed to you. 
If they turn away in denial, know that God wishes to chastise them for some of 
their sins – many are the sinners among mankind! Do they truly desire the law 
of paganism? But who is fairer than God in judgement for a people firm of faith?
10 Qur’an 43.32.
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O believers, take not Jews and Christians for allies; they are allies one of 
another. Who so among you takes them as allies is accounted of their number. 
God guides not the wrongdoers.11
14. We can safely assert, then, that like all other peoples, the Muslims, inasmuch 
as they form a distinct community, need a government to manage and organise 
their affairs. 
If this is how theologians understand the caliphate, if they attribute to it 
the meaning that public law specialists give to the notion of government, we 
can say that they are right and join them in affirming that such an institution 
is indeed necessary for the conduct of religious practices and the quest for the 
public good. The caliphate would in this sense be the equivalent of a govern-
ment which, whatever its form, whether it is personal or republican, despotic, 
constitutional, consensual, democratic, socialist, Bolshevik, etc., fits this defini-
tion. However, this argument does not allow us to proceed any further: we may 
not draw further inferences from this self-evident observation.
On the other hand, if by the caliphate the theologians mean the specific 
institution called by this name, then their argument is weak and the evidence 
inadequate.
15. Observation supported by reasoning and evidence from ancient and modern 
history show that the performance of religious rites as well as other aspects of 
religion do not necessitate the kind of government which theologians call the 
caliphate, nor do these require the presence of leaders known as caliphs. In fact, 
it should be noted that the temporal interests of Muslims do not depend on 
these arrangements either. Neither the conduct of our spiritual life, nor the 
direction of our temporal affairs calls for the caliphate.
To extend this analysis, the caliphate has always been, and still remains, 
a disaster for Islam and for Muslims. It has been a constant source of evil and 
corruption. We will elaborate on this point later. For the time being let us 
content ourselves with recalling the obvious considerations which show that our 
religion is not dependent, any more than our temporal affairs, on the “caliphate” 
of the theologians.
11 Qur’an 5.47–51.
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16. We have already mentioned Ibn Khaldun’s remark12 according to which: 
“The caliphate dissolved and its impact vanished when the Arabs lost their spirit 
of collective solidarity and when, in consequence, their momentum faded away 
and their strength had gone; then all that remained was pure kingship, with no 
relation whatsoever with the caliphate.” Can we say this situation unhinged the 
foundation of the faith or compromised the interests of the community in a way 
which the caliphate (as might be claimed) would have helped prevent? 
Since the middle of the third century of the hijra, the caliphate began losing 
the territories in its preserve, to the point, over time, when its influence was 
confined to the capital Baghdad. Thus: 
Khorasan and the regions situated beyond the Euphrates passed under 
the dominion of Ibn Saman. Under his descendants Bahrain passed to the 
Qarmatis, Yemen to Ibn Tabataba, Isfahan and Fars to the Buyids, Ahwaz 
and Wasit to Mu’izz al-Dawla, Aleppo to Saif al-Dawla, Egypt to Ahmad 
ibn Tulun and later to the rulers who gained control over it and founded 
independent kingdoms, like the Fatimids, the Ayyubids, the Mamluks and 
others.13
Religious principles were not adhered to any more in Baghdad than in the 
regions which broke away from it. Nor was the religion held in higher esteem 
there than anywhere else. Life in Baghdad was no better and the temporal affairs 
of Muslims were, if anything, in a worse condition.
17. The caliphate collapsed in Baghdad in the middle of the eighth century of 
the hijra, when the city was attacked by the Tartars. The Abbasid Caliph Al 
Mu’tassim Billah was slaughtered along with his family and officers of the state. 
The Muslim community remained without a caliph for three years.14
At this time Egypt was under the yoke of Zaher Bibars. With a calculated 
plan, this cunning ruler set out in search of a descendant of the Abbasids who 
might have escaped the massacre. By chance he found a man believed to be one 
of the last survivors of the dynasty. This discovery fitted with Zaher’s plan and 
enabled him to restore a caliphal cell in Egypt entirely in his control. Thus, 
he installed a dynasty of figureheads whom he declared to be the “Caliphs of 
12 See Chapter 1, section 7. 
13 Jalal ad-Din as-Suyuti, The History of the Khalifas Who Took the Right Way [c. 1400]. 
14 Suyuti, The History of the Khalifas Who Took the Right Way.
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Muslims”, obliging the believers to honour them and yield to their ostensible 
authority, while in reality it was he who wielded power, manipulating the 
symbols associated with the caliphate as he pleased. The Seljuk kings turned this 
practice into a family tradition until, finally, the Ottoman sultans assumed the 
title of caliph in 923 ah [1517].
Muslim interests, whether spiritual or temporal, were never served by 
elevating impotent figureheads to rulers over Egypt. Despite being adorned with 
the title of caliph, these puppets served no good. What was the situation of the 
extensive realm of Islam beyond Egypt, where the shackles of the caliphate had 
been cast away, where its authority was disregarded, and whose inhabitants have 
lived, and still live, free from the shadow of the caliphs and their supposedly 
sacred glory? Were the practices of faith neglected there more than anywhere 
else? Did any single catastrophe befall them? Did the sky over their temporal 
realm cave in when the caliphal star vanished from it? Did the bounty of the sky 
and the earth disappear when the caliph was gone? None of this came to pass.
The Caliphs were gone. The world did not lament their death.
Neither the feasts, nor the Fridays have shied away! 
18. By God, no! Would God, who has vowed that this religion should last 
forever, place its greatness at the mercy of a specific type of government, or 
attach its destiny to a special category of power-holders? Would He want the 
fortunes and misfortunes of the community of the faithful to be subject to the 
system of the caliphate, or to the will of the caliphs? God, in His great majesty, is 
much too determined to ensure the perpetuity of the faith, and too merciful to 
the faithful to inflict such a system on them.
We hope that we have succeeded in clearly showing that the caliphate or great 
imamate is an institution based neither on the precepts of religious faith nor on 
reason; and that all the justifications proposed along these lines crumble when 
we subject them to careful examination.
We must now try to answer the questions which arise in the mind of the 
reader. We must set out our own views on the nature and the origins of the 
caliphate. May God help and support us in this endeavour.
Book Two
Islam and Government
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The System of Power at the Time of the Prophet
The Prophet’s practice as a judge – Did the Prophet appoint judges? – Omar’s 
practice as a judge – ‘Ali’s practice (in this respect) – The practice of Mu’ad 
and Abu Mussa – Problems in ascertaining judicial practice at the time of 
the Prophet – The absence of kingship during the time of the Prophet – The 
failure of historians to inquire into the system of the regime of the Prophet – 
Was the Prophet a king? 
1. We have seen from our survey of the history of juridical authority at the time 
of the Prophet that the facts in this regard remain surrounded with confusion 
and ambiguity. It is not easy in these circumstances to acquire a clear idea or to 
give an account that satisfies the standards of critical research.
There is no doubt that juridical authority in the sense of arbitration and resolu-
tion of conflicts at the time of the Prophet resembled the way in which it had 
been exercised among the Arabs and among other peoples, long before the advent 
of Islam. We know that disputes were brought to the attention of the Prophet; 
that he agreed to consider the cases submitted to his attention and to pronounce 
a judgement. He said: “You ask me to settle your disputes. It is possible that one of 
you presents their case in a more tendentious way than others. If in consequence 
my judgement accords an advantage to that one, at the expense of the legitimate 
rights of their adversaries, they will have nothing to rejoice in. For, I will thereby 
have offered them a portion of hell. They should not take profit from it.”1 
 1 Al-Bukhari, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī [c. 810]. [Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī is one of the six canonical hadith collec-
tions of Sunni Islam. Its full title translates as “The Abridged Collection of Authentic Hadith with 
Connected Chains Regarding Matters Pertaining to the Prophet, His Practices and His Times”.]
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Similarly, we find many examples of how the Prophet resolved the issues 
brought before him in reliable historical reports. However, it is very difficult, 
indeed impossible, to deduce from these examples the general system of justice 
adopted by the Prophet. Indeed, what we know about the Prophet’s practice 
does not allow us to form a clear idea of its actual operation or its concrete 
organisation – assuming that it was organised in the first place.
2. We noted that the circumstances concerning juridical practice at that time 
are ambiguous and obscure in every respect. Hence, it is not even possible to 
establish whether or not the Prophet had appointed individuals with the respon-
sibilities of a judge.
Most theologians consider three of the Prophet’s companions to have been 
charged with the functions of a judge during his lifetime.
According to some authors,2 “the Prophet entrusted ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, 
‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and Mu’ad ibn Jabal with the functions of a judge”. To these 
should be added Abu Mussa al-Ash’ari, who probably had the same responsibili-
ties as Mu’ad ibn Jabal. 
3. It would be rather surprising from a historical point of view, if ‘Umar ibn al- 
Khattab carried out the functions of a judge during the lifetime of the Prophet. 
This account seems to be derived from another report: according to Tirmidhi 
in The Book of Traditions,* the third caliph ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan proposed that 
Abdallah ibn ‘Umar (son of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab) should be charged with the 
functions of a judge. The latter refused, impelling ‘Uthman to ask: “Why are you 
unwilling to exercise this responsibility, although your father did so regularly?” 
“My father,” Abdallah answered, “was able, when faced with complicated 
cases, to consult the Prophet; the Prophet could in turn consult the archangel 
Gabriel. But as for me, I do not see whom I could consult in case I am faced with 
difficulties.”3
4. As for ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, he was sent by the Prophet as a judge to Yemen 
while he was still a young man. According to Abu Da’ud, ‘Ali has said in this 
connection: 
 * Abdel Razek is referring to Al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣahih, also known as Sunan al-Tirmidhī, a major hadith 
collection by al-Tirmidhi (824–92).
 2 Rifā’a Rāfi’ at-Ṭahṭāwī, Nihāyat al-Ijāz fī Sīrat Sākin al-Ḥijāz [“The Ultimate Summary of the Life of 
an Inhabitant from the Hijaz”, 1876].
 3 Ibid. 
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The Prophet sent me to Yemen to judge while I was still young, and had no 
experience in judging. He assured me that God would guide my heart and 
aid me in my judgements. If any two people embroiled in a dispute were 
to come to me, my duty would be to suspend any judgement until I had 
listened equitably to both sides. In this way, I would be able to form a clear 
idea of the judgement to give. Since then I have been making judgements 
in this way and I have never doubted the judgements I have given.4 
This account is also reproduced by Abu ‘Amr ibn ‘Abd Al Barr in his work 
Al-Istī’āb.* He states that that the Prophet told his companions: “The one person 
who has proved most competent in the responsibilities of a judge is ‘Ali ibn Abi 
Talib.”
Al-Bukhari5 reports in this connection that before proceeding to Mecca on 
his farewell pilgrimage, the Prophet sent Khalid ibn al-Walid at the head of a 
group of his companions to Yemen, but then sent ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib instead to 
collect the khums.6** While the Prophet was still in Mecca, ‘Ali returned from 
Yemen with the proceeds of his mission.
According to ‘Ali ibn Burnhan din Al Halabi,7 the Prophet sent ‘Ali at the 
head of a group of soldiers to Yemen. The entire region of Hamadan converted 
to Islam in one day and ‘Ali wrote to the Prophet to inform him of this. On 
hearing the news, the Prophet prostrated himself, then rose, and said, “Peace be 
upon Hamadan!” Afterwards, all the inhabitants of Yemen converted to Islam 
massively. This is what happened with the first mission. A second group, with 
three hundred horsemen, was sent to the region of Madhaj in Yemen, with ‘Ali 
ibn Abi Talib at its head. ‘Ali conquered the region, collected the spoils of war 
and returned to join the Prophet on his farewell pilgrimage.
5. Mu’ad ibn Jabal, on his part, was sent by the Prophet as a judge to the province 
of Janad.8 The Prophet charged him with the task of teaching the Qur’an and 
 * Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (Yusuf ibn Abdallah), Al-Istī’āb fī Ma‘rifat al-Aṣhāb [“The Comprehensive Book of 
Knowledge about the Companions”, 1901].
 ** Khums literally means one-fifth or 20 per cent. In Muslim legal terminology, it refers to one-fifth of 
the portion of one’s wealth which is given as zakat – an alms-giving ordained in the Qur’an as a means 
of purifying one’s wealth. 
 4 Rifa’a al-Ṭahṭawī, Nihāyat al-Ijāz fī Sīrat Sākin al-Ḥijāz [“The Ultimate Summary of the Life of an 
Inhabitant from the Hijaz”, 1876].
 5 Al-Bukhari [810–70], Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, vol. 4. 
 6 Ibid.
 7 ‘Ali ibn Burhan Din al-Ḥalabi, Al-Sīra al-Ḥalabīya, vol. 3 [“A Biography of the Prophet”, c. 1460–1549].
 8 Al-Bukhari, Ṣaḥiḥ al-Bukhārā, vol. 4.
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Islamic laws to the inhabitants of this area and to deliver justice among them. 
He also charged him, in the year 8 ah on the tenth day of Ramadan, with the 
collection of alms-tax from the governors of Yemen. Janad is said to be a town 
in Yemen.
Al-Bukhari reports the following hadiths concerning this matter: 
The Messenger of God sent Abu Musa and Mu’ad ibn Jabal to Yemen. They 
were each assigned distinct regions of activity, as Yemen was divided into 
two regions. The Prophet advised them to favour gentleness over violence, 
and incentives over threats …
 According to Ibn Abbas, when the Messenger of God sent Mu’ad ibn 
Jabal to Yemen, he told him, “You are going to a people of the Book. When 
you are among them, invite them to vouch that there is no god but God, 
and that Muhammad is the Apostle of God. If they agree, tell them that 
God has prescribed to them five prayers through the day and night. If they 
respond, tell them that God has levied on them an alms-tax which will 
distribute some of the wealth of the rich to the poor. If they are receptive 
to all this, avoid interfering with whatever else they do. Fear the cry of the 
oppressed, for there is no barrier between them and God.”9
In Ahmed Zayni Dahlan’s biography of the Prophet, we find a similar account 
of these facts: “The Prophet sent Abu Musa Al Ash’ari and Mu’ad ibn Jabal to 
Yemen before the final pilgrimage, in the year 8, 9 or 10 of the hijra (according to 
different testimonies). Each of the two was in charge of a specific area. Mu’ad’s 
jurisdiction was over the hilly region bordering on Aden and included the 
community of Janad, while Abu Mussa’s jurisdiction was over the lower plains.”10
According to Ahmad, Abu Da’ud, Tirmidhi and others, Al Harith ibn ‘Amr, 
nephew of Al Mughira ibn Shu’ba, reported the following testimony of one of 
Mu’ad’s companions:
When the Prophet entrusted Mu’ad with a mission in Yemen he asked him, 
“How are you going to proceed if you find yourself obliged to render justice?” 
 9 Al-Bukhari, Les traditions islamiques [c. 810, trans. Octave Houdas and William Marçais, 4 vols, Paris: 
Ernest Leroux, 1903–14]. 
10 See the biography [sira] of the Prophet published in parallel with that by al-Halabi, As-Sīra 
al-Ḥalabīya. [Abdel Razek is referring to Ahmed Zayni Dahlan’s biography of the Prophet, As-Sīra 
an-Nabawīya wal-Athār al-Muḥammadīya [“A Biography of the Prophet and Muhammadan Tradi-
tions”], c. 1886.]
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Mu’ad said, “I will refer to the Book of God.” 
The Prophet asked, “What if you do not find anything there?” 
Mu’ad said, “I will refer to the Traditions of the Messenger of God.” 
The Prophet asked, “And what if you do not find anything, either in the 
Book of God or in the Traditions of his Messenger?” 
Mu’ad answered, “In that case I will reach a judgement by my own means 
[ijtihad]. I will never give up!” 
The Prophet then tapped him on his breast and said, “Praise be to God 
who has guided the agent of the Messenger of God along the same way as 
that of His Messenger.”11
6. These varied accounts from which we have quoted show that we are right in 
concluding that it is difficult to know what judicial practice was like at the time 
of the Prophet. We can see this in the differing versions of the same event. ‘Ali’s 
mission to Yemen is sometimes presented as being that of a judge and at other 
times for purposes of collecting the alms-tax. The same is true for Mu’ad, who in 
one account is a judge, in another a general making conquests, and in yet a third 
account an instructor in the tenets of the new faith.
The author of the As-Sīra al-Ḥalabīya [al-Halabi] reports the different views 
on the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to Mu’ad. According to Ibn ‘Abd 
Al Barr, Mu’ad was a judge. Al-Ghassani thinks he was a treasurer. Ibn Maymun’s 
account leads one to think that Mu’ad was rather an official in charge of the 
prayers. This latter suggestion leads one to think that he had held the post of a 
governor.12
7.  For a thorough study of the state of juridical authority at the time of the 
Prophet, and for a careful analysis and correct appraisal of all the information 
and accounts that have come down to us on this subject, we need to extend the 
scope of our inquiry to the system of government in Islam and its overall organi-
sation at this time, as well as the procedures of management followed in the 
Islamic kingdom – that is, if the territories over which God had enabled His 
Prophet to exercise dominion could be called an empire or kingdom. 
11 Reported by al-Shawkani [1759–1834], in his Irshād al-Fuḥūl ila Taḥqīq al-Ḥaqq min ‘Ilm al-‘Uṣūl 
[“The Master’s Guidance in Achieving Truth from the Roots of Law (science of al-Uṣūl)”, c. 
1759–1834]. In this report, the author mentions that the chain of transmitters for this hadith is long, 
but it is generally accepted that this does not hinder its authenticity.
12 See the biography of the Prophet by M. Ahmed Zayni Dahlan [As-Sīra an-Nabawīya wal-Athār 
al-Muḥammadīya [“A Biography of the Prophet and Muhammadan Traditions”, c. 1886].
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On inquiring into the judicial system of the times, we realise that neither 
this nor the other institutions and practices typical of any government existed 
in a clear or unequivocal shape during the lifetime of the Prophet. An objec-
tive scholar can conclude from this that the Prophet never in fact appointed a 
governor to keep order and administer the affairs in territories which God placed 
at his command. Everything that has been reported on this subject leads us to 
the conclusion that the Prophet from time to time delegated certain limited 
functions, such as command over troops, supervision of property, leadership of 
the prayer, instruction in the Qur’an, and the propagation of the faith, to certain 
individuals. These assignments were not continuous or permanent, as we can see 
from examples of pronouncements during military missions or expeditions; as 
well as from the examples of appointing a deputy during the Prophet’s absences 
from Medina while at war.
Apart from the resolution of conflicts and the general jurisdiction over 
provinces, none of the other functions which we can observe in the most 
minimal and rudimentary of states, such as the management of finances and the 
upkeep of law and order, are reported in the narratives which have come down 
to us, such as would lead us confidently to attribute a system of government to 
the Prophet.
8. We may note, in this connection, that most historians do not omit to give a 
list of the officials – governors, generals, judges and so on – appointed by each 
of the caliphs or rulers. Indeed, they show such deep interest in this issue as to 
have made it the object of specific studies, pursued with immense diligence and 
industry, thus exhibiting an acute consciousness of the scientific importance of 
such work. But when they turn to this aspect in the biography of the Prophet, 
they make vague and inconsistent statements, departing from the methods they 
normally follow in their inquiry into other periods. In our view there is no single 
historian who is an exception to this rule, apart from Rifa’a Al Tahtawi13 who, as 
we shall mention later, in his Nihāyat al-Ijāz fī Sīrat Sākin al-Ḥijāz,* reproduces 
the earlier conclusions of the author of Takhrīj ad-Dalālāt as-Sama’iyya.**
9. The more we delve into the nature of the juridical and administrative 
systems at the time of the Prophet, the more obscure and vague it becomes. Our 
 * “Concise Biography of the Illustrious Resident of the Hijaz” [1982]. 
 ** “Deducing the Prophetic Sayings” by ‘Ali ibn Muhammad Khuza’i [1985]. 
13 Rifa’a Rafi’ at-Tahtawi, a relative of Muhammad al-Baqir Zain al-‘Abidin. Died in 1873.
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 uncertainty drives us from one study to another and from one instance of confu-
sion to another, until we are at a complete loss. We find ourselves faced with 
a still greater difficulty that seems to form the source and the heart of all the 
confusions and perplexities we have so far encountered. Certainly, it is the most 
important of the questions we have come across. Should our reasoning succeed 
in finding an acceptable solution to this quandary, then all of our other problems 
will lose their edge and our uncertainty and confusion will evaporate.
However, as we approach this question our steps grow hesitant and our pace 
uncertain. This is initially due to the extreme complexity of the problem and 
to the countless obstacles it holds in store for the student. Clearly, without the 
aid of God there is not the least hope of success in disentangling the rights and 
wrongs of this issue. Thus, the sheer audacity involved in tackling this inquiry is 
likely to cause an outcry among those who believe that religion is a fixed thing, 
closed to examination by reason or the effort of the intellect.
Despite these risks, we beseech the Almighty for His succour and guidance 
in this endeavour, by means of which we hope to dispel the obscurity which 
surrounds this issue and, God willing, arrive at the manifest and reassuring truth 
of it.
The question that we propose to treat here concerns the exact nature of the 
Prophet’s mission. Was he or was he not at one and the same time a head of 
state and government as well as the Messenger, entrusted with propagation of 
the faith, and the spiritual leader of a community of believers?
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There is no objection to inquiring into whether or not the Prophet was a 
monarch – Prophecy and monarchy are two completely different phenomena – 
The thesis according to which the Prophet was also a monarch – The Prophet’s 
system of government as depicted in detail by certain theologians – Analysis 
of what may be considered as the apparatus of state at the time of the Prophet 
– The jihad – Financial administration – The Prophet’s exemplary behaviour 
– The putative appointments of governors by the Prophet for the administration 
of the land – Was the establishment of a temporal state one of the objectives 
of the Prophetic mission? – God’s message and its implementation – On Ibn 
Khaldun’s idea that Islam is a legislative system with the purpose of conveying 
and enforcing the message of the revelation – Objections to this thesis – The 
thesis according to which the Prophet’s regime had all the characteristics of a 
government – Our possible ignorance of the system put in place by the Prophet 
– A discussion of this possibility – Realising the pristine simplicity of the system 
of authority established by the Prophet – The simplicity of the Muslim faith 
– Discussion of this idea
1. We need have no qualms about embarking on a study intended to ascertain 
whether or not the Prophet was a king. There is no reason to think of such an 
undertaking as a threat to religion, or to the faith of the scholar involved in it. A 
careful examination of this issue will show that such a study is not so harmful as 
to push the believer beyond the limits of his or her faith, or to shake the princi-
ples of a pious person and lead them astray.
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The question might well seem grave and daunting because it bears upon the 
stature of the Prophet and touches on the position occupied by him. However, 
notwithstanding this impression, to pose this question is in no way to question the 
foundations of the Islamic faith. This kind of enquiry is probably of recent origin 
among Muslims. Such questions were not addressed directly by any  theologian 
in former times, and, as a result, no theologian has succeeded in forming a clear 
notion of these ideas. There is no reason, therefore, why theologians should 
regard a mere consideration of the question as to whether or not the Prophet was 
a Messenger as well as a king, an illicit innovation [bida’a]. Nor is it justified to see 
this as deviation or heresy. In fact, this enquiry does not fall under the category 
of religious dogmatics, normally a subject reserved for theologians. Rather, it 
falls into the realm of scientific research. Hence, it may be pursued all too safely.
2. We know that the mission of a prophet is very different from the position of 
a king and there is no necessary link between these two. The prophetic function 
confers a special stature on its incumbent amongst the people. The office of king 
is of a very different kind. In general, kings are not prophets or messengers of 
God. Likewise, how many among the messengers of God were kings? In fact, 
most prophets of whom we know were only messengers of God.
Jesus, son of Mary, was a Messenger sent to preach Christianity. This did not 
prevent him from advocating obedience to Caesar and endorsing his authority. 
It was He who pronounced these far-reaching words to his followers: “Render 
unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s”.1*
The Prophet Joseph, son of Jacob, had been an official in the dominion of 
Rayyan ibn al Walid, the Egyptian Pharaoh. Afterwards, he served another 
potentate, Qabus ibn Mus’ab.2
We know very few figures in the history of the prophets with the combined 
attributes, decreed by God, of a prophet and a king. Was the Prophet Muhammad 
one of them, or was he just a prophet and not also a king?
3. To our knowledge, none of the theologians has a clear opinion on this matter. 
We are not aware that any of them ventured to deal with it. Nevertheless, if we 
 * The translation given here is from Mark 12.17.
 1 Matthew 22.21. 
 2 Abu al-Fida, History, vol. 1. [Tārīkh Abi al-Fidā’ [“The History of Abu al-Fida”] was authored by Abu 
al-Fida [1273–1331] from 1315 to 1329. This historical treatise begins with pre-Islamic Arabia up to the 
author’s present day. The work was extended by many scholars after al-Fida’s death and was published 
in 1754 by the German scholar Johann Jakob Resike.] 
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were to proceed through simple inference, one could state that the lay Muslim 
is inclined to regard the Prophet as a Messenger-King sent by God. He or she 
would also accept that through Islam, the Prophet founded a state in the polit-
ical and civil sense of the term, a state of which he himself was king and lord. This 
seems to be the prevailing view among Muslims and one that is implicit in the 
way they conduct their affairs. It is also perhaps the most widespread opinion 
among theologians. For, whenever they address themes related to this subject, 
they tend to favour the point of view according to which early Islam was a polit-
ical entity and a state founded by the Prophet.
The argument advanced by Ibn Khaldun in The Muqaddimah is along the 
same lines, as it treats the caliphate as a vice-regency of the Lawgiver, having the 
function of protecting the faith and governing the land – thus investing it with 
the attributes and functions of kingship.3 
4. Rifa’a al-Tahtawi* cites passages from Takhrīj ad-Dalālāt as-Sama’iyya which 
present a frank elaboration of this position:
He whose knowledge is limited, and whose vision is confined to external 
appearance, thinks that most of the activities of a government are recent 
inventions rather than reflecting models of old. He believes that someone 
who works within a temporal order of things does so outside the tradition 
laid down by the Prophet. Hence he has a poor view of these functions. It 
is with a view to restoring the truth about this subject that I have stated 
here all that I know about the diverse functions of government. This is in 
order to show, for each of them, their essence and the manner in which they 
manifest themselves. I have enumerated there the functions instituted by 
the Prophet and the names of the companions to whom he allotted them. 
The purpose of doing this is to enlighten those who are in charge of these 
functions today, so that they may turn in gratitude to the Almighty who has 
steered them to the very duties enshrined in the law of Islam, to the tasks 
which were entrusted to the Companions who had the qualifications to 
perform them, and which God has ordained for them in advance.4
 * 1801–76.
 3 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah. See in particular ch. 31, “On Dynasties, Royal Authority, Govern-
ment Ranks”.
 4 Rifa’a al-Ṭahṭawī, Nihāyat al-Ijāz fī Sīrat Sākin al-Ḥijāz [“The Ultimate Summary of the Life of an 
Inhabitant from the Hijaz”, 1876]. 
Islam and the Foundations of Political Power
70
Rifa’a goes on to provide a brief survey of the various civil duties and procedures, 
such as the management of local administration, defence of the community 
and so on, which made up the Islamic system of government, together with the 
positions, professions and other associated dispensations. He thus reconstructs 
the model in force at the time of the Prophet, citing the functions associated 
with the Prophet and the general duties linked to the Great Imamate, the more 
important among the offices of the State, such as that of the minister, the hajib 
[government official], the secretary of the state, the supervision of the sacrifi-
cial rite of Budn,5 the office in charge of the distribution of water,6 as well as 
the functions of education and religious training, the teaching of the Qur’an, 
writing and fiqh [Muslim body of jurisprudence], the office of the mufti [Sunni 
legal scholar], the imam in charge of prayer and, lastly, the muezzin [the one who 
proclaims the call to prayer]. Referring next to the translators, secretaries and 
assistants of the army and the diwan [council of state], he asserts that the origin 
of administrative offices dates back to the Prophet. Next, he mentions political 
institutions, such as regional administration, the judiciary and the functions 
associated with it – the recording of testimonies, deeds, contracts, legacies and 
orders for expenditure – offices of estate agents and watchmen at buildings. 
Finally, he mentions the positions of market inspectors [muhtasib], town criers, 
watchmen, intelligence agents, prison guards and so on. He attributed such 
claims not only to a minority of biographers, but to all of them.
5. There is no doubt that the Prophet’s authority included certain elements that 
could be compared with those of a temporal government, thereby reflecting 
some aspects of power and regality.
6. The first example that comes to mind during the time of the Prophet is that of 
the jihad [struggle]. We know that the Prophet took armed action against those 
of his people who opposed his religion: that he conquered their lands, confis-
cated their property and turned their men and women into prisoners. Nor is 
there any doubt that the Prophet had designs on certain regions beyond Arabia 
and that he was preparing to deploy his armies in different areas. In his lifetime 
he confronted the Byzantine state to the west and made overtures to the kings 
 5 A sacrifice of a cow or camel that was practised in Mecca at the time.
 6 A service that was offered to pilgrims at the time.
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of Persia (to the east), Ethiopia, Egypt7 and so on, for conversion to the faith he 
was preaching. 
It is evident from a glance that the jihad is neither carried out specifically to 
rally men to the new faith, nor to make them believe in God or His Prophet. 
Rather, the jihad is launched to reinforce an established power and to extend the 
empire.
Religious preaching is above all a call to God. It takes effect only by word, by 
the change wrought in the heart through persuasion, by an impact on human 
sensibility. Resort to force or coercion is not compatible with a mission meant 
to guide people to their salvation and to purification of their faith. No prophet, 
throughout history, has ever tried to bring people to believe in God by the sword, 
or conquered a people so as to convince them to join his faith. The Prophet 
himself underscored this principle through the words of the revelation: 
There is no compulsion in religion.
Right guidance has been distinguished from error.8
Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and fair counsel, and debate with 
them in the fairest manner.9
So remind! For you are but a reminder,
You are not their minder.10
If they argue against you, say: “I have surrendered my face wholly to God, I and 
those who followed me.” Say to those to whom the Book has been revealed and 
to those without a Book: “Have you surrendered?” If they surrender, they are 
guided aright. If they turn away, your duty is merely to announce the message. 
And God is Ever-Attentive to His creatures.11
 Will you then compel people to become believers?12
These principles clearly show that the mission of Muhammad (like that of his 
predecessors) is to be fulfilled by means of persuasion and exhortation to the 
good and not by force or violence. Accordingly, if the Prophet took recourse 
 7 The allusion here is to the battle of Mu’ta and the expedition dispatched to Abni under the command-
ment of Usama ibn Ziyad.
 8 Qur’an 2.256.
 9 Qur’an 16.125.
10 Qur’an 88.21.
11 Qur’an 3.20.
12 Qur’an 10.99.
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to force it was not in order to call people to the faith, or to transmit God’s 
message to them. It can only be interpreted as a means to establishing a state 
and an Islamic government. We know that no government can survive without 
recourse to coercion and constraint. It is in this light that the belligerent acts of 
the Prophet should be understood.
7. We have said that the jihad was one of the features of the Islamic state and 
is one of the typical undertakings of any temporal state. We could add other 
examples in this connection. 
At the time of the Prophet the administration of finance was an important 
exercise. This was due to the importance of revenue and the expenses incurred, 
as well as the numerous measures required for the collection of funds from 
different sources – the religious tax, the booty, the tithe paid by the People of the 
Book and the allocation of these funds to pay for diverse expenses. The Prophet 
allocated these procedures to tax collectors and agents. There is no doubt that 
financial administration is a major function of the state, indeed the most impor-
tant office of any government. It is alien to the position of the Messenger and far 
removed from the typical behaviour of prophets.
8. Perhaps the best example is the one reported by Tabari, according to which 
the Prophet organised the administration of Yemen and allocated responsibility 
for the different geographical sectors to various men. Thus, he appointed ‘Amr 
ibn Hazm as governor of Najran; Khalid ibn Sai’d ibn al-‘As as governor between 
Najran, Rimah and Zubeid; Amir ibn Shahr in Hamadan; Ibn Badham in Sanaa; 
Tahar ibn Abi Hallah in ‘Ak and al-Ashahrain; Abu Musa al Ashari in Ma’rib; 
and Ya’la ibn Abi Umayya in Janad. Also, Mu’ad ibn Jabal served as an itinerant 
teacher across the districts of Yemen, Hadhramaut, and so on.
One might provide other examples from the same period, displaying the 
characteristics of a state, a government and the emergence of a temporal power. 
Anyone considering the issue from this perspective might conclude that the 
Prophet was at once an envoy of God and a political or worldly ruler.
9. If these examples are taken seriously and the Prophet is considered to be both 
a Messenger and a temporal ruler, then we will be inevitably faced with another 
difficulty worthy of consideration. Were the constitution of the Islamic state, and 
the actions pursued in that regard, alien to the mission entrusted to the Prophet? 
Or were they part of the message revealed to him by God?
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To look upon the Prophet’s domain as completely distinct from the preaching 
of Islam and alien to the Prophetic mission, represents a point of view which to 
my knowledge has no support in the creed of the Muslims. As far as I can recall, no 
Muslim treatise makes such an assertion. Nevertheless, this thesis could be urged 
without incurring blasphemy or heresy. In fact, it is not unlikely that some such 
consideration lies behind the outright rejection by certain Muslim sects of the 
idea that the institution of the caliphate is an inextricable component of Islam.
That the Prophet could engage in an activity so distinct from his prophetic 
mission need not perplex us any more than the circumstance of his dominion 
acquiring a temporal complexion intrinsically different from his religious 
mission. Although such a claim goes against the grain of our thinking, being 
rather alien to the discourse of Muslims, it does not deserve criticism or 
censure. Whether from the point of view of Islamic principles, the nature of the 
prophetic mission, or indeed the very spirit of the legislation and the tradition 
of the Prophet, nothing leads to rejecting such an opinion. We can even find 
substantial arguments in favour of this idea in those same sources, though we 
also recognise it as an exaggerated position.
10. The thesis that the state founded by the Prophet represents a fundamental 
entity, well integrated into the prophetic mission – indeed a fulfilment of it 
– appears to find general favour with Muslims. It is implicit in their habits of 
thought and action, and is corroborated in their principles and doctrines. It is 
clear that rational acceptability of this thesis requires us to show that the Prophet’s 
obligation was to put his message into practice after he had conveyed it – that he 
was responsible both for the transmission and the implementation of his message.
11. It is noteworthy that the scholars who have investigated the significance 
of the Prophet’s mission, and whose works we have had the opportunity to 
consider, have omitted to mention the implementation of religious principles 
as a constituent of the prophetic message. The one exception is Ibn Khaldun, 
who held that of all religions, Islam alone links the religious message with action 
designed to put it into practice. He elaborates this point of view in many passages 
in his historical work, Al Muqaddimah. He gives a detailed treatment of it in the 
chapter dealing with the offices of the Pope and Patriarch among Christians, and 
that of a Rabbi among Jews.13 
13 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, ch. 31, “On Dynasties, Royal Authority, Government Ranks”, p. 183.
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From this passage, it is apparent that Ibn Khaldun considers Islam to be 
simultaneously a message, a system of legislation and the implementation of 
this legislation. Among all the religions, Islam is unique in encompassing both 
spiritual and temporal power.
12. In our opinion, this is an unfounded interpretation. It is not justified by 
any authoritative source. Worse still, it is in contradiction to the significance of 
the Prophet’s message. As we have already seen, it is also incompatible with the 
prerequisites of purely religious dispensation. Moreover, were this interpretation 
sound, its proponents would have been confronted with another problem – the 
same problem we anticipated at the beginning of this work, and which has taken 
us to a wholly different line of inquiry.
If it is true that the Prophet instituted a political regime; or if he at least set 
into motion a process leading to such a state of affairs, why should this “state” have 
remained bereft of the paraphernalia typical of any temporal power? Why did 
scholars inquiring into this subject fail to identify the governors of this regime? 
Why was it not possible to know the procedures for the nomination of judges? 
Why did the Prophet not speak to his subjects about government and about 
the rules of popular consultation? Why did he keep the theologians in doubt 
about such an important subject as the system of government that he himself had 
introduced? These and a host of similar questions permeate our minds when we 
consider this topic. As a result, we are obliged to trace the origins of this confu-
sion, uncertainty and inconclusiveness – however we might describe it – which 
seems to pervade the construction of the system of government during the time 
of the Prophet. How could this have happened and what hidden, motivating 
forces might have been at work?
Those who uncritically champion the view that Muhammad both preached a 
new faith and established a new state – maintaining that this “state” as founded 
by the Prophet was organised and administered by virtue of divine inspiration 
– find themselves compelled to also maintain that the regime of the Prophet 
reflected a degree of perfection inaccessible to human reason. When questioned 
regarding the apparent imperfection of the system of control of this “state” and 
the ambiguity of the procedures of governance, they will most likely defend 
themselves by recourse to one of the following arguments.
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13. The author of Takhrīj ad-Dalālāt as-Sama’iyya14 proposes a relatively simple 
solution to this daunting problem; Rifa’a al Tahtawi follows suit. They presume 
that the government during the time of the Prophet was comprised of all the 
necessary components for a state: agents and services, organised systems, clearly 
defined rules and detailed procedures. So much so, that it was felt there was no 
need to revise or improve the system. However, there is no benefit in dwelling 
further on this point after all that we have already discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs on this very matter.
14. An adherent of the above-mentioned view might still argue that there is 
nothing to stop us from accepting that the apparatus of a state was already devel-
oped and firmly established at the time of the Prophet; that it comprised all the 
components of a perfect governmental system, befitting a regime led by an envoy 
of God, a man inspired by God and aided by His angels. If we lack knowledge of 
the details of this organisation, and of the exact, systematic fashion in which it 
was handled, it is only (so it might be argued) because chroniclers and histori-
ographers failed to pass on the relevant information; or because, if they did so, it 
remains, for one or another reason, unknown to us: of knowledge you have been 
granted but little.15
15. A scientific mind will not dismiss this line of reasoning without examining 
it. On the contrary, we should have no qualms in admitting that we are probably 
ignorant of a lot of historical facts about the Prophet. Our ignorance is certainly 
far greater than our knowledge, not only with respect to this simple subject, but 
also regarding a good many other subjects. Scholars must always be prepared to 
admit that there are facts which elude their understanding; and that their duty 
lies, precisely, in striving relentlessly to discover everything still inaccessible to the 
mind and to draw ever newer conclusions. For this is how science survives and 
continues. Our possible ignorance of certain matters should not stop us from 
believing in the truth of the propositions conveyed to us [that which is known to 
us]; from considering these as genuine scientific truths on which we may rely as a 
basis for judgement, or from which we may determine a chain of sources, or even 
draw conclusions, until we find evidence to the contrary.
14 Ali ibn Muhammad Khuza’i, Takhrīj ad-Dalālāt as-Sama’iyya [“Deducing the Prophetic Sayings”, 
1985]. 
15 Qur’an 17.85.
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For all these reasons we accept the possibility that our information about the 
system of rule by the Prophet might be incomplete and that one day we might 
well discover that it was indeed an exemplary system of government. Once again, 
as long as present evidence is not refuted by new data, this possibility need not 
prevent us from wondering about the real origin and significance of the confu-
sion and ambiguity concerning the Prophet’s system of authority which we have 
pointed out.
16. There is yet another way of resolving this issue. Most of what we understand 
today as the functions of a government, of the systems essential to any form of 
organised power, are in fact contingent conventions or artificial accretions by no 
means typical of a nascent, simple state. An authority that is close to nature has 
no place for conventions that are useless to the requirements of a simple human 
life.
When we consider this we see that whatever pertains to the state of the 
Prophet leads to a single observation: that it had none of the essential devices 
which political experts attribute to temporal governments. However, this has 
never been considered a defect. The absence of these devices has never been seen 
as a failing of the system set up at the time, or as a sign of anarchy or malfunction. 
This could be a plausible explanation for the apparent uncertainty that we can 
observe in the Prophet’s state.
17. It is an established fact that the Prophet Muhammad liked simplicity and 
detested all forms of affectation. His entire life, private as well as public, reflects 
the greatest informality. He did not allow any disparities in the regulations he 
imposed over people’s behaviour, whether public or private, or in the rules he 
laid down. His words and behaviour alike proclaim the ideal of simplicity, as can 
be seen in the remark he made to Jabir ibn Abdullah al-Balji: “Be concise in your 
speech,” he urged him, “and when you have conveyed what you have on your 
mind, do not belabour it any more”.16 
He mixed with people without false reserve and his relations with them were 
all marked by a noble simplicity. Apparently, the Prophet loved to joke with his 
friends and would say to them: “There is no distinction between you and me. 
God dislikes those who discriminate between friends.”17 It is said that: “when the 
16 Al Mubarrad, Al-Kāmil [“The Perfect One”, c. 826–98].
17 Ali ibn Burnhan Din al-Halabi, As-Sīra al-Ḥalabīya [c. 1886].
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Messenger of God was in a situation where he had to choose between two things, 
he opted for the simpler alternative, as long as it did not entail committing a 
sin.”18 In his advice to Abu Musa al-Ashari and Mu’adh ibn Jabal, cited above, he 
urged them to behave gently rather than aggressively and with reassurance rather 
than intimidation.
Expressing his aversion to all forms of affectation and hypocrisy, the Prophet 
addressed this prayer to God during his last pilgrimage: “Lord, let our pilgrimage 
be an act of piety, free from vanity and pretence.” And God on his part instructed 
him in these words: 
Say: “I ask you no wage for it, nor am I one who dissembles.” 19
While conveying divine decrees, the Prophet would ask the people to follow the 
simplest rules and to avoid dissimilitude. Thus, he said: “Follow what is incum-
bent on you in any particular matter insofar as it lies within your power.” And 
again: “This is a rigorous faith, but do implement it with gentleness.” As the 
Qur’an explicitly says: 
He chose you and did not burden you in religion …20
When we look at the legislation introduced by the Prophet, we will be hard 
put to find a single dispensation which does not boil down to principles of the 
simplest sort. For example, the rules about prayer do not hinge on calculations 
about the position of the sun or the pathways of the stars. The timings of the 
prayers rests rather on perceptible events which anyone may check for themselves 
– for example, the observable trajectory of the sun in the sky. The signal for the 
start of the fasting period or the pilgrimage (or other such rites) is to be found in 
the phases of the moon, which are plain for everyone to see and do not require 
calculations or elaborate observation. The phases of the moon are open to sense 
perception and involve no special procedures or implements. Thus, the start 
of the fast is triggered by simple observation. The relevant hadiths address the 
subject in these terms: “We are an illiterate people … Begin the fast as soon as you 
18 Al-Bukhari, Traditions islamiques [c. 810]. [It will perhaps clarify the meaning of this hadith and its 
relation to the present context by translating it as: “When he had to choose between two things, he 
always opted for the simplest solution, except where it led him to commit a sin.”]
19 Qur’an 38.86.
20 Qur’an 22.78.
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notice the new moon.”21 There was no need, then, to count hours and minutes. 
Everything was anchored rather in sensory perception, uncomplicated by any 
sense of mystery. As the Qur’an says: 
eat and drink until the white streak of dawn can be distinguished from the 
black streak. Then complete your fast until night-time.22 
The Prophet, who was unlearned,* was a messenger to a people without learn -
ing. There were no disparities in his private or public behaviour, or in the rules 
he introduced.
It is to these features that we may attribute the essential character of the polit-
ical system in place at the time of the Prophet. As we have seen, it was a system 
characterised by the greatest simplicity and conformity with the state of nature. 
In contrast, most existing systems of government prove to have developed 
innovations and conventions which we have come to take for granted as if they 
were essential traits, that is, an indispensable basis of political regimes. This is the 
case despite the fact that upon reflection it turns out to be anything but the case.
In sum, what would appear to be ambiguities, improvisations or intrinsic 
inefficiencies in the Prophet’s political order are but proof of the simplicity and 
the unsullied purity of his nature. 
18. If we had to choose between the two positions we have presented here, we 
would no doubt prefer the latter, for it is the closer of the two to the religious 
point of view. However, it does not seem right to hold such a position, for upon 
reflection one could well see that it is not in fact correct or well founded. 
Certainly, in the numerous systems which are introduced by modern govern-
ments, the vast majority of the conventions and innovations which charac-
terise them answer neither to the soundest principles of nature nor to the most 
authentic of instincts. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the majority of the 
institutions that constitute systems of government of recent origin do not entail 
artifices of a redundant kind, nor are they arbitrarily called into being. They are 
 * Abdel Razek takes the word ummi in the sense given to it by mainstream Sunni traditions. He does 
not seem to be aware of more recent interpretations, which take it to refer rather to being non-Jewish 
– the Prophet from the Abrahamic line having no Jewish roots. 
21 Al-Fatḥ al-Bārī fī Sharḥ Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī [“Grant of the Creator”], 1428 is a Sunni commentary by 
Ibn Hajr Asqalani on Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, one of the six major hadith collections.
22 Qur’an 2.187.
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not in contravention of natural propensities. On the contrary, they are essential 
as well as useful. No government with the least claim to civility can afford to do 
without them. 
For instance, we would scarcely see it as an expression of nature, or of a 
rudimentary form of organisation, if a government lacked a budget with which 
to exert control over revenue and expenditure, or if it lacked administrative 
offices designed to monitor internal and external affairs. Yet such expedients 
were wholly unknown at the time of the Prophet and are hardly mentioned by 
him.
Consequently, it would be wrong to seek to account for the omissions we 
might notice in the system of government headed by the Prophet in terms of an 
adherence to the most basic of principles and a rejection of superfluous conven-
tions. Instead, we should explore other possible views in attempting to resolve 
this perplexity.
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Islam: A Message from God rather than 
a System of Government; 
A Religion rather than a State
The Prophet was a messenger from God, not a king – The authority of a divine 
messenger contrasted with the authority of a temporal ruler – The specific excel-
lence of the Prophet – Clarification of terms such as “emperor”, “government” 
and so on – The Qur’an denies that the Prophet was a temporal ruler – Tradi-
tion follows suit – The character of Islam is antithetical to what appear to be 
the hallmarks of a state
1. We have seen that anyone inclined to think that the Prophet united in 
himself the functions of an envoy of God with those of a temporal ruler has 
to reckon with insurmountable obstacles. No sooner than one manages to get 
around a problem in this connection, one is faced by a new, equally daunting 
obstacle. Therefore, there remains only one alternative to consider in the hope 
of finding a clear and logical method capable of skirting all obstacles or insur-
mountable difficulties, and saving us from getting lost in mazes of guesswork 
or insuperable hurdles. This is to acknowledge that Muhammad was strictly a 
Messenger, entrusted with a purely religious mission, uncompromised by any 
desire for kingship or temporal power. This mission cannot in any way be inter-
preted as a campaign in quest of a kingdom in the general sense of this term. 
According to this view, Muhammad was no more and no less than an envoy sent 
by God, in no way different from his brethren-prophets who preceded him. He 
was not a king, nor the founder of an empire, nor someone preaching in favour 
of a kingdom.
This point of view is rather uncommon and perhaps unpalatable to Muslims. 
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It has the advantage, however, of being logical and having solid evidence in its 
favour. 
2. Before we embark on an elucidation of this point of view, we must be on 
guard against the risk of an error if one is not perceptive and one is not cautious. 
The calling of the Prophet presupposes a certain degree of authority or power 
over his people. However, this is not the same as the power or authority that a 
temporal ruler wields over his subjects. Thus, one must remain on guard against 
confusing these two forms of authority or power. The difference between them 
is so great that it could be seen as an opposition. The authority which Moses and 
Jesus exercised over their followers had nothing in common with the authority 
belonging to a king. This remains true for the great majority of prophets.
3. A genuinely religious mission requires a certain perfection of its bearer. Begin-
ning with his appearance: a freedom from physical or mental defects, or anything 
that might make him repulsive to others. Moreover, insofar as he must lead his 
people, he needs to possess a dignity calculated to command their respect, and 
likewise to endear him to the men and women who follow him. Lastly, he must 
enjoy a moral perfection born, first of all, of his character and, secondly, of what 
he inevitably acquires from his relationship with the Almighty. The bearer of a 
prophetic mission must, furthermore, command a social pre-eminence amongst 
his own people. This is indicated in the following hadith: 
God never sends a messenger to a people other than somebody who is one of 
them – the noblest and least vulnerable of them.1
Similarly, a prophet’s mission calls for a forcefulness of character, capable of 
driving his message home and rallying the people around him. For God does not 
ordain affairs idly. If he elects to convey His word through a prophet, His will 
is to see the work accomplished. It is to ensure that it leaves an indelible stamp 
on the destiny of the universe and to carve the truth of existence on the bosom 
of humanity. 
 1 A hadith which is reported by the two great masters, Al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj [821–75], 
as part of a long prophetic tradition: “Thus prophets are selected among the noblest men within their 
people.” See ‘Abd ar-Raḥman ibn ‘Ali ibn ad-Dayba, Taysīr al-Wuṣūl ila Jāmi’ al-Uṣūl min Ḥadīth 
ar-Rusūl [“Facilitating Access to all the Roots of Law (al-Uṣūl) from the Prophetic Accounts”, 
c.  1913].
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“We sent no messenger except to be obeyed, by God’s leave.”2 God does not in 
the least suffer the word of truth to be lost, or to be devoid of influence. Under 
no circumstances would He brook a setback or a humiliation to be visited upon 
His apostles (as the following verses of the Qur’an attest):
Messengers before you were mocked. But those who mocked them were 
overwhelmed by that which they used to mock.3
Say: “Travel the earth and see what was the destiny of liars.”4
God wishes to vindicate the truth with His words, and utterly to uproot the 
unbelievers, in order to vindicate the truth and nullify falsehood, even if the 
wicked shall hate it.5
Our Word has already passed to Our servants the messengers, That they shall 
be granted victory, That Our troops shall prevail.6
We will assuredly come to the aid of Our messengers, and of those who believed 
in this present life, and on the Day when the witnesses rise up, a Day when 
the excuses of the wicked shall be worthless. A curse shall fall upon them and 
an Evil Abode awaits them.7
The status of a prophet necessitates the possession of a power greater than that 
which a temporal ruler wields over his subjects, or that a parent exerts over their 
children. He may have a similar role as that of a political head in the affairs of 
his community. However, this role involves a function which is unique to the 
prophet and which he does not share with anyone else. It is a function that 
enables him to see directly into the hearts of people, to rend asunder their veils 
so as to gain insight into their innermost recesses. The prophet must penetrate 
to his followers’ deepest layers of sensibility, the mainsprings of their sentiments 
of love and hatred that lead them to commit acts of sin or of virtue. He must 
gain access to the hidden patterns of their mind, to its secret nooks and crannies, 
where their innermost fears and preoccupations, the springs of their motives 
and their character are to be found. Without doubt, the Prophet exercises this 
 2 Qur’an 4.64. 
 3 Qur’an 21.41. 
 4 Qur’an 6.11. 
 5 Qur’an 8.7–8. 
 6 Qur’an 37.171–3.  
 7 Qur’an 40.51–2. 
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function outwardly at the level of mass politics. But above all, he also exercises 
it at the level of the type of relations that exist between associates or partners in 
an alliance, a master and a servant, a parent and a child, or the intimate relations 
between a husband and wife that remain unknown to others. The Prophet has 
the outward as well as the inward aspects of things within his sight. He deals with 
relations of body as well as mind, on earth as well as in heaven. He is concerned 
with things of this world as well as the next.
We see, then, that the function of a prophet entails a gift, to an extent more 
than we could imagine, for communion with the hearts of men, and likewise, 
a capacity to mould them in their entirety. Besides, it is worth noting that the 
career of the Prophet Muhammad was distinguished by a number of features 
from that of his predecessors. 
4. Muhammad was elected by God for a summons to humanity at large. By the 
will of God, he was able to convey his message in full. He nursed it until it was 
brought to completion and its virtues were carried to a state of perfection, free 
altogether from confusion or ambiguity. He ensured that the faith was dedicated 
in its entirety to God alone. Such success requires the greatest talent any human 
being can have. It requires the greatest willpower, of the sort conferred by God 
on the most righteous among his chosen apostles; and it requires a divine aid 
commensurate with the immensity and the universal scope of the mission. The 
terms in which the Almighty invokes the Prophet’s mission are all too indicative 
in this regard: 
The bounty of God upon you has been immeasurable.8
… for you are in Our Very Eyes.9
The following hadiths convey the same sense:
“By God! God will never humiliate you.” 
“In God’s name, and without exalting myself [I vouch that] I am the noblest 
of the progeny of Adam.”
It is for this reason, in light of the mission with which the Prophet was charged, 
that his ability was so wide-ranging. His command and authority were absolute. 
 8 Qur’an 4.113. 
 9 Qur’an 52.48. 
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Everything pertaining to government was part of his prerogative. Every form that 
the exercise of authority may take was implicit in his leadership of the community 
of believers. If, as reason suggests – and judging from the record of the apostles 
who came before Muhammad – the form of control by a prophet over the affairs 
of his people must vary with each instance, we can see that he had a claim, more 
than all the others, to the most extensive power over his followers and their 
complete obedience. The sheer potency of his message, the authority invested in 
him by a divine mission and the penetrating impact of his honest preaching led to 
its triumph over error, in accordance with God’s will, and to its perpetual presence 
on earth. Such power is of heavenly provenance; it is conferred by God upon 
one who has been touched by an angel bearing a divine revelation. It belongs to 
the category of sacred power, attributable to prophets alone, containing nothing 
in the nature of imperial suzerainty;* no instance of temporal authority comes 
anywhere near it. It denotes the kind of sovereignty that is inherent in an authentic 
apostleship of God, charged with the delivery of a divine message and not the 
sovereignty of a ruler. It is a religious proclamation and prophetic authority in 
one, totally distinct from the power enjoyed by princes and potentates. 
We must reiterate our warning against the danger of confusing the two types 
of power – one which the prophet holds in his capacity as an envoy of God, the 
other being characteristic of kings and princes.
The power that the prophet exercises over his people is of a spiritual nature. 
It is born of a faith cherished in the heart. Submission to such power is whole-
hearted and carries in its wake submission on the part of the body. By contrast, 
the power of a prince is material. It elicits a submission of the body in which 
there is no involvement of the heart. The former aims at a leadership over men 
in the path of justice and initiation into the Truth. The latter has to do with the 
organisation of the vital requirements of a society and the occupation of land. 
The former aims at the establishment of a religion; the latter serves strictly the 
interests of this world. The former provides religious and spiritual direction; the 
latter is a purely secular enterprise. How far they are from each other! What a 
distance lies between them – between religion, on the one hand, and politics, 
on the other!
5. There is another aspect of this question which deserves attention. There are 
terms that serve as synonyms in a certain context, while in another they carry 
 * The authority of a suzerain (a superior feudal lord).
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different meanings. In our representation of things, there are times when this 
fact gives rise to confusion, differences and controversy. This is precisely the case 
with notions such as monarchy, kingdom, government or caliphate, or the king, 
potentate, leader, prince and so on. 
When we ask whether or not the Prophet was a king, what we are in fact 
seeking to know is whether he had a quality or trait other than what belongs 
to an apostle of God, and hence whether he could in principle be said to have 
been concerned or not with setting up a political entity. In the sense that we 
employ the term “king” (and it is immaterial to us if another equivalent term, 
such as “caliph”, “sultan” or “prince” were to be used instead), it quite simply 
means the holder of a power among people who constitute a political or civic 
unity. Similarly, we understand “government”, “state” or “kingdom”* in the sense 
that political scientists generally attach to these terms.
We do not deny that Islam constitutes a religious union and that, as such, 
Muslims are one community. The Prophet advocated this sense of unity, and 
what is more, he achieved it quite effectively before his death. Of this religious 
union, he was the head, the unparalleled Imam, a leader inspired by the Almighty; 
hence an absolute sovereign whose commandments none could defy and whose 
decisions none was able to oppose. He secured this union by means of the word 
and by means of the sword. God granted him victory over his opponents. He 
accorded to him the assistance of His angels. He enabled him to succeed in his 
cause, which he had cherished, and to deliver the message entrusted by God. 
Consequently, he possessed a power that no king would ever have over his people 
either before or after him. 
The Prophet is more caring of the believers than they are of themselves …10
Who so disobeys God and His Prophet has strayed far in manifest error.11
If one wants to call this spiritual unity a “state”, or to describe the absolute power 
wielded by the Prophet in terms of imperial or caliphal power, and so to charac-
terise the Prophet as king, caliph or sultan, let them be at liberty to do so. They 
are entitled to use what after all are words and therefore do not trouble us. For 
what is most important (as we have already pointed out) is the sense one attaches 
 * These three terms are in English in the original Arabic text.
10 Qur’an 33.6.
11 Qur’an 33.36.
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to these words, the sense that we have outlined above in the clearest possible 
fashion.
What is really essential to determine is whether the Prophet’s sovereignty 
over his people stemmed from his role as the Apostle of God or whether it 
was an imperial phenomenon; whether the occasional display of power in his 
actions points to the presence of a state, or of a spiritual authority; and whether 
the nature of the entity over which he presided was political, or whether it was 
rather a strictly and exclusively religious community. In a word, again, what is 
essential to determine is whether the Prophet was only an apostle of God or both 
a “king” and a Messenger from God. 
6 The text of the glorious Qur’an corroborates this thesis, maintaining that the 
Prophet had no interest whatsoever in political power. Its verses indicate that 
the Prophet’s religious work and preaching remained scrupulously free from 
anything in the nature of temporal power. Thus:
Who so obeys the Messenger thereby obeys God. Who so turns away, We did 
not send you as their overseer.12
Your people called it a lie, though it is the Truth. Say: “I am not your keeper; 
Every account has its closure. And you shall surely know.” 13
Follow what has been revealed to you from your Lord – there is no god but 
He – and turn away from the idolators. Had God willed, they would not 
have worshipped idols. But We did not appoint you their keeper, nor are you 
their guardian.14
Had your Lord willed it, all on earth, every single one, would have believed. 
Will you then compel people to become believers? No soul can believe except 
by God’s leave.15
Say: “O mankind, the Truth has come to you from your Lord. Who so embraces 
guidance, embraces guidance for his own soul’s good; Whoso goes astray, leads 
his own soul astray. Nor am I your guardian.” 16
12 Qur’an 4.80.
13 Qur’an 6.66–7.
14 Qur’an 6.106–7.
15 Qur’an 10.99–100.
16 Qur’an 10.108.
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We sent you not as guardian over them.17
Have you observed him who took his own caprice as his god? Are you to act as 
his warden? 18
We sent down on you the Book for mankind, in truth. Who so follows guidance 
does so for the good of his soul; who so strays in error does so to its detriment. 
You are not their guardian.19
If they turn away, it is not as their guardian that We sent you: yours is but to 
convey the message.20
We know best what they say, And you are not a tyrant ruling over them. So 
remind with the Qur’an whoever fears My threat.21
So remind! For you are but a reminder, You are not their minder. But he 
who turns away and blasphemes, Him God shall torment with the greatest 
of torments.22
We can see that the Qur’an explicitly forbids a view of the Prophet as a custodian 
of men, in charge of their affairs, possessing dominion over them, or for that 
matter a tyrant23 given to coercion. Nor that he was allowed the use of force for 
inducting the people into the faith. A person who shuns any form of control or 
dominion over men can scarcely be regarded as a head in the temporal sense. 
For domination, power or authority – of unlimited scope – is definitive of a 
temporal position of power.
Muhammad is not father of any man among you, but he is the Prophet of God 
and the Seal of Prophets. God has knowledge of all things.24 
17 Qur’an 17.54.
18 Qur’an 25.43.
19 Qur’an 39.41.
20 Qur’an 42.48.
21 Qur’an 50.45.
22 Qur’an 88.21–4.
23 It comes to me that I have read in a book that I can no longer trace back, that al-Jabbar is used as 
synonym for king by some Arabs, which clarifies the expression “Thou art not an al-Jabbar over them” 
[Qur’an 50.45, in some translations]. What I find in reference books is that kings are called Jabra, that 
it was common to say “Al-Jabbar has risen”, referring to the Gemini constellation, since it looked like 
a king sitting on a throne. It was also commonly said “an al-Jabbar arm’s length”, to mean, probably, 
the king’s arm’s length. 
24 Qur’an 33.40.
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The Qur’an is equally clear that Muhammad did not have any claim over his 
people save those stemming from his proclamation of the prophetic message. 
Concomitantly, if he had been a worldly ruler, he would have had corresponding 
rights over his people. Temporal power entails rights, privileges and conse-
quences quite distinct from those pertaining to a prophetic mission. This is 
highlighted in the following verses: 
Say: “I have no power to do myself good or harm save as God wills. Had I 
known the Unseen I would have done myself much good, and no harm would 
have touched me. I am merely a warner, and a herald of good tidings to a 
people who believe.” 25
Are you perhaps about to set aside some of what is being revealed to you, and 
with which your heart feels constricted, because they say: “If only a treasure 
were sent down upon him or an angel would accompany him”?
You are but a warner – and it is God Who is Guardian over all things.26
You are but a warner, and for every people there is a guide.27
Say: “I am but a human being like you, to whom inspiration is sent. Your God 
is in truth One God. Who so hopes to meet his Lord, let him perform deeds of 
righteousness, and associate none with the worship of his Lord.”28
Say: “O people, to you I am but a manifest warner.” 29
“I am merely one who receives inspiration, merely a clear warner.” 30
Say: “I am but a human being like you, to whom inspiration is sent. Your God 
is in truth One God.” 31
The Qur’an emphasises, then, that Muhammad was no more than a messenger, 
succeeding the many who came before him. It makes it equally plain that the 
Prophet’s task was confined to relaying the divine message to humanity; that this 
task was to be pursued to the exclusion of everything else; and that he was not to 
enforce what he was called upon to convey, or to compel the people to abide by 
it. The following verses make this clear:
25 Qur’an 7.188.
26 Qur’an 11.12.
27 Qur’an 13.7.
28 Qur’an 18.110.
29 Qur’an 22.49. 
30 Qur’an 38.70.
31 Qur’an 41.6.
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If you turn away, know that Our Messenger is enjoined only to convey the 
manifest message.32
The Messenger is enjoined only to convey the message, and God knows what 
you reveal and what you conceal.33
Have they not reflected? There is no madness in their companion. He is merely 
the one who delivers a distinct warning.34
Was it so strange to people that We revealed to a man among them: “Warn 
mankind, but give glad tidings to those who believe that they have precedence 
in virtue with their Lord”? 35
Whether We show you part of what We promised them or whether we cause 
you to die, it is your duty to convey the message, but Ours is the accounting.36
Are messengers enjoined to do anything other than deliver a manifest message? 37
If they turn away, yours is only to convey a manifest message.38
We sent you only as a herald of glad tidings, and a warner.39
We made it easy upon your tongue, to give glad tidings to the pious, and to 
warn a people who harbour such malice.40
We did not bring down the Qur’an upon you to make you suffer; rather, it is 
a Remembrance to him who fears God.41
If they turn and go, upon him rests his burden, and upon you your own. If you 
obey Him, you will be guided aright.42
But you We sent only as a herald of glad tidings and a warner.43
I have only been commanded to worship the Lord of this city which God has 
sanctified. To Him all things belong. And I have been commanded to be a 
Muslim, and to recite the Qur’an. 
32 Qur’an 5.92.
33 Qur’an 5.99.
34 Qur’an 7.184.
35 Qur’an 10.2.
36 Qur’an 13.40.
37 Qur’an 16.35.
38 Qur’an 16.82.
39 Qur’an 17.105.
40 Qur’an 19.97.
41 Qur’an 20.1–3.
42 Qur’an 24.54.
43 Qur’an 25.56.
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Who so is guided, is guided merely for his own good. Who so strays into error, 
say: “I am merely a warner.” 44
“If you deny the truth, other nations before you also denied it. The Messenger 
is bound only to deliver the message with total clarity.”45
O Prophet, We have sent you as a witness, a herald of glad tidings and a warner, 
one who calls to God, and a luminous lamp.46
We sent you not but to all of mankind – a herald of glad tidings and a warner. 
But most of mankind has no understanding. 47
“and then reflect. There is no touch of madness in your fellow townsman. He 
is merely a warner to you that great suffering is imminent.”48
You are but a warner. We sent you with the Truth, a herald of glad tidings and 
a warner, and there is no nation but a warner had passed it by.49
They said: “Our Lord knows that we are sent as messengers to you. Ours is only 
to convey a manifest declaration.” 50
Say: “I am but a warner, and there is no god but the One, All-Conquering 
God …” 51
Say: “I am not a novelty among messengers. I know not what is to be done to 
me or you. I merely follow what is revealed to me. I am nothing but a manifest 
warner.” 52
We have sent you as a witness, a bearer of glad tidings and a warner …53
Obey God and obey the Messenger and be on your guard. If you turn away, 
know that Our Messenger is enjoined only to convey the manifest message.54
 For they had said to those who disliked what God had revealed: “We will obey 
you in certain matters only.” And God knows full well their secret thoughts.55
44 Qur’an 27.91–2.
45 Qur’an 29.18. 
46 Qur’an 33.45–6.
47 Qur’an 34.28
48 Qur’an 34.46.
49 Qur’an 35.23–4.
50 Qur’an 36.16–17.
51 Qur’an 38.65.
52 Qur’an 46.9.
53 Qur’an 48.8.
54 Qur’an 5.92.
55 Qur’an 47.26.
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Say: “I pray solely to my Lord, and associate none with Him.”
Say: “I have no power to do you evil or bring you right guidance.”
Say: “None can grant me shelter from God, nor will I ever find, apart from Him, 
any hideout. I merely convey a proclamation from God, and His messages.” 56
7. If we now pass from the Qur’an to the sunna, we shall find even more explicit 
statements and still clearer evidence to this end.
The author of the As-Sīra an-Nabawīya57 mentions an incident where a man 
presented himself to the Prophet with a matter in hand. Finding himself in the 
presence of the Prophet, he was overawed and shook with fear. The Prophet 
said to him, “Be calm, for I am neither a king nor a tyrant. I am but the son of 
a Qurayshi woman who used to partake of salted meat.” It is said in a hadith 
that being given a choice by the angel Israfil between the combined role of a 
prophet and a king, on the one hand, and a prophet and a slave, on the other 
hand, the Prophet turned to Gabriel for advice. Gabriel cast his eyes downwards, 
as if to suggest that humility was the better option. (In another version, Gabriel 
explicitly says so.) Therefore, Muhammad opted for the status of a prophet and 
a worshipper.
This is again a definite sign that the Prophet was not a king, that he did not 
seek to be one and that he did not even harbour such an ambition in the depths 
of his heart. 
One looks in vain to either the Qur’an or the hadith for a simple allusion, 
whether explicit or implicit, which might give succour to the proponents of a 
political interpretation of the Islamic faith. These two sources are the ultimate, 
indisputable reference points in the Islamic faith. They are accessible to everyone. 
Anyone is free to look through them for an argument, or the semblance of an 
argument, in favour of this theory. It will be in vain. Unless we wish to content 
ourselves with suppositions, which in any case can never be a substitute for the 
truth.
8. Islam is a religious predication: a summons to God. It is a system that 
aspires to a reformation of the human condition; to redirect humanity to the 
path leading to God. It is a means to the attainment of everlasting beatitude, 
56 Qur’an 72.20–3.
57 Ahmed Zayni Dahlan, d. 1886. Iktifā’ al-Qanū‘ [“The Satisfaction of Frugality”], Edward Van Dyck: 
Cairo, 1896.
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the reward, promised by God, to the most righteous among His subjects. It is a 
religious union, one that God has willed for all of humanity, encompassing all 
the lands on earth.
It is a holy and pure preaching which calls out to all humanity, regardless of 
the colour of their skin, to hold fast onto the rope of the One God; to become a 
single community, a single fellowship united in the worship of the One God. It 
is a call to the lofty ideal of a universal peace intended to elevate the world to a 
fitting state of perfection and bliss, to the mercy of the Lord in heaven and earth 
and to His good in both worlds. 
This summons to humankind to come together as fellows in faith is in 
keep ing with the principles of reason. It is to be found in the human potential 
for its realisation.
Furthermore, God assures us that this wish for the unification of humankind 
will be granted:
So do not imagine that God shall fail His promise to His messengers …58
God has promised those among you who believed and did righteous deeds to 
make them inherit the earth, as He caused those before them to inherit, and 
to establish their religion on firm foundations – the religion He sanctioned for 
them – and to instil peace of mind following their fear. And let them worship 
Me, and associate nothing with Me. Thereafter, who so disbelieves, these are 
the dissolute.59
It is He Who sent His Messenger with Guidance and the religion of truth, that 
He may exalt it above all religions. Let God suffice as witness.60
Who is more wicked than one who fabricates lies from God while being called 
to Islam? God guides not a people who are wicked.
They mean to put out the light of God with their mouths, but God shall perfect 
His light, even though the unbelievers detest it. It is He Who sent His Messenger 
with Guidance and the religion of truth, to send it victorious over all other 
religions, even if the polytheists detest it.61
It is conceivable that humanity may one day come to be unified within a single 
58 Qur’an 14.47.
59 Qur’an 24.55.
60 Qur’an 48.28.
61 Qur’an 61.7–9.
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religion and so form a single community. By contrast, the hope that the world 
may come under a single government, that it may form a single political order, 
would seem almost alien to human nature. As such, it is probably not intended 
by God.
Nevertheless, such a prospect does fall into the category of secular endeavours, 
having been set by divine grace as an objective for human reason. In this domain, 
individuals have been left free to pursue this endeavour in accordance with their 
own understanding, knowledge and interests, their passions and predilections. 
For, in His infinite wisdom God so wished that people should differ from one 
another:
Had your Lord willed, He would have created mankind a single nation. But 
they continue to differ, save for those to whom God has shown mercy. It is for 
this reason that He created them.62
In order that the growth of civilisation on earth is brought to completion, and 
the design of God realised, God wished that there be competition among people:
Had God not restrained mankind, some by means of others, the earth would 
have become chaotic. But God is gracious towards His creation.63
What this concerns is a principle of worldly life, where the Prophet refused to 
legislate or intervene, saying only, “You are better informed than I am in affairs 
of the temporal realm.”
For it is indeed a principle of temporal life. Besides, we know that this whole 
sphere of life, with everything which it involves and is sought after, does not in the 
eyes of the Almighty call for any particular intervention on His part – nothing, 
that is, which falls outside the scope of God-given attributes of humanity: human 
reason, human sentiments, knowledge and desires. They do not feature, there-
fore, in the commitments and preoccupations of the apostles of God. 
9. We ought not to be misled in this regard by the fact that we do find activi-
ties in the career of the Prophet which appear to be political and which seem 
to indicate an exercise of imperial or stately power. Nevertheless, upon closer 
62 Qur’an 11.118–19. 
63 Qur’an 2.251.
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examination we comprehend that these activities were in fact nothing of the 
sort; rather, they were simply a set of means, among others, employed by the 
Prophet to reaffirm his teachings and reinforce the new faith. 
It is not surprising that the jihad should be one of these means. It is without 
doubt a violent and brutal means, however, what do we know about it after all? 
Is not evil at times an unavoidable means to good? Is not destruction sometimes 
a necessary precursor for constructive accomplishment? 
To those who say that coercion is undesirable we would say that it is a law 
of creation set down by God. The battle between truth and falsehood, between 
right and wrong, will continue till God accomplishes His design in the universe. 
If God bestows His bounties on an arid land, if He makes it fertile and revives 
its verdure, making it blossom into fruit – would all this lose value if some 
obstacle had to be overcome in the process or a building demolished?64
They said, “You have made war!
By the Prophets of God, you were not sent
Neither to kill nor to spill blood
Ignorance, bad dreams and mistake is all this!
You conquered by the sword after you conquered by the pen,
When all noble men came to you spontaneously,
The sword took care of the ignorant and the crowds
Evil, if addressed by the Good, burdens you
But when received by evil, dissipates.
You taught them what they ignored
Including war and its hideous face.”65 
10. The above discussion makes it clear that the Qur’an is not alone in ruling out 
the view that the Prophet, while pursuing his prophetic function, was at the same 
time calling for a state. Nor is the sunna alone in this respect. On the contrary, 
along with these sources, reason itself and everything which is implicit in the 
meaning and the nature of the prophetic mission points us away from this view.
The control that the Prophet exercised over the believers was strictly an exten-
64 Muhammad ‘Abduh, Risālat at-Tawḥīd [“Treatise on the Unity of God”, 1897]. [See Ishaq Musa’ad 
and Kenneth Cragg (trans.), The Theology of Unity, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2004.]
65 Extract from a poem by Ahmad Shawqi [1869–1932]. [In 1927 Shawqi was granted the title “Amir 
al- Sho’araa”, “Prince of Poets”. His anthology of poems Al-Shawqīyyāt [1890–1943] is seen as a major 
contribution to the Arabic literary tradition.]
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sion of his prophetic function. It had none of the characteristics of temporal 
power. In all certainty, it was not a government; it was not a state; nor a political 
movement; neither was it the sovereignty of kings and princes.
We hope to have arrived at an answer to the afore-mentioned inquiry 
confirming the absence in the first Islamic community of any manifestations of 
a civil power or the preoccupations of a state. We hope to have shown that there 
was no governmental set-up, no offices of governors or judges and no establish-
ment of administrative departments. In conclusion, we hope that the perplexity 
and confusion which we felt in the past have given way to clarity and peace of 
mind.
Book Three
The Caliphate and the Government 
throughout History
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Religious Unity and the Arab People
Islam is not a religion exclusive to the Arabs – Arabness and religion – The 
simultaneous existence of religious unity and political diversity among Arabs 
– Islamic institutions have a religious rather than political character – The 
rudimentary nature of political differentiation during the time of the Prophet 
– The end of Prophetic authority with the death of the Prophet – The Prophet 
did not appoint a caliph to succeed him – The Shi’a doctrine of the succession 
of Ali ibn Abi Talib – The doctrine of the Jama’a (Sunni) in favour of the 
succession of Abu Bakr 
1. As we know, Islam is a summons to a superior order which God has appointed 
for the whole world – for the east as well as the west, for Arabs and non-Arabs, for 
men and women, the rich and the poor, the literate and the illiterate. By means 
of this faith, God has willed the existence of a spiritual union that embraces all of 
humanity and gathers unto itself all the countries of this earth. Islam was never 
meant to be a uniquely Arab cause. It was not meant to form an Arab entity or 
an Arab religion. Hence, Islam does not recognise any claim to the superiority 
of a single nation over others, or of a language, or of a country or a generation, 
save the superiority conferred by piety. This is true even though the Prophet was 
an Arab, and so had a natural liking for Arabs, whom he acclaimed. And it holds 
true despite that the book revealed by God is in clear Arabic.
2. It was necessary that Islamic teaching should become manifest in this world, 
that it should prevail as an immutable truth among the truths of the universe, 
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and that it should be transmitted to humankind, from the Lord, by a messenger 
chosen for this purpose. In His infinite wisdom and His unfathomable majesty, 
God willed that the man assigned to carry this message should be the offspring 
of Arabian tribes rather than some other race, from among the descendants of 
Ismail – more precisely, from the tribe of the Quraysh and the clan of Banu 
Hashim, namely, Muhammad ibn Abdullah.
The reason for this choice lies in the infinite wisdom of God, which we may 
or may not fathom:
It is your Lord Who creates what He wills, and it is He Who chooses – the 
choice is not theirs. May God be glorified and exalted far above what they 
associate with Him!
Your Lord knows what their breasts conceal and what they openly declare.1
Having been revealed in an Arabic book and through an Arab apostle, the new 
preaching naturally struck roots among the Arabs before spreading to other 
people. It was inevitable that the Arabs should be the first to hear the message, 
to be the bearers of the glad tidings and the warning, to receive the command to 
follow the path of the Lord, and to be among the first flocks whom the Prophet 
gathered onto the true path.
In this way, the Prophet divulged his message first to his close relatives and 
then to the Arabs, his people. Fortified by divine grace, he pursued his mission 
among them until they submitted totally to him. Under the guidance of the 
righteous Messenger, they became the first people to join together in the faith.
3. As is well known, the Arab lands were home to a number of peoples and 
tribes, differing from one another, speaking in different dialects and spread over 
a far-flung region. They also differed in their political organisation: some lived 
under the yoke of Byzantium, while others formed independent entities. As a 
result, there were huge differences in their systems of government, their methods 
of government, their customs and many aspects of their material and economic 
life.
These tribes, who had lived in mutual antagonism, came together under the 
banner of Islam. By the grace of God, they formed a great fellowship whose 
members were joined to one another by religious ties and by their common 
 1 Qur’an 28.68–9.
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acknowledgement of the authority of the Prophet who gathered them in the 
reach of his benevolence and mercy. Thus, they formed a single community 
[umma], obeying the authority of a single head consisting of the person of the 
Prophet. 
This union of the Arabs, achieved during the time of the Prophet, was not 
– from whichever point of view one looks at it – a political union. It had none 
of the characteristics of a state or a government. It was nothing but a religious 
community devoid of any traces of politics. It was a union of faith, of religious 
doctrine, not a political union answering to the requirements of temporal power. 
4. The life of the Prophet clearly illustrates the above. As far as we know the 
Prophet never intervened in the political affairs of the various tribes. He never 
sought to modify their system of government or to influence their administra-
tive or judicial organisation. Neither did he try to intervene in the prevailing 
social or economic relations. There is no record of his having ever dismissed a 
governor, nominated a judge, set up a military guard or introduced measures to 
regulate the trade, agriculture or crafts of the people. He left all these matters to 
the people, openly declaring that they were better informed about them than 
he was himself. Each tribe was thus responsible for its particular conditions, 
its political set-up and the regulations, or (in case of an absence thereof ) the 
anarchy under which they lived. What they were bound by was solely, as we have 
seen, the union brought about by Islam and the obligations which stemmed 
from it to honour its principles and its moral regulations. 
It may be said that the principles and the moral rules and regulations 
advocated by the Prophet constitute a rather large number, governing as they do 
the elements of the majority of aspects of national life; encompassing such diverse 
areas or activities as a system of punishments, the organisation of an army, the 
conduct of jihad, transactions of trade, credit, mortgage; furthermore, including 
the principles of good conduct in a whole variety of situations, such as one’s 
manner of sitting, walking, talking and so forth. One might well conclude that 
whoever it was that brought the Arabs together on the basis of such numerous 
rules designed to standardise their behaviour, their laws and their customs to the 
level required by Islam would in the process have unified their common way of 
life, and so necessarily created a unified state. The Prophet, then, would have to 
be viewed as the inspiration for and a ruler over just such a state.
However, a thorough examination of this notion illustrates that the whole set 
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of legislation introduced by Islam, which the Prophet instructed the Muslims 
to follow, does not in the least resemble the sort of regulations enforced by a 
political authority or put in place in a temporal state. Moreover, these regula-
tions taken in their totality do not make up even a limited part of the regulations 
and the legislative apparatus required by any temporal state. 
In reality every principle of faith, every regulation that was introduced by the 
religion of Islam, including the rules of public morality and their accompanying 
set of sanctions, belongs to a purely religious sphere of legislation dedicated to 
God and to the search for salvation in the hereafter. Whether or not this religious 
goal is obvious, and whether it is effective in the sphere of worldly life, are not 
considerations that play an important role in the development of a religious 
legislation, or the mind of a Messenger.
The Arabs, even after being united under the law of Islam, maintained the 
diversity which we have already noted in their political sphere and in other areas 
of their civic life, social as well as economic. That is to say, that they constituted 
diverse, separate nations insofar as the conditions of those times permitted the 
realisation of such things as nations and governments.
This was the situation of the Arabs at the death of the Prophet: a religious 
union overseeing a diversity of nations, differing almost completely from one 
another. This is an established, indisputable fact.
5. One may suspect that this diversity that we have observed to exist during the 
time of the Prophet has remained unnoticed; that the impression of homoge-
neity with which historians have sought to depict this time has misled us. We 
most appreciate, to start with, that history is full of mistakes. How many a time 
has history been in error! How often has it led people astray!
In addition, we must remember that the diversities and animosities that were 
prevalent among the Arabs were to a large extent mitigated by the bonds of 
affection by which they were bound to Islam. This was a consequence of having 
been brought together under the banner of a common faith and having been led 
to adopt common customs and institutions.
A third factor to be taken into account is the result, mentioned earlier, of the 
spiritual leadership of the Prophet. It is not surprising to note that the differ-
ences among the Arab people were mitigated and their outward signs made to 
disappear, that the violence of the people was moderated and its intensity dimin-
ished. As the Qur’an declares:
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Remember God’s bounties upon you, when you were enemies to one another, 
and how He brought harmony to your hearts so that, by His blessing, you 
became brothers. You had once been on the edge of a precipice of fire, and He 
saved you from it.2
Nevertheless, the Arabs continued to exist as different communities and formed 
separate political units. This situation was only natural. Its extent may have 
diminished, but it was in no way abolished.
No sooner had the Prophet died than the springs of difference and diver-
gence among Arabs were powerfully reactivated. Every community rediscovered 
a sense of its separate identity and independent existence. The union realised at 
the time of the Prophet was now on the verge of dissolution. “The majority of 
the Arabs lapsed into apostasy at this time save for the inhabitants of Medina, 
Mecca and Taif.”3 
6. As we have seen, the unity of the Arab state was none other than the unity 
of the Islamic faith. It was not a political union. The leadership of the Prophet 
was of a spiritual and religious character rather than a temporal one. The submis-
sion to him by the Arab peoples was an act of faith. It stemmed from a religious 
conviction, not a political allegiance or recognition of the kind of authority 
typical of a government. The Arabs gathered themselves around him as an act 
of love for God, an act that earned them the favour of the divine revelation, the 
opening of the heavens and the commandments and prescriptions of the Lord. 
As the Qur’an says: 
God did the believers a favour when He sent among them a Messenger, of their 
number, reciting to them His verses, purifying them and teaching them the 
Book and the Wisdom …4
This, then, was the kind of role of leadership occupied by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd 
Allah ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi. It was not a status attained 
by him in his own right, nor on account of his parentage. It owed itself solely to 
his being an apostle of God.
 2 Qur’an 3.103.
 3 Abu al-Fida, Tārīkh Abi al-Fidā’ [“The History of Abu al-Fida”], vol. 1.
 4 Qur’an 3.164.
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Your companion has not veered from the truth, nor is he misguided.
Nor is he giving voice to his fancies.5
The Prophet conversed with God via His angels. As he was the “Seal of Prophets”,6 
none could exercise the religious role he had discharged after his death. None 
could inherit his mission; no one could succeed him. The mission of the apostle 
of God was not something that could be passed on. It was not something that 
could be bequeathed or delegated.
7. Thus, the Prophet died without appointing a successor – or someone who 
might discharge the function he had performed in the community. In other 
words, he did not make a single allusion in his whole life to the prospect of an 
Islamic or Arab state.
We can be certain – God preserve us from believing to the contrary – that 
the Prophet did not depart from the world without having delivered the entire 
message of God and having expounded to his community the entire set of 
principles of the new religion in a manner calculated to prevent any confusion or 
ambiguity. If the establishment of a state had indeed been part of his appointed 
purpose, how could he have left it so vague that the Muslims, finding themselves 
completely in the dark [after his death], fell to killing one another? Why did he 
not address the problem of succession or the head of state when holders of power 
always and everywhere regard it as a duty to settle this question as a matter of 
priority? How could he have left his people in such utter confusion as that which 
swept over them and instantly plunged them into the most vicious violence even 
before they could see his body to the grave?
8. We know that the Shi’a are unanimous in holding that the Prophet desig-
nated ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib to succeed him as the Caliph of the Muslims. We will 
not discuss this doctrine here as it has little historical authenticity.*
According to Ibn Khaldun, “the texts that [the Shi’a] cite and interpret in 
line with their doctrines are as unknown to the masters of the Sunna as to the 
 * The author is expressing here, in crude terms, a view which is shared by traditional Sunni clerics as 
part of their polemics against their Shi’a colleagues. The strategy here, as is often the case, is outright 
dismissal of all narratives other than one’s own, thus avoiding any real examination of the narra-
tive. This is clearly shown by the passage Abdel Razek quotes from Ibn Khaldun in the following 
paragraph.
 5 Qur’an 53.2–3.
 6 Qur’an 33.40.
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transmitters of the law. The bulk of the texts may well be forged or have been 
unreliably transmitted, or susceptible to a different interpretation from that to 
be found in their misguided approach to the matter.”
9. The Zahiri Imam ibn Hazm aligned himself to a school of thought which had 
little following, to the effect that the Prophet expressly appointed Abu Bakr as 
the leader of the Muslim community after his death. This was supported [in his 
view] by the fact that the majority of the Muhajirun and the Ansar called Abu 
Bakr the Caliph of the Prophet, a term implying an act of designation by a prede-
cessor and not simply a succession without prior indication – a usage which, we 
might add, is not accepted by everyone as linguistically correct. He advances an 
extremely long argument in favour of this view. 
The above opinion seems to us extravagant and unjustified. We have 
consulted available works of philology and found nothing in them in support of 
Ibn Hazm’s thesis. On the contrary, we observe the commonly agreed account 
of the differences over the nomination of Abu Bakr that broke out among his 
companions, together with the abstention of several important men among 
them. We also have the address of Umar-al-Khatab reiterating his remark on the 
day of the Prophet’s death: 
O brothers, yesterday I told you something which was nothing more than 
a mere personal opinion. It was not from the Book of God, nor was it 
something that the Prophet confided in me. It was simply that I had assumed 
the Prophet would reign over us until the last person among us was dead. 
God has now left among us His holy Book, by means of which He guided 
His apostle onto the right path. If you hold fast to the prescriptions of the 
Book, you will be led along the same path. God has gathered you around 
the best among you, he who is the friend of the Prophet, his companion in 
the cave. Give your allegiance to him!7
This statement, to which we could add others, proves that the thesis according 
to which the Prophet made provisions for his succession has no basis. It is an 
 7 When the Prophet died, Umar ibn al-Khattab rose among the people and declared: “Some hypocrites 
pretend that the Messenger of God has died, although, by God, the Messenger has not died! But he 
has gone to God, as Moses did once and stayed away from his people for forty nights before returning, 
when it was said that he had died. By God, the Messenger will come back and will cut the hands and 
feet of those who pretend that he died.” Quoted by Tabari [Persian historian Muhammad ibn Jarir 
al-Tabari, 838–923. His most well-known work is Tafsir al-Tabari, 897, a commentary on the Qur’an].
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indisputable fact that he gave no indication as to the form the government of 
Muslims ought to take after his death. He did not propose any rules in this 
regard to which the Muslims could refer.*
He did not return to the Eternal except when the faith had achieved perfec-
tion and its merits had been realised. The teachings of Islam shaped the truth 
of the world once and for all. It was then that the Prophet breathed his last. It 
was then that his mission was accomplished. It was then that the link between 
heaven and earth that he represented was severed forever.
 * This is again a statement of the Sunni school of interpretation.
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The Arab State
Authority after the time of the Prophet is necessarily political – The influence 
of Islam on Arabs – The birth of the Arab state – Differences among the Arabs 
on the question of allegiance
1. We have emphasised that the authority of the Prophet had a spiritual basis. 
It stemmed solely from his function as the Messenger. This function was 
completed with his death. With the demise of the Prophet, the type of authority 
that he had hereto exercised came to an end. Therefore, as there was no one who 
could succeed him in that position, no one was entitled to inherit his prophetic 
function.
If it became essential to institute leadership among the followers of the 
Prophet after his death, this had to be a new type of leadership, bearing no 
relation to the type of authority the Prophet had exercised. 
It is only reasonable, and as one might expect, as well as in line with evidence, 
that there could be no religious authority after the Prophet. It is equally under-
standable that an authority of a new type, sharing nothing with the function of 
transmitting the divine message, and having no foundation in religion, should 
appear after him. This would have to be a secular power. Being secular, this 
was bound to be no more and no less than a temporal or political rather than a 
religious power. This is in fact what happened. 
2. The Islamic teachings improved the lot of the Arab peoples on a number of 
levels. As soon as the Apostle of Islam called out to the people, they became a 
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united nation, among the best during their time. Like every other nation, they 
prepared to conquer and to colonise.
A pure creed, unsullied by polytheism, a faith established solidly in the 
deepest part of the soul, a morality which the Prophet had raised to the highest 
peak, an intellect in accordance with the soundest nature, a sense of vitality 
accruing from the natural environment, a union under God capable of recon-
ciling extremes and eradicating differences, binding them into a true fraternity 
under God – such was the condition of the Arabs at the death of the Prophet.
A people who had been reborn (for such were the Arabs at that point in 
time), could not suffer to return to their previous way of life after the Prophet, 
that is, to the unenlightened [jahiliyya] state of a primitive people, of tribes at 
war with one another, of political enfeeblement. When God provides the condi-
tions to make a people strong and dominant, then this is exactly what the people 
become. They can do no other than to play their full part, undiminished, in the 
world. It was thus necessary that the Arab state come into existence, like others 
that had done so before it and others that would do so after it.
3. The Arabs were aware that God had granted them the essential conditions for 
the foundation of a state and that preliminary steps towards this end had been 
taken. Perhaps the Arabs had already sensed this before the death of the Prophet. 
Certainly, it was at this time that they began to confer with one another about 
the formation of a state in the political sense – something that had become 
feasible on the basis of the religious entity that was the legacy of the Prophet. 
Every prophet’s work is followed by a monarchy which is built on compul-
sion.1 
Thus, they conferred together at this time about building a state, creating 
a government as an act of original creation. This is why we now find in their 
discourse terms such as “prince”, “principality”, “minister”, “ministry” and so on. 
They spoke of the army, the armaments, the higher ranks, group strength, the 
ability of self-defence, the power of coercion and the capacity to rescue. Such 
discussions were, no doubt, to do with nothing but temporal power and the 
installation of a state. As a result, as it is well known, rivalries began between the 
 1 This means that every prophecy brings as a consequence the emergence of kings who prevail 
themselves of its legitimacy. See Asās al-Balāgha [c. 1100, a classical Arabic dictionary by al-Zamakh-
shari].
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Muhajirun and the Ansar and between the companions of the Prophet. These 
rivalries persisted until allegiance was finally given to Abu Bakr. Hence, the latter 
became the first ruler in the history of Islam.
Upon examining the manner in which allegiance came to be paid to Abu 
Bakr, we can see that this allegiance had very much to do with a temporal or 
political pledge; that it had all the attributes of a newly created state; and that it 
was put into effect in the way that governments are established – that is, on the 
basis of force and coercion. 
The new state created by the Arabs was an Arab state and an Arab power. 
While Islam, as we know, is a religion addressed to all humanity, a religion that 
is neither Arab nor non-Arab.
The Arab state was in fact founded on the basis of a religious predication. No 
doubt, this state provided for the preservation and direction of this preaching. 
Moreover, this newly founded state most likely had a major impact on the course 
taken by this religion. Certainly, the Arab state had a major impact on the evolu-
tion and the transformation of Islam from this time onwards. The fact remains, 
nonetheless, that it was an Arab state, promoting the power of the Arabs, serving 
their interests, enabling them to subjugate other countries on earth, which 
they colonised and exploited in the fullest sense of these words. They were no 
different in this regard from other powers that are able to conquer and colonise.
4. When the early Muslims assembled to choose someone to preside over their 
affairs, they already had a grasp of their new situation. The Ansar proposed to 
the Muhajirun an alternating arrangement of power. “Let us choose a prince 
from among yourselves”, they said. “Then we shall choose one from among 
ourselves.” Abu Bakr replied to them: “The princes must be nominated from 
amongst ourselves. Your party will provide ministers.”
This is clear also from what Abu Sufian said at that time: “By God, I see a 
storm rising that can be settled only in blood. O Abd Manaf clan members, 
why is Abu Bakr involved in our affairs? Where are the two incapables, ‘Ali and 
al-‘Abbas?” After reciting he is said to have addressed ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, saying: 
“Open thy hands, so that I give you my allegiance.” When ‘Ali declined the offer, 
he recited verses by al-Mutalmiss:
Accept the humiliation inflicted upon them only two
Camels and pegs
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The former remains bound in degradation,
The latter is broken and no one feels regret for it!
It is also clear from the fact that Sa’d ibn ‘Ubadah* refused to give allegiance to 
Abu Bakr, saying: “By God, I would rather shower you with my arrows to the last 
one, soak my spear in your blood and hit you with my sword with all my strength. 
I would fight you together with my clan and all those who follow me from my 
people. I will not renounce by the truth of God. Even if the demons and all the 
men allied themselves to support you, I will not join them, and will wait until 
I know the judgement of the Almighty.” After which he stopped praying with 
the community, participating in assemblies and, when in pilgrimage, practicing 
the rituals along with fellow Muslims. He stayed in this state of mind until Abu 
Bakr died.2 
Muslims were aware, by that time, that they were building a temporal govern-
ment. This is why they allowed themselves to disagree over accepting or rejecting 
such a government, since they understood it to be a matter of temporal (worldly) 
interest, not religious creeds. They considered that their divergences did not 
threaten their faith.
Neither Abu Bakr nor any other notable of the time pretended that leader-
ship over Muslims was a religious office, implying that its rejection could amount 
to a rejection of the faith. To the contrary, Abu Bakr said: “O people, I am one of 
you. I do not know whether you will expect from me things that the Messenger 
of God could offer. God in fact has elected Muhammad over all his creation, 
and has protected him from error, while I am merely a follower, not a founder?”
However, numerous facts combined afterwards to confer to the position of 
Abu Bakr a religious character, which led some to imagine that he held a religious 
office by which he substituted for the Prophet. Thus, was born the allegation 
following which the office of ruler over Muslims was a religion function and a 
fulfilment of the Prophet’s role.
One of the reasons for the emergence of such an allegation was the title of 
caliph (deputy) of the Prophet, which was given to Abu Bakr.
 * A leader of the Ansar, the Medinan citizens who helped the Prophet Muhammad and the Muhajirun 
on their arrival to the city. He died around 630.
 2 Mentioned by Tabari.
111
9
The Nature of the Caliphate
The advent of the title, the Caliph of the Prophet – The real meaning of the 
succession to the Prophet assumed by Abu Bakr – The reason for the choice of 
this title – How those who opposed Abu Bakr came to be regarded as apostates 
– Not all the opponents were apostates – On those who refused to pay the zakat 
– The ensuing battles were political rather than religious – The existence of 
real apostates – Abu Bakr’s religious qualities – The propagation of belief in 
the religious character of the function of the caliph – The spread of this belief 
by kings and temporal rulers – Religion does not entail the institution of the 
caliphate 
1. We have not yet established with certainty who devised the title of caliph for 
Abu Bakr. Nevertheless, we have noted that Abu Bakr agreed to be addressed as 
such, hence one could surmise that this implies his approval of the title of caliph 
for himself. We know that he placed this title at the head of the correspondence 
that he addressed via intermediaries to commanders of the Bedouin tribes that 
had turned apostate. These letters probably constitute Abu Bakr’s first writings 
and thus the first documented instance we might have of the use of this title.* 
2. The Prophet was doubtlessly the leader of the Arabs who brought about their 
unification, as we have already discussed. It would seem correct, in the light 
of Arabic linguistic usage, to attribute to Abu Bakr the expression the caliph 
(successor) of the Prophet or simply, in short, the caliph when he became the 
 * Mentioned by Tabari.
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ruler of the Arabs, uniting them in the political sense as we understand it today. 
To do so is only to affirm the meaning of the idea of succession. It is simply to 
say that he came to his position after the Prophet, without imputing any further 
significance to this fact. 
3. It is all too understandable that at a time of grave peril, when there was a resur-
gence of tempestuous passions within a people who had just come out of a state 
of witlessness, and who had not yet shed the tribal spirit of solidarity and the 
rude complexion and violent ways of Bedouin life – that in such circumstances 
Abu Bakr, seeking to found a new state and to re-unify scattered elements of the 
society, should have assumed a title with such splendid and alluring resonance 
and such a powerful appeal so as to succeed in his task. There are those who 
developed an argument from this, concluding that Abu Bakr’s succession of 
the Prophet was a succession in the full sense of the word; that, because he had 
succeeded the Prophet, and because the Prophet was a vicegerent of God, Abu 
Bakr, too, had become the vicegerent of God. They would not have been wrong 
in their reasoning had the idea of succession meant what some people at the time 
took it to mean, but what no one today takes it to mean. For Abu Bakr himself, 
denying this interpretation, said: “I am in no way the vicegerent of God, only 
that of the Prophet.”1
4. The title of caliph led a number of Arabs and Muslims to show to Abu Bakr a 
religious reverence similar to that which they had [shown] towards the Prophet. 
It led them to regard the function of the temporal head that he had discharged in 
the same manner in which they had regarded everything to do with their faith. 
For this reason, the insurrection against Abu Bakr was seen by these individuals 
as a repudiation of the faith – in other words, a form of apostasy. It is likely, in 
our opinion, that the interpretation that consigns those who opposed the power 
of Abu Bakr to the rank of apostates, along with the very expression “the wars of 
apostasy”, has its source in this fact.
5. In fact, it is very likely that those who rose against Abu Bakr were not all 
apostates in the sense of repudiators of belief in God and His Prophet. They 
must have retained their Islamic faith while refusing for some reason to become 
part of the political apparatus headed by Abu Bakr, with neither resentment 
 1 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, p. 180
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at their religious faith nor a vacillation over it or a weakening of it. They were 
certainly not apostates and the war that was waged against them ought not to 
have been waged in the name of religion. If it became necessary to fight them, 
this was for political reasons alone – reasons such as a defence of Arab unity and 
the Arab state.
We know that among those who refused to recognise the authority of Abu 
Bakr, and who were certainly not regarded as apostates, were certain men like Ali 
ibn Abi Talib and Sa’d ibn Ubadah.
6. Similarly, it is likely that among those against whom Abu Bakr waged war 
for their refusal to pay the zakat there were those who had meant through this 
gesture neither to reject the religion nor to commit apostasy. All they intended 
to do was refuse to submit to Abu Bakr’s regime, just as some of the most 
eminent figures in the Muslim community (mentioned above) had done. It was 
but natural that having refused to recognise Abu Bakr as the temporal sovereign, 
having rejected his authority along with that of his government, they should 
refuse to pay zakat to him. 
When we try to reconstruct the facts concerning those who rose against Abu 
Bakr from the mass of historical accounts that we have inherited on this subject, 
the mystifications and iniquities of historical writing come home to us all the 
more powerfully. Those who opposed Abu Bakr have collectively been treated as 
apostates, just as the wars against them have been called wars of apostasy. Never-
theless, a ray of light shines through this mist of mystification and future scholars 
may well follow the lead of this beacon and come to a proper understanding of 
the facts.
In this connection we can examine again the words of Malik ibn Nuwayra 
to Khalid ibn al-Walid. Malik was one of the so-called “apostates” who was 
executed upon the orders of Khalid (and whose skull was subsequently used as a 
prop for a cooking-pot over a camp fire). Malik declared to him, with manifest 
sincerity, that he continued to adhere to Islam, but that he was not prepared to 
pay zakat to Khalid’s master (that is, Abu Bakr).
Thus, the dispute between the two men did not concern religion. It was a 
dispute between Malik, a Muslim who remained loyal to his faith, but who 
belonged to the tribe of Tamim* and Abu Bakr, a member of the tribe of Quraysh 
and the founder, moreover, of an Arab state whose leaders were all Qurayshites. 
 * One of the largest Arab tribes and a sister clan of the Quraysh. Also known as Banu Tamim. 
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It was thus a dispute over the allocation of power. It was not over the principles 
of religion or the fundamental elements of faith.
Moreover, Malik’s self-avowed commitment to Islam is not all that there is to 
it. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab confirmed the fact when he complained to Abu Bakr: 
“Khalid has murdered a Muslim. You must therefore put him to death.” Indeed, 
Abu Bakr, too, bore witness to Malik’s adherence to Islam when he replied: “I 
shall not kill him. For he has interpreted the order wrongly.”2
Let us take another example, namely, of one of the poets alleged to be an 
apostate:3 *
We obeyed the Prophet when he was among us.
O servants of God, what have we to do with Abu Bakr? 
Will we become a legacy [for someone else] when he dies?
By God, its weight will break our backs.
We can see that these remarks indicate nothing but a revolt against Abu Bakr – a 
denunciation of his power and a refusal to give allegiance to him. At the same 
time, they express faith in the Prophet. They do not in any way detract from the 
principles of the Islamic faith.
Does not the history of this period inform us of ‘Umar’s reproach to Abu 
Bakr for having declared war on alleged apostates? Thus, he said: “How can you 
fight these men in these circumstances when the Prophet said, ‘I have received 
the order to fight the people until such time as they realise that there is no god 
but God. The lives and properties of these will be protected, unless the law 
dictates otherwise. This judgement will rest with God.’”**
This is just a small glimpse of truth in the information which reached us, of 
truths that were nearly buried and were forgotten. Research can help find more.
7. We should not hesitate for a moment, therefore, to conclude that in the 
majority of cases the so-called wars of apostasy were against the regime of Abu 
Bakr and bore no religious significance. The conflicts that were involved were 
purely political. The people have since conflated them with wars fought in 
defence of the faith, whereas in fact they were quite devoid of a religious element.
 * Mentioned by Abu al-Fida in his History.
 ** Mentioned by al-Bukhari.
 2 Abu al-Fida, Tārīkh Abi al-Fidā’ [“The History of Abu al-Fida”, 1315–29].
 3 Al-Khalil ibn Aws, brother of A-Hacin ibn Aws. See al-Tabari’s History.
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This is not the place for us to inquire into the real causes of the numerous 
battles that were fought against “apostasy”. We cannot pretend to be in a position, 
were we tempted to undertake such an inquiry, to carry it through. Nevertheless, 
if we paid the utmost attention to the ancestry and the tribal affiliation of those 
who revolted against Abu Bakr, then some of the motivations which were at play 
during the wars of apostasy would become apparent. We would best understand 
these motives if we were to examine the relationships of the apostates with the 
tribe of Quraysh to which the holders of power in question belonged. We would 
need, further, to bear in mind the laws that operate in a nation which is yet in its 
infancy: the spirit of collective solidarity which serves as the road to power, as 
well as the mores and characteristics of the Arab people. If one had the oppor-
tunity to pursue this inquiry in the correct manner, all of these elements would 
have to be closely considered.
8. We readily admit that there were Muslims who did indeed turn to apostasy 
after the death of the Prophet. This was an occurrence that stemmed almost 
from the laws and the system of nature itself. We also admit, all too readily, 
the appearance of false prophets, as much during the lifetime of the Prophet 
as after his death. Experience shows us that pretence to prophecy is an all too 
real temptation for a charlatan capable of seducing the masses and misleading 
friends and admirers. People at large are only too liable to be taken in by a 
misguided charlatan who is skilled at luring people into error and leading them 
down the path of sin. This is why we accept that there was a group of people who 
renounced Islam, at the beginning of Abu Bakr’s reign, for no other reason than 
that the Prophet was dead. It is for the same reason that various false prophets 
must have appeared among the Arab tribes at around this time.
The first act of Abu Bakr, then, was to wage war against the genuine apostates 
and false prophets until they had been defeated and their falsehood destroyed.
Abu Bakr initiated his move against the apostates in the newly constituted 
state by declaring war against them. It was then that the word “apostate” came 
into use. It was a justifiable term at the outset, referring to the true apostates. 
However, it subsequently came to be extended to all the Arab opponents, 
whether they were religious dissenters or political opponents who retained 
their Islamic faith. For this reason the wars waged by Abu Bakr have taken on a 
religious colour in toto. They have been described under the insignia of Islam and 
depicted as having been prosecuted under the banner of the faith. To have rallied 
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around Abu Bakr was regarded as having rallied around Islam, while to have 
rebelled against his authority was seen as an act of apostasy and a sign of iniquity.
9. Another factor that might have helped to sow the seeds of confusion in 
the people, causing them to attach a religious dimension to Abu Bakr’s reign 
in particular, was the personality of al-Siddiq.4 Abu Bakr had enjoyed a place 
of honour with the Prophet, was the object of respectful mention in sermons 
and had acquired a prominent status among Muslims. Besides, he was given to 
emulating the demeanour of the Prophet and following his example in private 
behaviour as well as public deeds. He put all his energies into pursuing his role 
in the way of the faith and in applying, as far as possible, the procedures of the 
Prophet. It is therefore understandable that the place he occupied in the new 
state, of which he was the first ruler, should have been decked in the vestments 
of religion.
10. Thus, we can see that the title of caliph (the successor and vicegerent of the 
Prophet), together with the circumstances in which it was employed – circum-
stances which we have described only in part – were among the sources of the 
misconception, propagated among the ranks of Muslims, that the caliphate was 
a religious function. This led the people (wrongly) to ascribe the rank of the 
Prophet himself to whomever it was who held power over Muslims.
Thus, did the erroneous view gain ground, from the early days of Islam, that 
the caliphate was a religious office and that the caliph was the author, by delega-
tion, of religious law. 
11. It was in the interest of the rulers to propagate this fiction among the 
people. They did so with a view to protecting their throne and suppressing their 
opponents in the name of religion. They were relentless in inculcating this belief 
among the masses through numerous means* – the belief, namely, that obedi-
ence to rulers is tantamount to obedience to God; and rebellion against them, a 
rebellion against God. However, they were not contented even with this. They 
could not acknowledge what Abu Bakr had acknowledged, nor did they share 
his aversion. They turned the ruler into a representative of God on earth, His 
 * Exactly how numerous is something that historians might well have demonstrated had they been 
more willing to examine the facts.
 4 The name by which Abu Bakr was known.
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shadow, extending over His creatures: There is no God but He, glory to Him, far 
about their polytheism!”5
Thereafter the institution of the “caliphate” was included in the religious 
sciences. It was given the same status as the articles of faith. It was studied by 
Muslims in the same breath as the attributes of God and inculcated in the same 
manner as the profession of the faith, that is: “There is no other god beside God, 
and Muhammad is His messenger”. 
Such is the crime committed by despots and such are the consequences of 
their rule. In the name of religion they have misled the Muslims, veiled the roads 
to truth from their eyes and blocked the light of knowledge. In the name of 
religion they have usurped ownership over the Muslims. They have demeaned 
them and forbidden them to reflect on questions to do with politics. They have 
fooled them in the name of religion and set up obstacles, of all sorts, to intellec-
tual activity. They have done all this to the point of depriving them of any frame 
of reference outside religion, even in purely political affairs, and in matters to do 
strictly with government.
These despots have likewise thwarted an understanding of religion and impris-
oned Muslims within the mental boundaries set by them. They have prohibited 
all scientific thought liable to encroach on the domain reserved for the caliphate.
The sum effect of all this has been to kill the vital impulses of intellectual inquiry 
among Muslims. The impulse towards political reflection and  investigation of 
caliphs as well as the institution of the caliphate has been effectively paralysed.
12. In truth, this institution which Muslims generally know as the caliphate has 
nothing to do with religion. It has no more to do with it than the lust for power 
and the exercise of intimidation that has been associated with this institution. 
The caliphate is not among the tenets of the faith – no more so than the judiciary 
or some other governmental function or state position. These exist by dint of 
nothing else but political fiat, with which religion has nothing to do whatsoever, 
which it wants neither to know nor to ignore; which it neither advocates nor 
repudiates. It is a matter which religion has left to humankind, for people to 
organise in accordance with the principles of reason, the experience of nations 
and the rules of politics.
What holds true in this case applies equally to the setting up of Islamic armies, 
the construction of towns and fortifications, the organisation of  government 
 5 Qur’an 9.31.
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– all matters which are of no interest to religion, but pertain rather to reason 
and experience, to rules of engagement in battle, to the art of building and the 
opinions of experts. 
There is not a single principle of the faith that forbids Muslims to co-operate 
with other nations in the total enterprise of the social and political sciences. 
There is no principle that prevents them from dismantling this obsolete system, a 
system which has demeaned and subjugated them, crushing them in its iron grip. 
Nothing stops them from building their state and their system of government on 
the basis of past constructions of human reason, of systems whose sturdiness has 
stood the test of time, which the experience of nations has shown to be effective.
Praise be to God, who guided us onto the right path, and whose guidance was 
indispensable to the progress of this work. And greetings be on Muhammad, His 
Prophet, his companions, and all those who followed his path.
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rary scholars of the Qur’an. 
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Al-Muti‘i, Muhammad Bakhit, c. 1860–1930
Mufti of Egypt from 1914 until 1921, born in Asyut. He served as provincial 
judge in various resorts, as qadi of Alexandria and of Cairo, and in a number of 
other high positions prior to his appointment as mufti of Egypt in 1914. He was a 
member of al-Rabita al-Sharkiyya (“The Oriental League”), but resigned in 1925 
in protest at the efforts of some of its members to bring about the annulment 
of the intended trial of Ali Abdel Razek. In his work Haqīqat al-Islām wa Uṣūl 
al-Ḥukm [“The Truth about Islam and the Foundations of Political Power”] 
1926, Bakhit criticised Abdel Razek’s major essay Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm. 
Bakhit’s work reflects his intellectual involvement with issues of his time, such 
as the status of women, conflict over the translation of the Qur’an and Islam’s 
interaction with Western science and technology. 
Al-Taftazani, Mas‘ud ibn ‘Amr ibn ‘Abdallah (Sa‘ad al-Din Masud ibn Umar ibn 
Abd Allah al-Taftazani), 1322–90
Renowned scholar and author on grammar, rhetoric, theology, logic, law and 
Qur’anic exegesis, born in Taftazan. Al-Taftazani’s fame rests mainly on his 
commentaries, which came to be widely used in teaching at madrasas (Muslim 
institutions of learning and study) until modern times. He wrote a commentary 
of the Qur’an in Persian and translated a volume by the poet Sai’di from Persian 
into Turkish.
Al-Zamakhshari (Mahmud ibn Umar al-Zamakhshari), 1075–1144
Known as Djar Allah, al-Zamakhshari was a scholar who made important 
contributions to grammar, philology and lexicography. His most important 
grammatical work is the Kitāb al-Mufaṣal fīl-Naḥw (ed. J. P. Broch, Christiania: 
Universitas Regiae Fredericianae, 1859, rev. 1879), a compendium on Arabic 
grammar that had considerable influence on Western grammars of Arabic. He is 
also known for his commentary on the Qur’an entitled al-Kashāf.
Ibn Khaldun (Abu Zayd Abdurrahman bin Muhammad bin Khaldun 
 Al-Hadrami), 1332–1406
Arab historian and philosopher born in Tunis. He is the author of The Muqad-
dimah (“Introduction”, 1377), also known as Prolegomena, a history of North 
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African politics in which Ibn Khaldun analysed the rise and fall of dynasties and 
argued that group solidarity was vital to success in power. Ibn Khaldun built a 
career as a political operator, but in 1375, disillusioned, he withdrew into the 
Sahara desert, where he wrote The Muqaddimah in four years. Later he worked 
as a judge in Egypt. Over the past three centuries, Ibn Khaldun has been redis-
covered as a prescient political scientist, philosopher and sociologist.
Rashid Rida (Muhammad Rashid ibn Ali Rida), 1865–1935
Major figure in the modern Sunni reform movement, follower of Muhammad 
Abduh and founder of the journal Al-Manar, which is devoted to the interpreta-
tion of the sources of Muslim belief and practice.
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